Annotated Bibliography: Grande Bretagne / Great Britain: Part Four: Administrative Law texts

(with C. N. Doe).

"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

Article 6 ECHR, Civil Rights and the Enduring Role of the Common Law

This article examines the role that the common law has played in Human Rights Act 1998 case law on the protection of 'civil rights' within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. Focusing on Article 6 ECHR's 'disclosure' and 'full jurisdiction' requirements, it highlights an increasingly nuanced relationship between the ECHR and common law in cases under and outside the Human Rights Act 1998. Although the general pattern within the case law has been one of domestic court fidelity to the ECHR - something that is wholly consistent with section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 - the article notes areas in which the courts have been reluctant to adapt common law principles, as well as instances of common law protections exceeding those available under Article 6 ECHR. The article suggests that such lines of reasoning reveal a robustness within the common law that brings a multi-dimensional quality to the Human Rights Act 1998. It also suggests that such robustness can be analysed with reference to 'common law constitutionalism' and a corresponding imagery of 'dialogue' between the domestic courts and European Court of Human Rights.

Law in Northern Ireland

This is the latest edition of a book which is the standard introductory text for newcomers to the legal system of Northern Ireland. After explaining how law-making has evolved in Northern Ireland, particularly since the partition of Ireland in 1921, the book devotes separate chapters to the current constitutional position of Northern Ireland, to the making of legislation and case law for that jurisdiction, and to the influence of EU and European Convention law. It examines the principles of public law applying in Northern Ireland and outlines the role of some of the public authorities there. It then moves to chapters on criminal law and criminal procedure, followed by chapters on private law and civil procedure. It ends by examining the legal professions, legal education, the legal aid regimes and legal costs. There are also appendices with sample sources of law. Throughout the book, the focus is on conveying in comprehensible terms the essential features of this small, but historically very controversial, legal jurisdiction.

Redefining the outer boundaries of EU Law: the Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci trilogy

In its three recent rulings in the cases of Zambrano, McCarthy, and Dereci, the Court appears to have been determined to redefine the external boundaries of EU law, in cases involving the family reunification rights of Union citizens.These three judgments can be read as an indication that for Article 20 TFEU to apply, there is no longer a requirement of a cross-border element on the facts of the case, and that it is sufficient if the contested national measure has the effect of ‘depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of their rights (the ‘Zambrano principle’).The cases can, at the same time, also be read as a confirmation that the free movement provisions do – still – require a cross-border element and, in particular, the exercise of inter-State movement, in order to apply. Though the result in these cases has not been entirely unexpected, especially in the aftermath of the Rottmann ruling, it is rather problematic in that, although it is obvious that the Court wishes to redraw the line dividing the national and EU spheres of competence, it does not make it entirely clear where this line now lies and leaves many essential questions unanswered, which will obviously require some time to be resolved. EU lawyers are consequently, once more, left with having to decipher as best as they can the real intentions of the Court in this new line of case-law, which has been further complicated by the fact that what the Court seems to have given with one hand in Zambrano (and before that in Rottmann), has taken it back to a large extent through its rulings in McCarthy and Dereci, which appear to confine the former two cases to their own exceptional facts.6 Moreover, the ‘reverse discrimination Pandora’s box’, the opening of which appears to have been the real target of these references, remains untouched: instead of providing a direct solution to this problem, the Court has chosen to – once again – broaden the scope of the Treaty provisions in order to include within it as many situations as possible and, thus, prevent the emergence of this type of differential treatment on a case-by-case basis.As will be explained, nonetheless, this is by no means an appropriate solution to the reverse discrimination conundrum.

Why UK public lawyers need to be legal and political theorists

My aim in this article is to encourage UK public lawyers to engage with contemporary debates in legal, political and constitutional theory. My argument is motivated by three related concerns. First, there is an extricable link between these disciplines: behind every proposition of public law can be found a theory of law, govenment, the state and so on; secondly, public lawyers have historically neglected or fudged theory in their work; finally, a growing number of public lawyers are now using cutting-edge legal and political theories to fashion radical new understandings of the British constitution: other (more conservative-minded) public lawyers have no option, I argue, but to answer these new challenges. I illustrate my argument with reference to debates about Parliamentary sovereignty, the constitutional foundations of judicial review, political constitutionalism, and judicial deference.

The relevance of context in property law: a case for judicial restraint?

A distinction between the domestic and commercial context is commonly drawn in property law discourse and has been brought into focus by three recent House of Lords' decisions. The thesis of this paper is that while the distinction is a useful explanatory tool, it runs into difficulties when given legal effect by the courts. There is a definitional problem in understanding what is included within each context. Indeed, the distinction assumes the existence of a dichotomy when, in fact, the domestic and commercial spheres are better seen as a continuum. In Stack v Dowden, the majority of the House of Lords gave legal effect to context and considered that different rules should apply to determine ownership of the home. This paper locates its decision in the broader debate on judicial restraint and creativity. By analogy with current discussion of due deference in public law, it is suggested that, in light of the policy issues involved and the broader ramifications of the decision, insufficient justification was given for the approach adopted by the majority.