EU support mechanisms to promote public private partnerships for financing Trans-European transport infrastructure

Since the mid 80ies the Trans ‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) policy has been setting the framework for the development of infrastructure for the smooth functioning of the internal market within the European Union (EU). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have always been regarded by the EU as a key instrument to promote the TEN‐T.

Analysis of safety-based incentives in public private partnerships. The case of Spain

OUTLINE: • Introduction • Experimental Setup • Experimental Procedure • Experimental Results - Surface Roughness - Residual Stresses - Friction - Wear - EDX • Conclusions

Analysis of alternative tendering mechanisms for transportation Public-Private Partnerships

This paper describes a theoretical model based primarily on transaction costs, for comparing the various tendering mechanisms used for transportation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. In particular, the model contrasts negotiated procedures with the open procedure, as defined by the current European Union legislation on public tendering. The model includes both ex ante transaction costs (borne during the tendering stage) and ex post transaction costs (such as enforcement costs, re-negotiation costs, and costs arising from litigation between partners), explaining the trade-off between them. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the open procedure implies lower transaction costs ex ante, while the negotiated procedure reduces the probability of the appearance of new contingencies not foreseen in the contract, hence diminishing the expected value of transaction costs ex post. Therefore, the balance between ex ante and ex post transaction costs is the main criterion for deciding whether the open or negotiated procedure would be optimal. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence currently exists only on ex ante transaction costs in transportation infrastructure projects. This evidence has shown a relevant difference between the two procedures as far as ex ante costs are concerned, favouring the open procedure. The model developed in this paper also demonstrates that a larger degree of complexity in a contract does not unequivocally favour the use of a negotiated procedure. Only in those cases dealing with very innovative projects, where important dimensions of the quality of the asset or service are not verifiable, may we observe an advantage in favour of the negotiated procedure. The bottom line is that we find it difficult to justify the employment of negotiated procedures in most transportation PPP contracts, especially in the field of roads. Nevertheless, the field remains open for future empirical work and research on the levels of transaction costs borne ex post in PPP contracts, as well as on the probabilities of such costs appearing under any of the procurement procedures.

Application of Public Private Partnerships to the Spanish Airport System

The current deficit situation of the Spanish airport system suggests the need to manage this in a more efficient and profitable way. One of the possible options is through private management and being able to do this through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This study analyzes the situation of the sector and its economic importance and the different possibilities for introducing private management in a public company, specifying the situation in the case of airports, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of these possibilities, and aiming at results obtained in other places where it has been applied. It is proposed that the ideal model for the introduction of private management would be through PPP models tailored to each airport, but having common characteristics according to the group they belong to. Finally, we observe that not all airports are commercially attractive, so that the PPP concept does not apply to all of them. In some cases even the operability itself is not viable at all, and that should be considered separately in order to avoid creating a private monopoly while trying to enhance competition among them.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.

The role of private sector in development: The relation between public-private investment in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries

Increasing foreign private investment in developing countries explains why the Public-Private Investment (PPI) is becoming a key tool to reach the development goal. This article analyzes the relation between PPI in infrastructure and agricultural exports in developing countries. We use the panel data approach (52 countries and 17 years). Results show that PPI in infrastructure has a positive impact on agricultural exports of developing countries. The impact is greater in developing countries with higher income rates. This suggests that the lower income countries require the intervention of public sector without which private investment cannot help to economic development.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Guidelines for state implementation of ISTEA toll provisions in creating public-private partnerships.

Mode of access: Internet.

A series of designs, for shop fronts, porticoes, and entrances to buildings, public & private /

Mode of access: Internet.

Public private cooperation for better transportation.

"UMTA Technical Assistance Program."

Partnership projects : federal support for public-private housing and development efforts : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives /

"B-236100"--P. 1.

Attitude change and the public-private attitude distinction

In this paper, we highlight the importance of the distinction between public and private attitudes in research on attitude change. First, we clarify the definitions of public and private attitudes by locating the researcher as a potential source of influence. In a test of this definition, we compare participant reports of potentially embarrassing behaviour and the study's importance between participants responding when a researcher has potential access to their reports (public condition), and participants whose reports the researcher has no potential access to (private condition). Participants high in public self-focus or low in defensive self-presentation reported the study to be more important in the public condition than the private condition. Further, participants in the public condition reported less frequency of engaging in embarrassing behaviours than those in the private condition, an effect not moderated by individual differences. We conclude that the public-private distinction is an essential element in attitude change theory.