Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.

Assédio Moral e Sexual nas Relações de trabalho: Os factores que potenciam o assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho e as atitudes das pessoas perante tal fenómeno. Caso Enapor

Esta pesquisa monográfica, ora apresentada, visa analisar e compreender os factores que os funcionários da ENAPOR percepcionam como estando na origem do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, bem como as atitudes dos mesmos perante o fenómeno. Os aspectos apresentados derivam de interpretações feitas durante a investigação sobre a temática em estudo, assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalho, tendo como bases as autoras BARRETO (2000) e FREITAS (2001). Estas são as autoras nas quais pretendemos centralizar, mas, outras abordagens teóricas darão suporte a esta nossa investigação. Pretendemos estudar o tema com base na análise documental, Pesquisas na Internet e aplicação das entrevistas aos directores e outros funcionários de outro escalão. A escolha destas duas autoras como suportes teóricos para esta pesquisa tem a ver, sobretudo, com o facto de elas estarem intrinsecamente relacionadas com os objectivos que norteiam a nossa investigação. Utilizaremos também como suporte teórico as contribuições de outros autores em relação à problemática do assédio moral e sexual nas relações de trabalhos. As mesmas razões apresentadas nos parágrafos anteriores em relação às outras contribuições teóricas dos outros autores também se aplicam de forma específica a este autor. Para uma análise aprofundada desta pesquisa, recorreu-se ao método qualitativa para a análise de resultados, utilizando como instrumentos de recolha dos dados a entrevistas. Esta pesquisa monográfica está estruturada em cinco capítulos: no primeiro capítulo, uma reflexão sobre a definição do objecto de estudo e da metodologia; no segundo, assédio moral e sexual; no terceiro, temos as estratégias, motivos que encoraja a pratica do assédio, as atitudes e as politica de prevenção. No quarto, capítulo procede-se à apresentação, análise e interpretação dos resultados obtidos, por último, as principais conclusões a que se chegou nesta pesquisa e as considerações finais do mesmo.

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.

Lag, moral och rättvisa i rättsskipningen : paneldiskussion

Diskussionsfrågan n:r 5, "Lag, moral och rättvisa i rättsskipningen - vems moral och rättvisa i förhållande till vem?" behandlades den 15 april 1999 i form av en paneldebatt

La licitud de l’interès: evolució històrica d’un tema de moral econòmica

[cat] El problema de la consideració de qualsevol interès com a usura i les formes per a evitar la condemna eclesiàstica foren uns dels principals temes econòmics i morals de l’Europa tradicional. Aquest paper mostra els orígens i fonaments de la doctrina eclesiàstica sobre la usura, l’aparición dels instruments comercials i financers que evitaven la condemna de l’església i les excepcions i noves doctrines que consideraven lícit el benefici procedent del préstec.