Seniority-based pay: is it used as a motivation device?

The purpose of this article is to explain what factors determine the use of seniority-based pay for production workers in Spanish manufacturing industry. The data used in order to achieve these objectives was taken from 774 Spanish industrial plants. The estimation of several ordered probit models enabled us to see that in firms where it was more costly for management to engage in opportunistic behaviour, deferred payment shows a negative relation to the use of devices, like monitoring or incentive payment, designed to align workers’ objectives with those of the company.

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

(When) would i lie to you? comment on? deception: the role of consequences?

This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy?s data cannot reject the hipótesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person?s decisión of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences in behavior between our sub jects and Gneezy?s sub jects.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

I have faith in my thing, you know what I mean? Mixed method elements on individual investments on religious markets.

In contemporary society, religious signification and secular systems mix and influence each other. Holistic conceptions of a world in which man is integrated harmoniously with nature meet representations of a world run by an immanent God. On the market of the various systems, the individual goes from one system to another, following his immediate needs and expectations without necessarily leaving any marks in a meaningful long term system. This article presents the first results of an ongoing research in Switzerland on contemporary religion focusing on (new) paths of socialization of modern that individuals and the various (non-) belief systems that they simultaneously develop

Flying High and Laying Low in the Public and Private Sectors: A Comparison of Pay Differentials for Full-Time Male Employees in Britain

Using new linked employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, full-time male public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector counterparts. Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated with public sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working in higher paid occupations. Further focussing analysis on the highly skilled and unskilled occupations in both sectors, reveals evidence of workplace segregation positively impacting on earnings in the private sector for the highly skilled, and in the public sector for the unskilled. Substantial earnings gaps between the highly skilled and unskilled are found, and the unexplained components in these gaps are very similar regardless of sector.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Effects of Experience, Knowledge and Signals on Willingness to Pay for a Public Good

This paper compares how increases in experience versus increases in knowledge about a public good affect willingness to pay (WTP) for its provision. This is challenging because while consumers are often certain about their previous experiences with a good, they may be uncertain about the accuracy of their knowledge. We therefore design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their WTP for it. Using data for two different public goods, we show qualitative equivalence of the effect of knowledge and experience on valuation for a public good. Surprisingly, though, we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject’s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it: treatment causes an increase of $150-$200 in WTP for well-informed individuals. We find no such effect for less informed subjects. Our results imply that WTP estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

Anatomie chirurgicale du foie: ce qu'il faut savoir [Surgical anatomy of the liver: what you need to know]

A precise knowledge of arterial, portal, hepatic and biliary anatomical variations is mandatory when a liver surgery is planned. However, only certain variations must be searched when a precise intervention is planned. The main liver resection and biliary interventions will be precised. Related anatomical variations will be precised.

General Practitioners' willingness to pay for continuing medical education in a fee-for-service universal coverage health care system

Background: Sponsoring of physicians meetings by life science companies has led to reduced participation fees but might influence physician's prescription practices. A ban on such sponsoring may increase participation fees. We aimed to evaluate factors associated with physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their position on the sponsoring of medical meetings and their opinion on alternative financing options. Methods: An anonymous web-based questionnaire was sent to 447 general practitioners in one state in Switzerland, identified through their affiliation to a medical association. The questionnaire evaluated physicians' willingness to pay for medical meetings, their perception of a bias in prescription practices induced by commercial support, their opinion on the introduction of a binding legislation and alternative financing options, their frequency of exchange with sales representatives and other relevant socioeconomic factors. We built a multivariate predictor logistic regression model to identify determinants of willingness to pay. Results: Of the 115 physicians who responded (response rate 26%), 48% were willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses, 79% disagreed that commercial support introduced a bias in their prescription practices and 61% disagreed that it introduced a bias in their colleagues' prescription practices. Based on the multivariate logistic regression, perception of a bias in peers prescription practices (OR=7.47, 95% CI 1.65-38.18) and group practice structure (OR=4.62, 95% CI 1.34-22.29) were significantly associated with an increase in willingness to pay. Two thirds (76%) of physicians did not support the introduction of a binding legislation and 53% were in favour of creating a general fund administered by an independent body. Conclusion: Our results suggest that almost half of physicians surveyed are willing to pay more than what they currently pay for congresses. Predictors of an increase in physicians' willingness to pay were perception of the influence of bias in peers prescription practices and group practice structure. Most responders did not agree that sponsoring introduced prescribing bias nor did they support the 2 introduction of a binding legislation prohibiting sponsoring but a majority did agree to an independent body that would centrally administer a general fund.

Body dissatisfaction on top of depressive mood among adolescent with severe dysmenorrhea

Purpose: Dysmenorrhea is the leading cause of recurrent short-term school absenteeism among adolescent girls. Yet, studies of menstrual symptoms in the light of adolescent psychological background seldom appear in the recent literature. This study aims to determine whether adolescent girls with severe dysmenorrhea (SD) have different body perception on top of poorer psychological health. Methods: We analyzed data from the Swiss Multicentre Adolescent Survey on Health (SMASH 2002) among a nationally representative sample of adolescents (n = 7548; 3340 females) aged 16 to 20 years attending post-mandatory education. Dysmenorrhea was defined as presence of abdominal or back pain during menstruation on the last 12 months. The severity of dysmenorrhea was defined according to the impact on daily activity and was assessed by 3 questions on the way menstruations interfere with daily life: 1) "You feel well and have normal activities", 2)"you must stay at home" and 3) "you feel restricted in your school or professional activities". Studied variables were: depressive symptoms, suicidal attempt, sexual abuse, health perception in general, body satisfaction, desire to modify body shape, and disordered eating behavior (DEB) with restrictive or bulimic tendency. Controlling variables included socio-economic status (SES) as measured by both parent's level of education, gynecological age (age-age at menarche), academic track (student/apprentice) and age. Results: 12.4% (95% CI: 11.0-14) declared severe dysmenorrhea, 74.2% (95% CI: 71.8-76.5) mild to moderate dysmenorrhea and 13,4% (95% CI: 11.5-15.5) had no dysmenorrhea. Compared to their peers, controlling for confounding variables, subjects with SD were more numerous to report depressive symptoms (AOR: 1.73; 95% CI: 1.39-2.15), to feel in poor health (AOR: 1.44; 95% CI: 1.14-1.81). Moreover, the proportion of those reporting dissatisfaction with their body appearance was higher (AOR: 1.48; 95% CI: 1.00-2.18). Conclusion: Patients with SD not only show a different profile than their peers in terms of their mental health and health perception, but also a distinct relation to their body. Therefore clinicians should pay particular attention to patients with SD and offer them a global evaluation keeping in mind what can be associated with SD.