REMEDIATION OF TETRACYCLINE FROM WATER SOURCES USING VETIVER GRASS (Chrysopogon zizanioides L. Nash) AND TETRACYCLINE-TOLERANT ROOT-ASSOCIATED BACTERIA

Antibiotics are emerging contaminants worldwide. Due to insufficient policy regulations, public awareness, and the constant exposure of the environment to antibiotic sources has created a major environmental concern. Wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) are not equipped to filter-out these compounds before the discharge of the disinfected effluent into water sources (e.g., lakes and streams) and current available technologies are not equipped to remediate these compounds from environmental sources. Hence, the challenge remains to establish a biological system to remove these antibiotics from wastewater. An invitro hydroponic remediation system was developed using vetiver grass (Chrysopogon zizanioides L. Nash) to remediate tetracycline (TC) from water. Comparative metabolomics studies were conducted to investigate the metabolites/pathways associated with tetracycline metabolism in plants and TC-degrading bacteria. The results show that vetiver plants effectively uptake tetracycline from water sources. Vetiver root-associated bacteria recovered during the hydroponic remediation trial were highly tolerant to TC (as high as 600 ppm) and could use TC as a sole carbon and energy source. Growth conditions (pH, temperature, and oxygen requirement) for TC-tolerant bacteria were optimized for higher TC remediation capability from water sources. The plant (roots and shoots) and bacterial species were further characterized for the metabolites produced during the TC degradation process using GC-MS to identify the possible biochemical mechanism involved. Also, the plant root zone was screened for metabolites/enzymes that were secreted during antibiotic degradation and could potentially enhance the degradation process. The root zone was selected for this analysis because this region of the plant has shown a greater capacity for antibiotic degradation compared to the shoot zone. The role of antioxidant enzymes in TC degradation process revealed glutathione-S-transferase (GSTs) as an important group of enzymes in both plant and bacteria potentially involved in TC degradation process. Metabolomics results also suggest potential GST activity in the TC remediation/ transformation process used by plants. This information could be useful in gaining insights for the application of biological remediation systems for the mitigation of antibiotics from waste-water.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.

Ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement in trade credit supply: theory and evidence from China

If payment of goods is easily default, economic transaction may deeply suffer from the risk. This risky environment formed a mechanism that governs how economic transaction is realized, subsequently how trade credit is given. This paper distinguished ex ante bargaining and ex post enforcement, then modeled that bargaining power reduces trade credit ex ante, and ex post enforcement power and cash in hand of buyer can enhances both trade amount and trade credit in a presence of default risk. We modeled this relationship in order to organize findings from previous literature and from our original micro data on detailed transaction in China to consistently understand the mechanism governing trade credit. Then empirically tested a structure from the theoretical prediction with data. Results show that ex post enforcement power of seller mainly determines size of trade credit and trade amount, cash in hand of buyer can substitute with enforcement power; Bargaining power of seller is exercised to reduces trade credit and trade amount for avoiding default risk, but it simultaneously improves enforcement power as well. We found that ex post enforcement power consists of (ex ante) bargaining power on between two parties and intervention from the third party. However, its magnitude is far smaller than the direct impact to reduce trade credit and trade amount.

Effects of soluble humic acids on the uptake of heavy metals by Vetiveria zizanioides (L.) Nash in contaminated mining soils

In the past, mining wastes were left wherever they might lie in the surroundings of the mine area. Unfortunately, inactive and abandoned mines continue to pollute our environment, reason why these sites should be restored with minimum impact. Phytoextraction is an environmental-friendly and cost-effective technology less harmful than traditional methods that uses metal hyperaccumulator or at least tolerant plants to extract heavy metals from polluted soils. One disadvantage of hyperaccumulator species is their slow growth rate and low biomass production. Vetiveria zizanioides (L.) Nash, perennial species adapted to Mediterranean climate has a strong root system which can reach up to 3 m deep, is fast growing, and can survive in sites with high metal levels (Chen et al., 2004). Due to the fact that metals in abandoned mine tailings become strongly bonded to soil solids, humic acids used as chelating agents could increase metal bioavailability (Evangelou et al., 2004; Wilde et al., 2005) and thereby promote higher accumulation in the harvestable parts of the plant. The objective of this study was to examine the performance of humic acid assisted phytoextraction using Vetiveria zizanioides (L.) Nash in heavy metals contaminated soils.

Apontamentos sobre política criminal e a plea bargaining / Walter Fanganiello maierovitch. --

Inclui bibliografia.

Shop collective bargaining: a study of wage determination in the men's garment industry

by Francis Joseph Haas.

The family Caseidae / [by] Everett C. Olson -- [Edited by Edward G. Nash, Patricia M. Williams]

v.17:no.3(1967)

The non-therapsid reptiles of the Lufeng Basin, Yunnan, China / David Jay Simmons -- [Edited by Edward G. Nash]

v.15:no.1(1965)