In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.

Digital goes politics: Einblick in die Schweizer ICT-Verbands und Politiklandschaft

Die Schweizer ICT-Verbands- und Politiklandschaft ist verworren. Der folgende Ueberblick ueber ICT-Verbaende, Lobbying-Organisationen, Politiker und ICT-Themen soll etwas Licht ins Dickicht bringen. Der Artikel hat weder Anspruch auf Vollstaendigkeit noch auf Neutralitaet, versucht aber dennoch einen moeglichst ausgeglichenen Einblick zu schaffen.

The Treatment Action Campaign's First Decade: Success Achieved?

South Africa is known to have the largest HIV epidemic in the world with 5.7 million people currently living with HIV, according to UNAIDS. In light of the crisis, South Africa's Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has led the social movement for increased treatment access for people living with HIV through lobbying the government, multinational pharmaceutical companies, and grassroots campaigning. Since it's founding a decade ago, TAC has been highly acclaimed both regionally and internationally for its success. In order to determine the success of this social movement organization, social movement theories, such as mobilization potential, external political opportunity structure, and framing of the social context of issues will be examined. The assessment of TAC's success will be made based on two outcomes: political outcome and social/cultural outcome. The assessment of TAC's success, using this framework has shown that TAC is a successful social movement organization overall.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending

This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piece-meal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis, using spatial models of legislator preferences, is inconclusive. This paper uses a model of interest group lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific interest groups. In the appropriations process, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that leads to overspending on subsidies. In the budget process, a Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to a binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free rider problem among the groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as each group only obtains a small fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of groups is sufficiently large, each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however, provision of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two extensions: the first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into the model. The second analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In each case,the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to procedural and budget rules.

Mandating the HPV vaccine

Background. HPV is the underlying cause of cervical cancer, a malignant tumor of the female genital tract. Each year, cervical cancer is newly diagnosed in approximately 10,000 women, and over 3,000 women die from the malignancy. In addition, HPV is implicated as a cause of other cancers involving the genital tract, male and female, and the head and neck. ^ Gardasil, a vaccine against HPV, was licensed by the FDA in June 2006. Early study results have shown Gardasil to be safe and effective at preventing HPV infections that are commonly associated with the development of cervical cancer, as well as other HPV-related cancers and genital warts. The vaccine is most effective when administered in childhood, before initial exposure to HPV, which typically occurs shortly after the onset of sexual activity. Accordingly, the CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) has recommended routine vaccination of females aged 11-12 years. ^ Taking the ACIP recommendation one step further, many states have considered school-based mandates of the HPV vaccine in an attempt to reduce the burden of HPV-related illness, in particular to reduce the disparately high incidence of cervical cancer in medically underserved populations. These mandate attempts have sparked heated debate—highlighting public concerns regarding adolescent sexuality, corporate greed, and vaccines in general. ^ Methods. My research focuses on publicly available sources of information such as medical journals, government reports (federal and state), NGO reports, newspapers, and books. I begin with a background discussion of HPV, cervical cancer, and the HPV vaccine. I then discuss public health policy issues related to vaccines, vaccine mandates, and HPV-related illness. Specifically, I discuss the public health benefit of previous vaccine mandates, the legality of vaccine mandates, and the undue corporate influence on the politics of instituting HPV vaccine mandates. In addition, I examine some of the causes behind the anti-vaccine movement and the controversy surrounding adolescent sexuality as it pertains to the HPV vaccine. In the final section, I focus on the recent failed attempt by Governor Rick Perry to mandate the HPV vaccine in Texas. A retrospective analysis of Governor Perry's policy decisions is undertaken and recommendations are made regarding future attempts to mandate the HPV vaccine, or other vaccines under development for similar sexually transmitted viral diseases such as HIV and herpes simplex. ^ Results. In Texas, as in other states across the country, HPV vaccine mandates faced opposition from those who, while they may support mandates of other vaccines, oppose mandates for the HPV vaccine based largely on the idea that HPV is a sexually transmitted disease—they see responsible sexual behavior as the appropriate method for preventing HPV-related illness. A second major group of opposition comes from those who are generally opposed to all vaccine mandates, due to concerns that mandates are intended primarily for the financial benefit of the pharmaceutical industry or due to concerns—largely unfounded—that vaccines pose a greater health threat than the illnesses they are designed to prevent. ^ Conclusion. In order to reduce opposition to vaccine mandates, care must be taken to educate the public regarding the benefits of vaccination by mobilizing the public health sector, avoid the impression that the decision to institute mandates is rash or pressured by allowing time for open debate, and minimize lobbying efforts by vaccine manufacturers. ^

Edna Chavis

As an advocate for the elderly, Edna Chavis has made many improvements for matured people. She worked for the Social Security Administration for eleven years, where she recognized that “older people are the same as anyone else with the same wants and desires.” Since then, she gained educational experience to assist her in understanding the self-concept of older people. She earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Science and a teaching certificate from Eastern Michigan University in 1972, a Master of Science Degree in Adult Education from Tuskegee Institute in 1975, and a PhD Degree in Social Gerontology and Adult Education from the University of Missouri in 1979. Some of her accomplishments include her position as the head of the Missouri Delegates to the White House Conference on Aging and her lobbying efforts toward Missouri’s first Governor’s Conference on Aging. She was also awarded the Lt. Governor’s Nursing Home Task Force Certificate of Appreciation. As an adjunct instructor at Lincoln University, Chavis emphasizes to her students that aging is a natural process. She has had a great impact on her students, several of whom have continued on related career paths. Following her own advice that “Aging successfully is to never sit down and do nothing,” Chavis continues to teach, work as a gerontologist, and serve on committees within the Department of Health and Senior Services.

Petitions to European government authorities related to ice importing,

Three letters and one petition lobbying the English and French governments for exclusive rights to import ice to the West Indies, Jamaica, and Guadeloupe.

Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.

A feigned liberalisation: Russia is restricting Gazprom's monopoly on exports. OSW Commentary No. 121, 26.11.2013

An act restricting Gazprom’s monopoly in Russian gas exports came into effect on 1 December 2013. Previously Gazprom had had a legal guarantee to its monopoly position. The changes are an effect of consultations between various ministries that had been conducted for many months and were affected by lobbying from Novatek and Rosneft (Gazprom’s competitors on the domestic gas market); they need not, though, be seen as system changes. The ‘liberalisation’ they appear to bring in is feigned. Proof of this are found for example in both the limited material scope of the new law (it concerns only exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG) and the small number of the beneficiaries of the new regulations (the new solutions will be beneficial for Novatek and Rosneft). Contrary to initial announcements, the right to export LNG has not been restricted to South-Eastern Asian markets, which means that Russian liquefied natural gas is also likely to be sold to Europe in the coming years. Although these changes have been motivated above all by the individual interests of Gazprom’s competitors, they are also to a certain extent a response to the processes taking place on regional gas markets. They may, therefore, turn out to be beneficial for the state (increasing Russia’s share on the global LNG market and attracting foreign investors to gas extraction projects being implemented in Russia). The new regulations are probably the first step down the long road to breaking Gazprom’s monopoly in gas exports via the pipeline system.

New market conditions and "exit strategies" for the German arms industry. OSW Commentary No. 130, 12.03.2014

Due to changing internal and external conditions, the German arms industry is facing serious challenges as are its counterparts across Europe. The arms sales market in Germany is contracting – orders from the Bundeswehr are slowing down and the Federal Ministry of Defence is planning to change the way it cooperates with German arms producers. In addition, member states of NATO and the EU, major customers of German arms manufacturers, are reducing their defence spending, which will spell a fall in their orders for new armament and military equipment. In response to the new circumstances, the German arms industry is beginning to organise itself and increase its lobbying efforts in Berlin and, with the support of the federal government, it has been implementing specific measures in several areas. German companies are interested in securing new markets outside NATO and the EU and are also exploring opportunities for mergers and joint ventures with other German and foreign companies, and are seeking to create more conducive conditions for business on the EU and NATO markets.

Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap? OSW COMMENTARY No. 154, 2014-12-01

The Eurasian Union (or, to give it its full name, the Eurasian Economic Union, EEU) is Russia's flagship project, by use of which it aims to institutionally subordinate the post-Soviet states to itself using political ties and the projected common economic space. The Kremlin has so far managed to persuade Belarus and Kazakhstan, and tentatively also Armenia, to join this integration project, which on the surface looks like a multilateral initiative but in reality conceals a network of bilateral relations centred on Russia. However, in order for Russia to reconstruct its influence in its neighbourhood permanently and without change, it is of key importance that Ukraine is incorporated into the EEU. That still seemed feasible even in 2013, but the Maidan and the Russian-Ukrainian war have undone this possibility. However, they also opened up an alternative scenario for Russia, one in which the Western states recognise the Eurasian Union as a legitimate partner in discussions about a new order in Europe with a view to restoring peace in Ukraine. It is worth taking into account the strategic consequences of that scenario. We need to consider if the idea which Moscow has been lobbying for – and which has found some supporters in Brussels and Berlin – threatens to take us back to the Cold War system of geopolitical blocs and implies recognition of Russia's dominance over Ukraine and the other Eastern Partnership countries?

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

Russia's position on the events in Kyrgyzstan (April-June 2010). OSW Commentary No. 38, 2010-07-27

Russia was the first state in the world to de facto recognise the regime change in Kyrgyzstan that took place on 7 April 2010. This recognition, along with a previous campaign by the Russian media against the then President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has given rise to suspicion that the events of April were provoked by Russia. However, it seems no more than reasonable to say that Russia provided some inspiration and lobbying in that direction. Russia offered support to the new Kyrgyz government almost immediately, albeit conditionally. Russia’s relations with Roza Otunbayeva’s government have been changing in nature; they are currently much cooler than they had been immediately after the coup. There are many indications that this change was a reaction to the extension of the lease agreement for the American military base in the Manas airport. At the same time, Moscow remains in contact with the political rivals to the current regime, which suggests that the Kremlin is preparing for different developments, and does not regard the current crisis as having been fully resolved. Despite the interim government’s plea for help, Russia refused to undertake military intervention in southern Kyrgyzstan, which plunged into ethnic unrest in June. This shows that Russia is wary of being dragged into a long-standing and bloody conflict in the region, which could entail considerable expenses and jeopardise Russia’s authority. It should be expected that after the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, Russia will return to its plans to establish a second military base in this country (in addition to the Kant base) to reinforce its dominant position in the region. This is the first time that Russia has had a real chance to play a stabilising role in the CIS area. How Russia copes with this challenge may decide its position in post-Soviet Central Asia – and in a wider context, its relations with NATO, the USA and China.