976 resultados para Multiparty computation
Resumo:
Trust and reputation are important factors that influence the success of both traditional transactions in physical social networks and modern e-commerce in virtual Internet environments. It is difficult to define the concept of trust and quantify it because trust has both subjective and objective characteristics at the same time. A well-reported issue with reputation management system in business-to-consumer (BtoC) e-commerce is the “all good reputation” problem. In order to deal with the confusion, a new computational model of reputation is proposed in this paper. The ratings of each customer are set as basic trust score events. In addition, the time series of massive ratings are aggregated to formulate the sellers’ local temporal trust scores by Beta distribution. A logical model of trust and reputation is established based on the analysis of the dynamical relationship between trust and reputation. As for single goods with repeat transactions, an iterative mathematical model of trust and reputation is established with a closed-loop feedback mechanism. Numerical experiments on repeated transactions recorded over a period of 24 months are performed. The experimental results show that the proposed method plays guiding roles for both theoretical research into trust and reputation and the practical design of reputation systems in BtoC e-commerce.
Resumo:
Trust is one of the most important factors that influence the successful application of network service environments, such as e-commerce, wireless sensor networks, and online social networks. Computation models associated with trust and reputation have been paid special attention in both computer societies and service science in recent years. In this paper, a dynamical computation model of reputation for B2C e-commerce is proposed. Firstly, conceptions associated with trust and reputation are introduced, and the mathematical formula of trust for B2C e-commerce is given. Then a dynamical computation model of reputation is further proposed based on the conception of trust and the relationship between trust and reputation. In the proposed model, classical varying processes of reputation of B2C e-commerce are discussed. Furthermore, the iterative trust and reputation computation models are formulated via a set of difference equations based on the closed-loop feedback mechanism. Finally, a group of numerical simulation experiments are performed to illustrate the proposed model of trust and reputation. Experimental results show that the proposed model is effective in simulating the dynamical processes of trust and reputation for B2C e-commerce.
Resumo:
In this work we applied a quantum circuit treatment to describe the nuclear spin relaxation. From the Redfield theory, we obtain a description of the quadrupolar relaxation as a computational process in a spin 3/2 system, through a model in which the environment is comprised by five qubits and three different quantum noise channels. The interaction between the environment and the spin 3/2 nuclei is described by a quantum circuit fully compatible with the Redfield theory of relaxation. Theoretical predictions are compared to experimental data, a short review of quantum channels and relaxation in NMR qubits is also present.
Resumo:
We present a variable time step, fully adaptive in space, hybrid method for the accurate simulation of incompressible two-phase flows in the presence of surface tension in two dimensions. The method is based on the hybrid level set/front-tracking approach proposed in [H. D. Ceniceros and A. M. Roma, J. Comput. Phys., 205, 391400, 2005]. Geometric, interfacial quantities are computed from front-tracking via the immersed-boundary setting while the signed distance (level set) function, which is evaluated fast and to machine precision, is used as a fluid indicator. The surface tension force is obtained by employing the mixed Eulerian/Lagrangian representation introduced in [S. Shin, S. I. Abdel-Khalik, V. Daru and D. Juric, J. Comput. Phys., 203, 493-516, 2005] whose success for greatly reducing parasitic currents has been demonstrated. The use of our accurate fluid indicator together with effective Lagrangian marker control enhance this parasitic current reduction by several orders of magnitude. To resolve accurately and efficiently sharp gradients and salient flow features we employ dynamic, adaptive mesh refinements. This spatial adaption is used in concert with a dynamic control of the distribution of the Lagrangian nodes along the fluid interface and a variable time step, linearly implicit time integration scheme. We present numerical examples designed to test the capabilities and performance of the proposed approach as well as three applications: the long-time evolution of a fluid interface undergoing Rayleigh-Taylor instability, an example of bubble ascending dynamics, and a drop impacting on a free interface whose dynamics we compare with both existing numerical and experimental data.
Resumo:
In this paper a competitive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive externality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent government can improve upon decentralized allocation internalizing the externality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuals' welfare, no• operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters .
Resumo:
How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.
Infrastructure privatization in a neoclassical economy: macroeconomic impact and welfare computation
Resumo:
In this paper a competi tive general equilibrium model is used to investigate the welfare and long run allocation impacts of privatization. There are two types of capital in this model economy, one private and the other initially public ("infrastructure"), and a positive extemality due to the latter is assumed. A benevolent governrnent can improve upon decentralized allocation intemalizing the extemality, but it introduces distortions in the economy through the finance of its investments. It is shown that even making the best case for public action - maximization of individuais' welfare, no operation inefficiency and free supply to society of infrastructure services - privatization is welfare improving for a large set of economies. Hence, arguments against privatization based solely on under-investment are incorrect, as this maybe the optimal action when the financing of public investment are considered. When operation inefficiency is introduced in the public sector, gains from privatization are much higher and positive for most reasonable combinations of parameters.
Resumo:
In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.
Resumo:
This doctoral dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the Brazilian cabinet according to the concepts of a multiparty presidential system. Appointing politicians as ministers is one of the most important coalition-building tools and has been widely used by minority presidents. This dissertation will therefore analyze the high-level Brazilian national bureaucracy between 1995 and 2014. It argues that the ministries – or departments – are not equal, and that allied parties therefore take into account the different characteristics of a ministry when demanding positions as a patronage strategy or for use as other kinds of political assets. After reviewing the literature on the theme, followed by a comparative analysis of the Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, and Guatemalan cabinets, all the Brazilian ministries will be weighed and ranked on a scale that is able to measure their political importance and attractiveness. This rank takes into account variables such as the budgetary power, the ability to spend money according the ministers’ will, the ability to hire new employees, the ministries’ influence over other governmental agents such as companies, agencies, and so on, the ministers’ tenure in office. Finally, a proxy is provided that seeks to identify the normative power a department may hold. All of these characteristics will then be taken into account in considering the representatives’ opinion, thus helping to ascertain whether the cabinet appointment has been coalescent among the several parties that belong to the president’s coalition.