La modernisation de Tunis : un urbanisme et une architecture d’État au miroir d’une anthologie de la percée dans la médina (1881-1987)

Cette thèse traite de quelques moments clés dans l’histoire urbaine et architecturale moderne de la ville de Tunis. Elle les aborde conjointement à la problématique du percement de son noyau historique : la médina, née d’un projet de modernisation urbaine lancé par les beys de Tunis à la fin du XIXe siècle, poursuivi par le protectorat français de 1881 à 1956, puis par le gouvernement indépendant de 1956 à 1987. Partant, la recherche est répartie sur trois temps avec, au centre, le projet de la percée dite de la Casbah adopté par le Président Bourguiba à la fin de 1959. Pour plusieurs raisons, ce moment est cité rapidement dans la littérature malgré son importance dans la compréhension du visage actuel de la capitale tunisienne. Pour le saisir, on a dû retourner aux premières tentatives de percement de la médina de Tunis par le colonisateur français en 1887. Puis, on s’est progressivement approché de l’ancêtre direct de la percée bourguibienne paru sur le Plan directeur de Tunis en 1948. De ce premier temps, on a mis en valeur les stratégies coloniales dans leur gestion du territoire et leur rapport au processus de valorisation/dévalorisation du patrimoine issu de la civilisation arabo-islamique. Le second temps, qui correspond au plan de décolonisation mené par l’État indépendant dès 1955, est marqué par le lancement d’un « concours international ouvert pour une étude d’aménagement de la ville de Tunis » organisé par le Secrétariat d’État aux travaux publics en collaboration avec l’Union internationale des architectes. L’étude de cet événement et du colloque qui l’a suivi a ôté le voile sur ses raisons d’être politico-économiques que dissimulaient les usuels soucis de l’hygiène, de la circulation et de l’embellissement du Grand Tunis. Pour appuyer davantage ces constats, un troisième et dernier temps a été dédié au chantier de Tunis au lendemain du concours. L’accent mis sur les lieux symboliques du pouvoir et le désir obsessif des autorités à se les approprier ont réduit ce chantier à une redistribution concertée des symboles de la souveraineté nationale dans le but de centraliser et de personnifier le pouvoir en place. Le présent travail se situe dans le cadre des études postcoloniales et projette un regard critique sur la décolonisation en rapport avec ce qu’on a taxé d’urbanisme d’État. Propulsé par une certaine perception de la modernité, cet urbanisme est indissociable d’une instrumentalisation politique qui met l’accent sur les questions identitaires et patrimoniales, insiste sur la rupture avec le passé et tend à écarter l’opinion publique des questions inhérentes à l’aménagement du territoire et à la sauvegarde de la mémoire collective. En procédant par une analyse contextuelle de faits historiques et une lecture typomorphologique de la percée de la Casbah, cette recherche attire l’attention sur l’ampleur de certaines décisions gouvernementales concernant l’aménagement de l’espace urbain et la conservation de l’héritage architectural à court, moyen et long termes. Elle renseigne aussi sur le rôle des collectivités, de l’élite et des professionnels dans la canalisation de ces décisions pour ou contre leur droit à la ville.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

An appropriated state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW COMMENTARY 168, 22.04.2015,

From the Introduction. There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).

A captured state? Moldova’s uncertain prospects for modernisation. OSW Commentary No. 168, 22 April 2015

There have been several significant changes on Moldova’s domestic political scene in the wake of the November 2014 parliamentary elections there. Negotiations lasted nearly two months and resulted in the formation of a minority coalition composed of two groupings: the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM). New coalition received unofficial support from the Communist Party (PCRM), which had previously been considered an opposition party. Contrary to their initial announcements, PDLM and PDM did not admit the Liberal Party led by Mihai Ghimpu to power. Moreover, they blocked the nomination for prime minister of the incumbent, Iurie Leancă. Leancă has been perceived by many as an honest politician and a guarantor of reforms. This situation resulted in the political model present in Moldova since 2009 being preserved. In this model the state’s institutions are subordinated to two main oligarch politicians: Vlad Filat (the leader of PLDM) and Vlad Plahotniuc (a billionaire who de facto controls PDM).