An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Host range restrictions of oncogenes: myc genes transform avian but not mammalian cells and mht/raf genes transform mammalian but not avian cells.

The host range of retroviral oncogenes is naturally limited by the host range of the retroviral vector. The question of whether the transforming host range of retroviral oncogenes is also restricted by the host species has not been directly addressed. Here we have tested in avian and murine host species the transforming host range of two retroviral onc genes, myc of avian carcinoma viruses MH2 and MC29 and mht/raf of avian carcinoma virus MH2 and murine sarcoma virus MSV 3611. Virus vector-mediated host restriction was bypassed by recombining viral oncogenes with retroviral vectors that can readily infect the host to be tested. It was found that, despite high expression, transforming function of retroviral myc genes is restricted to avian cells, and that of retroviral mht/raf genes is restricted to murine cells. Since retroviral oncogenes encode the same proteins as certain cellular genes, termed protooncogenes, our data must also be relevant to the oncogene hypothesis of cancer. According to this hypothesis, cancer is caused by mutation of protooncogenes. Because protooncogenes are conserved in evolution and are presumed to have conserved functions, the oncogene hypothesis assumes no host range restriction of transforming function. For example, mutated human proto-myc is postulated to cause Burkitt lymphoma, because avian retroviruses with myc genes cause cancer in birds. But there is no evidence that known mutated protooncogenes can transform human cells. The findings reported here indicate that host range restriction appears to be one of the reasons (in addition to insufficient transcriptional activation) why known, mutated protooncogenes lack transforming function in human cells.

Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry

The crossroads of urban development and improved technology allowing oil and gas development in new areas can result in contentious community issues. The debate over one of the improved technologies – i.e., hydraulic fracturing – can be highly emotional. Consequently, industry must address community issues, earning trust and therefore a “social license to operate.” This paper provides fundamental knowledge of the social license to operate concept, validates its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly with respect to shale gas development, discusses the current status of social license in the unconventional development sphere, analyzes current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a social license, and identifies potential new methods of encouraging, establishing, and monitoring a social license to operate. The paper also proposes a new institutional framework in which to promote the social license to operate, “The Center for Social License to Operate in the Oil & Gas Industry.”

The minimal overlap rule: restrictions on mergers for creditors’ consensus

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial additivity in this context, to be called μ-additivity. We find out that this property, together with two quite compelling axioms, equal treatment of equals and continuity, identify the minimal overlap rule, introduced by O’Neill (Math. Soc. Sci. 2:345–371, 1982).

Pure Business, Law Enforcement or Sheer Politics? The EU’s WTO Complaints against Chinese Export Restrictions on Raw Materials. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2013

In light of the growing international competition among states and globally operating companies for limited natural resources, export restrictions on raw materials have become a popular means for governments to strive for various goals, including industrial development, natural resource conservation and environmental protection. For instance, China as a major supplier of many raw materials has been using its powerful position to both economic and political ends. The European Union (EU), alongside economic heavyweights such as the US, Japan and Mexico, launched two high-profile cases against such export restrictions by China at the WTO in 2009 and 2012. Against this background, this paper analyses the EU’s motivations in the initiation of trade disputes on export restrictions at WTO, particularly focusing on the two cases with China. It argues that the EU's WTO complaints against export restrictions on raw materials are to a large extent motivated by its economic and systemic interests rather than political interests. The EU is more likely to launch a WTO complaint, the stronger the potential and actual impact on its economy, the more ambiguous the WTO rules and the stronger the internal or external lobbying by member states or companies. This argumentation is based on the analysis of pertinent factors such as the economic impact, the ambiguity of WTO law on export restrictions and the pressure by individual member states on the EU as well as the role of joint complaints at the WTO and political considerations influencing the EU’s decision-making process.