Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.

Realist evaluation: an immanent critique

This paper critically analyses realist evaluation, focussing on its primary analytical concepts: mechanisms, contexts, and outcomes. Noting that nursing investigators have had difficulty in operationalizing the concepts of mechanism and context, it is argued that their confusion is at least partially the result of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the realist evaluation model. Problematic issues include the adoption of empiricist and idealist positions, oscillation between determinism and voluntarism, subsumption of agency under structure, and categorical confusion between context and mechanism. In relation to outcomes, it is argued that realist evaluation's adoption of the fact/value distinction prevents it from taking into account the concerns of those affected by interventions. The aim of the paper is to use these immanent critiques of realist evaluation to construct an internally consistent realist approach to evaluation that is more amenable to being operationalized by nursing researchers.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

After the Critique of Rights: For a Radical Democratic Theory and Practice of Human Rights

The critique of human rights has proliferated in critical legal thinking over recent years, making it clear that we can no longer uncritically approach human rights in their liberal form. In this article I assert that after the critique of rights one way human rights may be productively re-engaged in radical politics is by drawing from the radical democratic tradition. Radical democratic thought provides plausible resources to rework the shortcomings of liberal human rights, and allows human rights to be brought within the purview of a wider political project adopting a critical approach to current relations of power. Building upon previous re-engagements with rights using radical democratic thought, I return to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to explore how human rights may be thought as an antagonistic hegemonic activity within a critical relation to power, a concept which is fundamentally futural, and may emerge as one site for work towards radical and plural democracy. I also assert, via Judith Butler's model of cultural translation, that a radical democratic practice of human rights may be advanced which resonates with and builds upon already existing activism, thereby holding possibilities to persuade those who remain sceptical as to radical re-engagements with rights.

Psychotherapy and its alternatives: Commentary on a critique

In this commentary, Michael Rustin reviews the articles in the symposium, outlining their main aims and arguments. He goes on to provide some critical reflections, asking questions about the key concept of the ‘therapeutic state’. He notes that little attention is given to psychoanalytic or other psychological theories of the mind, as distinct from the biological models which are the main object of criticism in the symposium. He argues that just as it is justifiable and useful to take account of theories of the mind in considering issues of mental health and therapy, so it is desirable also to take account of the structures of society which have responsibility for generating conditions of mental well- or ill-being, and to reflect on how these may be changed. The commentary argues that the counter-cultural and somewhat ‘post-modern’ critical approach which informs the symposium can only form part of a sufficient response to the problems which the symposium identifies.

La réception critique des auteurs nés à l'étranger et de leurs oeuvres dans trois périodiques québécois : Voix et images, Lettres Québécoises et Châtelaine (1976-2000)

En 1986, Robert Berrouët-Oriol dénonçait le silence de la critique québécoise envers ce qu'il a appelé les écritures migrantes. Selon lui, on n'octroyait pas à ces textes la place qui leur était due au sein du discours critique. Seule une analyse exhaustive de la réception critique pourrait révéler les mécanismes d'exclusion en vigueur dans le champ littéraire québécois. Tel a été l'objectif de ce mémoire. Le premier chapitre présente une mise en contexte de la réalité vécue par les nouveaux arrivants au Québec. Un panorama des grands enjeux sociaux, politiques et culturels des dernières vingt-cinq années du XXe siècle est proposé. Ce tableau de l'époque se voit complété par un survol des différentes politiques d'intégration mises en place par les gouvernements pour accueillir les immigrants. Enfin, une rapide étude du phénomène des écritures migrantes, inscrites au coeur de la littérature québécoise, clôt ce chapitre. Par la suite, les données sociologiques des auteurs du corpus sont analysées de façon quantitative, afin d'obtenir de ces derniers un profil juste et signifiant. Selon cette même perspective quantitative, nous examinons également les articles colligés dans le but d'y déceler des tendances temporelles et des particularités propres à chacun des périodiques. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à une analyse de la terminologie utilisée par les critiques pour désigner les auteurs nés à l'étranger qui sont traités dans les pages des périodiques sélectionnés. Nous verrons à quels moments et dans quelles circonstances un auteur se voit attribuer une dénomination québécoise ou participant du marquage d'une altérité. Ce mémoire s'achève sur une étude approfondie des thématiques, tout autant celles abordées par les auteurs nés à l'étranger dans leurs ouvrages que relevées par les critiques qui en font la mention.

La qualification et le traitement légal des ressources phytogénétiques au bénéfice de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale durable - Regard critique sur leur gestion

L’agrobiodiversité est le résultat de la domestication, de l’amélioration des caractères génétiques, de la conservation et de l’échange des semences par les agriculteurs depuis la première révolution agricole, il y a près de 10 000 ans. Toutefois, cette diversification agricole s’amenuise, s’érode. Cette érosion touche désormais les espèces végétales majeures. Plusieurs variétés de plantes cultivées sont abandonnées au profit de variétés artificialisées et uniformisées. Suivant une logique plus économique, les ressources génétiques végétales ou phytogénétiques, d’abord qualifiées de patrimoine commun de l’humanité, deviennent rapidement des biens prisés par l’industrie biotechnologique confortant les pays riches en biodiversité, mais économiquement faibles, à subordonner cette richesse au principe de la souveraineté permanente sur les ressources naturelles. Ce principe à la base du droit international a permis aux États hôtes de contrôler l’accès aux ressources biologiques sur leur territoire, mettant ainsi fin au pillage de celles-ci, mais également au libre accès pour tous à la ressource. À l’évidence, la nature hybride des ressources phytogénétiques enclenche un processus complexe d’exclusivismes et de prérogatives. D’une part, ces ressources composent la base de notre alimentation et à ce titre elles intéressent l’humanité entière, d’autre part, elles sont la matière première utilisée par les oligopoles semenciers, une double vocation qui suscite un partage antagonique à plusieurs égards. Cette thèse analyse les perspectives offertes par le droit international public afin de réconcilier ces positions au bénéfice de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale durable, et s’interroge sur le meilleur cadre juridique que le droit international puisse attribuer aux ressources phytogénétiques afin d’améliorer la circulation et la disponibilité des denrées agricoles et alimentaires. À cet effet, l’entrée en vigueur du Traité international sur les ressources phytogénétiques pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture va créer une sorte de système compromissoire conciliant dans un même souffle, l’intérêt général et l’appropriation privative au profit de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale durable : le Système multilatéral d’accès et de partage des avantages. Un dispositif ad hoc exceptionnel qui facilite l’accès à une partie négociée de ces ressources ainsi que le partage juste et équitable des avantages qui découlent de leur utilisation entre tous les usagers. Le Système multilatéral est la clé de voûte du Traité. Par le truchement de ce système, le Traité matérialise un ordre juridique raffiné et complexe qui opère une récursivité des ressources phytogénétiques vers le domaine public international, et par incidence, invite à considérer ces ressources comme des biens communs libres d’accès pour la recherche, l’amélioration et le réensemencement. Outre cette requalification, ce système ouvrira la voie à une nouvelle forme de gestion fiduciaire octroyant des droits et impliquant des responsabilités à l’égard d’un groupe d’usagers particuliers.

Écrire « Du fond de cette attente éparpillée partout dans la foule ». Édition critique de lettres de Gaston Miron (1949-1965)

Engaged Disengagement: Reframing as Feminist Critique in Vanessa Place’s Tragodía

This essay positions Vanessa Place’s Tragodía (2011) as an instance of reframing as contemporary feminist cultural critique. An enquiry into allegory, hermeneutics, and the performative use of indifference in Place’s conceptual writing generates insights into new narrative conditions produced by Place’s work. Tragodía does not represent trauma but rather generates trauma through a poetic practice that has a bipartite structure: conceptual writing (allegory) and Place’s performances of the narratives. Place’s performance is read in this analysis as an ancillary act of reframing that raises the question of what might be at stake in the performative use of indifference. Understood as a strategy of failure, Place’s performance parallels the lack of mediation in the conceptual act of reframing. Positioned counter to the linguistic deformation of the subjects' speech acts and the erasure of affect that occurs in the legal narratives through the act of interpretation, the refusal to interpret implicit in the act of reframing in Tragodía is an ethical gesture, a paratextual pathway to metamorphosis. In its refusal to interpret, Tragodía creates a site of contextual resistance to the oppression of the subjects’ organic narratives by the institutional language of the law, and offers a new textual field of meaning-making.

Towards a Critique of Educative Violence: Walter Benjamin and ‘Second Education’

Although modern systems of mass education are typically defined in their opposition to violence, it has been argued that it is only through an insistent and critical focus upon violence that radical thought can be sustained. This article seeks to take up this challenge in relation to Walter Benjamin’s lesser-known writings on education. Benjamin retained throughout his life a deep suspicion about academic institutions and about the pedagogic, social and economic violence implicated in the idea of cultural transmission. He nonetheless remained committed to the possibility of another kind of revolutionary potential inherent to true education and, when he comes to speak of this in his Critique of Violence, it is remarkable that he describes it as manifesting an educative violence. This article argues that Benjamin’s philosophy works toward a critique of educative violence that results in a distinction between a ‘first’ and ‘second’ kind of education and asks whether destruction might have a positive role to play within pedagogical theories in contrast to current valorisations of creativity and productivity.