The Copenhagen principles on the handling of detainees: implications for the procedural regulation of internment

The Copenhagen Principles on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations were released in October 2012 after a five-year long process involving states and certain organizations. The Principles address a number of issues concerning the handling and transfer of detainees. They apply in military operations conducted by states abroad in the context of non-international armed conflicts and peace operations. This article focuses on those principles that address the procedural regulation of internment (ie preventive, security detention), as it is here that the current law is particularly unclear. On the one hand, the treaty provisions applicable in non-international armed conflicts contain no rules on the procedural regulation of internment, in comparison with the law of international armed conflict. On the other hand, the relevant rules under international human rights law (IHRL) appear derogable in such situations. This article demonstrates that the approach taken to this issue in the Copenhagen Principles is one which essentially draws on the procedural rules applicable to civilian internment in the international armed conflicts. These rules adopt standards that are lower than those under IHRL. Reference is then made to other recent practice, which illustrates that the Copenhagen Principles do not apply in a legal vacuum. In particular, two recent judicial developments highlight the continued relevance of human rights law and domestic law, respectively, in regulating detention operations in the context of international military operations. Compliance with the Copenhagen Principles may not, therefore, be sufficient for detention to be lawful.

Housing or property? The dynamics of housing policy and property principles in the right to buy

This paper examines the interplay and tension between housing law and policy and property law, in the specific context of the right to buy (RTB). It focuses on funding arrangements between the RTB tenant and another party. It first examines how courts determine the parties' respective entitlements in the home, highlighting the difficulty of categorising, under traditional property law principles, a contribution in the form of the statutory discount conferred on the RTB tenant. Secondly, it considers possible exploitation of the RTB scheme, both at the macro level of exploitation of the policy underpinning the legislation and, at the micro level, of exploitation of the tenant. The measures contained in the Housing Act 2004 intended to curb exploitation of the RTB are analysed to determine what can be considered to be legitimate and illegitimate uses of the scheme. It is argued that, despite the government's implicit approval, certain funding arrangements by non-resident relatives fail to give effect to the spirit of the scheme.

Shared authority: courts and legislatures in legal theory

This book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

From legal commons to social commons: Brazil and the cultural industry in the 21st century

This article describes some of the current transformations regarding the processes by which information and culture are generated, from the point of view of developing countries. In this brief analysis, the article discusses the role of projects such as Creative Commons for developing countries. It also discusses the idea of legal commons and social commons. While the idea of legal commons can be understood as the voluntary use of licenses such as Creative Commons in order to create a “commons”, the idea of social commons has to do with the tensions between legality and illegality in developing countries. These tensions appear prominently in the so-called global “peripheries”, and in many instances make the legal structure of intellectual property irrelevant, unfamiliar, or unenforceable, for various reasons. With the emergence of digital technology and the Internet, in many places and regions in developing countries (especially in the “peripheries”), technology ended up arriving earlier than the idea of intellectual property. Such a de facto situation propitiated the emergence of cultural industries that were not driven by intellectual property incentives. In these cultural businesses, the idea of “sharing” and of free dissemination of the content is intrinsic to the social circumstances taking place in these peripheries. Also, the appropriation of technology on the part of the “peripheries” ends up promoting autonomous forms of bridging the digital divide, such as the “LAN house” phenomenon discussed below. This paper proposes that many lessons can be learned from the business models emerging from social commons practices in developing countries. The tension between legality and illegality in “peripheral” areas in developing countries is not new. The work of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and others in the 1970s was paradigmatic for the discussion of legal pluralism regarding the occupation of land in Brazil. This paper aims to follow in that same pioneer tradition of studies about legal pluralism, and to apply those principles to the discussion of “intellectual property” rather than the ownership of land.

Decisão monocrática e agravo interno: lesão ao devido processo legal?

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar os institutos da decisão monocrática e do agravo interno, sob o prisma de metodologia empírica que busca priorizar a realidade pragmática da aplicação do artigo 557 do Código de Processo Civil. Enfocou-se o instituto da decisão monocrática no contexto das minirreformas processuais brasileiras, que tiveram como alicerce o princípio da efetividade processual. Esse princípio pressupõe a duração razoável do processo, garantida na Constituição Federal Brasileira. A partir da constitucionalidade desse princípio, defendeu-se a constitucionalidade do artigo 557 do Código de Processo Civil, que não pode ser considerado abstratamente inconstitucional. Demonstrou-se que a aplicabilidade do artigo 557 pode ser inconstitucional se não atender à técnica da ponderação de valores, que garante a interpretação conforme a Constituição. Analisou-se o agravo interno, sob a premissa do valor da celeridade em cotejo com o devido processo legal, que permeou a subsequente análise do procedimento desta espécie de agravo. Após uma reflexão sobre os institutos da decisão monocrática e do agravo interno, aliada ao exame dos princípios do devido processo legal, ampla defesa, contraditório e motivação das decisões judiciais, passou-se ao exame empírico desses institutos jurídicos. Nessa análise, foram coletados e examinados dados estatísticos, que confirmaram – e, assim, possibilitaram a conclusão da dissertação – a constitucionalidade do artigo 557 e a importância de sua interpretação conforme os referidos princípios constitucionais.

Enforcing international financial standards in Brazil: limits and possibilities for adoption of IOSCO principles

Foreign capital and institutional investors play a key role in the Brazilian capital and financial markets. Internationally promoted regulatory patterns, especially IOSCO principles, have been increasingly influencing administrative rule making by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) as well as the adoption of transnational rules in Brazil by means of self-regulatory activity. Even though there is a certain level of convergence of market regulatory standards at the transnational level, implementation and enforcement of rules remains essentially domestic. We analyze two case studies regarding the transposition of international standards into the Brazilian legal system, which illustrate this tension between the transnational and domestic dimensions of financial markets regulation. The first case concerns a CVM rule on disclosure of executive compensation and the its interpretation by local courts. The second case refers to the adoption of suitability rules.

DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL E PROCESSO ADMINISTRATIVO SANCIONADOR NAS AGÊNCIAS REGULADORAS

This paper discusses the growing attention that, over the last decades, has been given to the administrative procedure in Administrative Law, as it also highlights the procedures which are in tune with the new trappings of this legal field. It focuses on the sanctioning competence of regulatory agencies, notably what concerns the procedural guide that conditions its exercise. It aims at gathering varied elements, many times dispersed over the legal system, so it is possible to list, with a satisfactory degree of detail, the procedural constitutional guidelines which are indispensable to the sanctioning of private entities through punitive action by regulatory agencies. It highlights the due legal process clause, for the abundance of the protective set there is around it, as a guiding constitutional principle for the application of sanctions by regulatory agencies. It examines the repercussion of the constitutional principle of the due legal process on Administrative Law, focusing on the most relevant principles on which the first unfolds itself. It analyzes, in light of the due legal process principle, the sanctioning administrative procedure developed in regulatory agencies. In conclusion, it is asserted that there is no room, in the Brazilian legal system as a whole, for sanctions to be applied summarily; that there reigns, in our system, an absolute presumption, dictated by the Constitution, that only through regular procedures can the best and fairest decision, concerning cases in which the rights of private parties could be affected, be taken by the public administration; that, respecting the principle of the right to a fair hearing, it is indispensable that there be motivation of a decision that imposes a sanction; that there should be, in homage to the principle of full defense and for the need to preserve the autonomy of the regulatory party, an appeal court in every agency; that the principles listed in the federal law No. 9.784/1999 should be mandatorily monitored by the agencies, for this is the only alternative consistent with the Constitution

A Comparative Analysis of Hedging in a Corpus of Two Written Legal Discourse Genres

Esta tesis doctoral, que es la culminación de mis estudios de doctorado impartidos por el Departamento de Lingüística Aplicada a la Ciencia y a la Tecnología de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, aborda el análisis del uso de la matización (hedging) en el lenguaje legal inglés siguiendo los postulados y principios de la análisis crítica de género (Bhatia, 2004) y empleando las herramientas de análisis de córpora WordSmith Tools versión 6 (Scott, 2014). Como refleja el título, el estudio se centra en la descripción y en el análisis contrastivo de las variedades léxico-sintácticas de los matizadores del discurso (hedges) y las estrategias discursivas que con ellos se llevan a cabo, además de las funciones que éstas desempeñan en un corpus de sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de EE. UU., y de artículos jurídicos de investigación americanos, relacionando, en la medida posible, éstas con los rasgos determinantes de los dos géneros, desde una perspectiva socio-cognitiva. El elemento innovador que ofrece es que, a pesar de los numerosos estudios que se han podido realizar sobre los matizadores del discurso en el inglés general (Lakoff, 1973; Hübler, 1983; Clemen, 1997; Markkanen and Schröder, 1997; Mauranen, 1997; Fetzer 2010; y Finnegan, 2010 entre otros) académico (Crompton, 1997; Meyer, 1997; Skelton, 1997; Martín Butragueňo, 2003) científico (Hyland, 1996a, 1996c, 1998c, 2007; Grabe and Kaplan, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1997 Varttala, 2001) médico (Prince, 1982; Salager-Meyer, 1994; Skelton, 1997), y, en menor medida el inglés legal (Toska, 2012), no existe ningún tipo de investigación que vincule los distintos usos de la matización a las características genéricas de las comunicaciones profesionales. Dentro del lenguaje legal, la matización confirma su dependencia tanto de las expectativas a macro-nivel de la comunidad de discurso, como de las intenciones a micro-nivel del escritor de la comunicación, variando en función de los propósitos comunicativos del género ya sean éstos educativos, pedagógicos, interpersonales u operativos. El estudio pone de relieve el uso predominante de los verbos modales epistémicos y de los verbos léxicos como matizadores del discurso, estos últimos divididos en cuatro tipos (Hyland 1998c; Palmer 1986, 1990, 2001) especulativos, citativos, deductivos y sensoriales. La realización léxico-sintáctica del matizador puede señalar una de cuatro estrategias discursivas particulares (Namsaraev, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1994), la indeterminación, la despersonalización, la subjectivisación, o la matización camuflada (camouflage hedging), cuya incidencia y función varia según género. La identificación y cuantificación de los distintos matizadores y estrategias empleados en los diferentes géneros del discurso legal puede tener implicaciones pedagógicos para los estudiantes de derecho no nativos que tienen que demostrar una competencia adecuada en su uso y procesamiento. ABSTRACT This doctoral thesis, which represents the culmination of my doctoral studies undertaken in the Department of Linguistics Applied to Science and Technology of the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, focusses on the analysis of hedging in legal English following the principles of Critical Genre Analysis (Bhatia, 2004), and using WordSmith Tools version 6 (Scott, 2014) corpus analysis tools. As the title suggests, this study centers on the description and contrastive analysis of lexico-grammatical realizations of hedges and the discourse strategies which they can indicate, as well as the functions they can carry out, in a corpus of U.S. Supreme Court opinions and American law review articles. The study relates realization, incidence and function of hedging to the predominant generic characteristics of the two genres from a socio-cognitive perspective. While there have been numerous studies on hedging in general English (Lakoff, 1973; Hübler, 1983; Clemen, 1997; Markkanen and Schröder, 1997; Mauranen, 1997; Fetzer 2010; and Finnegan, 2010 among others) academic English (Crompton, 1997; Meyer, 1997; Skelton, 1997; Martín Butragueňo, 2003) scientific English (Hyland, 1996a, 1996c, 1998c, 2007; Grabe and Kaplan, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1997 Varttala, 2001) medical English (Prince, 1982; Salager-Meyer, 1994; Skelton, 1997), and, to a lesser degree, legal English (Toska, 2012), this study is innovative in that it links the different realizations and functions of hedging to the generic characteristics of a particular professional communication. Within legal English, hedging has been found to depend on not only the macro-level expectations of the discourse community for a specific genre, but also on the micro-level intentions of the author of a communication, varying according to the educational, pedagogical, interpersonal or operative purposes the genre may have. The study highlights the predominance of epistemic modal verbs and lexical verbs as hedges, dividing the latter into four types (Hyland, 1998c; Palmer, 1986, 1990, 2001): speculative, quotative, deductive and sensorial. Lexical-grammatical realizations of hedges can signal one of four discourse strategies (Namsaraev, 1997; Salager-Meyer, 1994), indetermination, depersonalization, subjectivization and camouflage hedging, as well as fulfill a variety of functions. The identification and quantification of the different hedges and hedging strategies and functions in the two genres may have pedagogical implications for non-native law students who must demonstrate adequate competence in the production and interpretation of hedged discourse.

Origen y evolución histórico-legal del club deportivo en la Comunidad de Madrid (1833-1936)

Cuando se inició el trabajo para obtener el título de doctora, el proyecto era acerca de la financiación público privada de los clubes deportivos madrileños. El punto uno de ese primer índice, versaba sobre el origen del club deportivo en la Comunidad de Madrid (en este sentido, es preciso tener en cuenta que el territorio sufrió modificaciones, lo que antes eran pueblos hoy son distritos y lo que antes era provincia hoy es Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid, nuestro ámbito territorial de estudio). Al leer la doctrina autorizada que coincidía en su totalidad en que los primeros clubes deportivos fueron de origen inglés (el Recreativo de Huelva en el año1889 era considerado el primer club de España) y recordar dudas e inquietudes al respecto que surgieron durante la licenciatura, la investigación se tornó incómoda, por no decir temeraria. ¿Por qué había que limitarse a recoger las ideas de una doctrina, sin duda hoy y entonces prestigiosa, cuando se pensaba que aquella teoría del origen británico no podía ser, aunque fuera dentro de un marco teórico? No parecía tener sentido que no hubiera habido asociacionismo en España antes de la llegada de las compañías inglesas, pero sobre todo en Madrid, siempre bulliciosa en cuanto a participación ciudadana, por varios motivos: existían juegos y deportes populares autóctonos antes de que llegara el fútbol. ¿No se asociaban los madrileños para poder competir con otros?, ¿Se equivocó Goya al pintar estampas de juegos populares?, ¿Por qué existía entonces una Ley de Asociaciones de 1887, evidentemente anterior al Recreativo de Huelva (1889)? Las leyes se elaboran en respuesta a una necesidad social o a una costumbre anterior, o a las dos cosas. ¿Nadie pensó en la costumbre, siendo fuente del Derecho junto con la Ley y los principios generales?, ¿Nadie, estando tan cerca?, ¿Nadie, figurando en el artículo 1 del Código Civil? De esta forma, la justificación y objetivos cambiaron, la investigación se volvió otra, se tenía necesidad de probar la lógica o nada. Sólo hacían falta las pruebas documentales que aportaran luz y fueran tangibles para la argumentación jurídica. Así, entre las reglas del juego de la norma jurídica, la jurisprudencia y la doctrina, se desenvuelve el marco teórico de este trabajo. Es necesario para ello conocer cómo funciona la legislación que afecta a los clubes deportivos en la actualidad para entender las similitudes con los clubes pioneros. Es preciso comprender que una Ley nunca se encuentra aislada de otras, que todas están relacionadas, que los cruces son inevitablemente ilimitados y los resultados inmensos. Se ha realizado un análisis de una realidad compleja que trasciende de lo jurídico y lo deportivo. Respecto al material y método, no se encontraban referencias de estudios comparados, desde el punto de vista jurídico, de los Estatutos de los primeros clubes deportivos madrileños, ni nombrarlos hasta que a principios del año 2013 digitalizamos en la Biblioteca Nacional el Reglamento del Instituto de Gimnástica, Equitación y Esgrima (Villalobos, 1842); la prueba documental que se buscaba para apoyar la teoría ya era tangible. Luego se encontrarían otros para añadir a la muestra y también documentación probatoria complementaria. Tampoco había trabajos sobre la documentación emanada de la Administración Pública, por lo que se han estudiado Expedientes administrativos así como su comparativa con la legislación coetánea y la actual, lo que ha permitido concretar más la forma y tipología de las primeras formas jurídicas deportivas. Para la búsqueda de documentación se ha recurrido a bibliotecas, archivos e incluso depósitos que tenían legajos sin clasificar, habían sufrido las inundaciones y carcoma que azotaron a los sótanos de Madrid e incluso a alguno el fuego le miró de reojo. La documentación encontrada ha permitido convivir con los personajes que habitaron los clubes pioneros en los primeros domicilios sociales; historias reales con banda sonora propia. Y es que el nacimiento del asociacionismo deportivo madrileño no se podría haber gestado en mejor momento; durante el Romanticismo, ni en mejor lugar, en las encrucijadas de las callejuelas estrechas cercanas a las grandes arterias de la Capital; un paseo por las calles Libertad, Barbieri, Minas, Hortaleza y Montera. Los resultados de la investigación confirman la teoría de que el primer club deportivo madrileño nada tuvo que ver con los clubes que posteriormente vinieron en los equipajes de las compañías inglesas. Ni en tiempo, son anteriores; ni en lugar, Madrid; ni en forma, la comparativa con un club británico de la época denota diferencias o mejor, deficiencias, pero más que nada en el fondo. Los clubes madrileños tenían una naturaleza que reflejaba el sentir de los primeros socios y el espíritu de la Capital: beneficencia, espectáculo, participación ciudadana y trabajo en equipo. También se demuestra, tanto en los resultados como en la discusión, las particularidades de los primeros clubes madrileños en cuanto a su relación con la imprenta, la docencia, la prensa, las instalaciones deportivas siempre compartidas con la cultura como la terminología y las equipaciones, pero sobre todo la especial relación con el inherente derecho de reunión. Difícil pensar en un principio que la prueba de la costumbre se encontrara en la cartelería teatral, y que un programa de una competición deportiva escondiera unos Estatutos durante siglos. ABSTRACT When work for a doctorate degree began, the project was about public-private financing of sports clubs Madrid. At point one of the first index, concerned the origin of the sports club in Madrid ( Keep in mind that the territory was modified, which were towns before today are districts and what was once the province is now Community Autonomous of Madrid, our territorial area of study). When reading the authoritative doctrine which coincided entirely in the first sports clubs were of English origin (Huelva Recreation Club, 1889) and remember about questions and concerns raised during the undergraduate research became awkward, if not reckless. Why it had to be limited to collecting the ideas of a doctrine certainly prestigious now and then, when it was thought that this theory could not be British origin, albeit within a framework? It did not seem to make sense that there had been associations in Spain before the arrival of British companies, but especially in Madrid, always busy in terms of citizen participation, for several reasons; and indigenous games were popular sports before the football do the locals are not associated to compete with other?, Goya was wrong to paint pictures of popular games?, Why then was no Associations Act, 1887, clearly previous Huelva Recreation Club (1889)? The laws are developed in response to a social need or a past practice, or both. No one thought of being a source of law practice with the law and the general principles? No, being so close? No one appearing in Article 1 of the Civil? Thus the rationale and objectives of the research turned back, it was necessary to try logic or anything. Only documentary evidence was needed that provide light and were tangible to the legal arguments. Thus, among the rules of the legal rule, jurisprudence and doctrine, the theoretical framework of this work develops, we need to know how legislation affects sports clubs at present to understand the similarities with clubs works pioneers, we must understand that a law is never isolated from others, they are all related, intersections are inevitably unlimited and the immense results. It has made an analysis of a complex reality that transcends the legal and sports. Regarding the material and method, no references to studies were compared, from the legal point of view, of the Statute of the first Madrid sports clubs, or name them until early 2013 digitized at the National Library of the Institute of Regulation Gymnastics, Riding and Fencing (Villalobos, 1842); the documentary evidence that was sought to support the theory was already tangible. Then they find others to add to the sample and further supporting documentation. There was also no work on the documentation issued by the Public Administration, which have been studied administrative records and their comparison with the contemporary legislation and the current, allowing more concrete form and type of the first sports legal forms. Search for documentation we have turned to libraries, archives and even deposits that were not rated bundles, had suffered flooding and decay in the basement of Madrid and even fire some looked askance. The found documents have enabled us to live with the characters that inhabited the early clubs in the first addresses; real stories with its own soundtrack. And the birth of the Madrid sports associations could not have been gestated at a better time ; during the Romantic period , or in a better place ; at the crossroads of the nearby narrow streets of the great arteries of the Capital; a walk along the Libertad, Barbieri, Minas, Hortaleza and Montera. The research results confirm the theory that the first Madrid sports club had nothing to do with the clubs that later came in the luggage of British companies, nor in time; They predate, or rather; Madrid, or in the form; the comparison with a British club denotes the time differences or rather shortcomings, but more than anything in the background; the Madrid club had a nature that reflect the sentiments of the first members and the spirit of the Capital; charity, show, citizen participation and teamwork. It is also shown in the results and discussion the particularities of the first locals clubs in their relationship with the press, teaching, media, sports facilities always shared with the culture and terminology and the kits, but all the special relationship with the inherent right of assembly; hard to think at first that the test of habit were in the theater posters, and a program of a sports competition hide Statutes for centuries.

O devido processo legal para o refúgio no Brasil

O processo para o refúgio é o conjunto de regras e princípios necessários à aplicação do Direito dos Refugiados aos casos concretos. Quando este conjunto respeita os padrões democráticos do Devido Processo Legal, as tendências históricas de exploração e manipulação política do instituto de refúgio podem ser limitadas e os objetivos humanitários deste ramo dos Direitos Humanos podem ser alcançados com maior transparência. Quando o Devido Processo Legal para o refúgio é respeitado, também se permite que a pessoa que figura como solicitante de refúgio seja tratada como sujeito de direitos - e não como objeto do processo. Uma vez que a Convenção de Genebra de 1951, sobre o Estatuto dos Refugiados, não estabeleceu normas de processo, cada país signatário necessita criar um regime próprio para processar os pedidos de determinação, extensão, perda e cessação da condição de refugiado em seus territórios. O primeiro regime processual brasileiro foi criado no ano de 1997, pela Lei Federal 9497. Desde então, o país vem desenvolvendo, através do Comitê Nacional para Refugiados (CONARE), regras infra legais e rotinas práticas que têm determinado um padrão processual ainda fragmentado e inseguro. O estudo do aparato normativo nacional e da realidade observada entre 2012 e 2014 revelam a existência de problemas (pontuais ou crônicos) sobre o cumprimento de diversos princípios processuais, tais como a Legalidade, a Impessoalidade e Independência da autoridade julgadora, o Contraditório, a Ampla Defesa, a Publicidade, a Fundamentação, a Igualdade e a Razoável Duração do Processo. Estes problemas impõem desafios variados ao Brasil, tanto em dimensão legislativa quanto estrutural. O enfrentamento destas questões precisa ocorrer com rapidez. O motivo da urgência, porém, não é a nova demanda de imigração observada no país, mas sim o fato de que as violações ao Devido Processo Legal, verificadas no processo para o refúgio brasileiro, representam, em si, violações de Direitos Humanos, que, ademais prejudicam o compromisso do país para com a proteção internacional dos refugiados.

Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for services. Research Papers in Law, 6/2007

Introduction. The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ is not that little. In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory instrument (conclusion: para. 3).

Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law. Research Papers in Law, 4/2004

From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.

General Principles of EU Law: The Ghost in the Platonic Heaven in Need of Conceptual Clarification. Pittsburgh Papers on the European Union Vol. 2, 2013

General principles are en vogue in EU law – and in need of conceptual clarification. A closer look at several concepts of principle in legal philosophy and legal theory sheds light upon the concept of general principles in EU law. A distinction between an aprioristic model of principle and a model of principle informed by legal positivism may contribute to clarifying the genesis of a (general) principle in EU law, as well as its nature and functions. This paper demonstrates that an evolution has taken place from a reliance on seemingly natural law inspired reflections of general principles via the desperate search to ground general principles in various kinds of sources based on a more or less sound methodology towards an increasing reliance on strictly positivistic approaches. Against this backdrop, general principles are likely to lose significance where there are other norms while retaining an important yet uncontrollable role where the traditional canon of sources is silent.

The UN General Assembly Resolution on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Proceedings - an Example for Europe. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/04 • May 2013

Summary. The EU’s attempts to adopt an EU-wide instrument on the right to access to legal aid in criminal proceedings have not been successful so far. The important issue was originally part of Measure C of the Roadmap for criminal procedural rights,1 but due to political difficulties legal aid was dropped from the agenda. However, on a different plane agreement was reached on this topic as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted the world’s first international instrument dedicated to access to legal aid in December 2012.2 This policy brief argues that the EU should carry on in the ‘spirit’ of these recent developments and adopt a directive providing suspects and defendants with access to legal aid. 1 Council Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ C 295/1, 4 December 2009; hereafter will be referred to this Council Resolution as the ‘Roadmap’; for further information see M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘The EU Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings’, 4 EUCrim (2009), 157-161. 2 United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Access to Legal Aid in Criminal Justice Systems, A/Res/67/187, 20 December 2012; from here on will be referred to this as the ‘Resolution’.