771 resultados para Legal ownership
Resumo:
FUNDAMENTO: A hipertensão arterial apresenta alta prevalência e é um importante fator de risco cardiovascular. OBJETIVO: Estimar a prevalência da hipertensão arterial e sua associação com o estilo de vida. MÉTODOS: Estudo transversal, de base populacional, por meio de inquérito domiciliar realizado em Sinop-MT (n = 690). A amostra da pesquisa foi obtida por amostragem simples em duas etapas. A pressão arterial foi aferida três vezes e para a análise, a média das duas últimas medidas. Considerou-se hipertensos aqueles que apresentaram PA > 140/90 mmHg e/ou que referiram uso de drogas anti-hipertensivas. A análise de regressão logística múltipla hierarquizada foi utilizada para testar a associação entre a hipertensão e as variáveis independentes. RESULTADOS: A prevalência de hipertensão arterial foi de 23,2% (IC 95%: 20,1 - 26,6). A única variável relacionada ao estilo de vida associada à hipertensão arterial foi o consumo de bebidas alcoólicas, sendo protetor para as mulheres que consumiam até 15 g de etanol/dia (OR = 0,49; IC 95%: 0,26 - 0,93) e deletério para os homens que consumiam mais de 30 g de etanol/dia (OR = 2,94; IC 95%: 1,28 - 6,77). CONCLUSÃO: A hipertensão arterial associou-se independentemente com o consumo de bebidas alcoólicas, entre homens e mulheres.
Resumo:
v.44:no.2(1955)
Resumo:
This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.
Resumo:
We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.
Resumo:
Purpose - This paper focuses on analyzing the effect that public reforms have on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises in regulated environments. Design/methodology/approach - The research is focused in the postal sector where public and private companies must obey a legal framework related to provide a universal service. The analysis is carried out using a panel of 7 European postal operators for the period 1997-2003. The activity analyzed was the letter mail division; we take as key variable the unit cost of a letter and use a translog cost function where as independent variables we include traffic levels, labor cost per employee, quality and availability of the service as well as the type of ownership (public or private). Additionally, in a second stage the geographical differences among countries are considered. Findings - Results indicate that postal operators that experienced organizational changes without being privatized, such as the Spanish and Greek operators, do not have higher unit costs than privatized postal operators like the one of Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we find that in all cases the operator of Ireland appear to be the most efficient. In this case restructuring process has been carried out giving an important leadership role to workers. This suggests us that labor culture could be a key variable to study when analyzing reform processes in public enterprises. Originality/value - Our findings show that in a regulated environment like in the postal sector, public and private companies can obtain similar efficiency levels in term of unit costs.
Resumo:
Pendent
Resumo:
This study analyses the impact that job accessibility in public transport has on car ownership. An ordered probit explaining the number of cars per household is estimated as a function of head of household characteristics, household characteristics and job accessibility. The data used in the analysis come from the Microcensus of year 2001 of the Spanish Institute of Statistics for the areas of Barcelona and Madrid. Our results show a significant effect of accessibility on car ownership. Additionally, we carried out simulation exercises in which the expected number of vehicles decreases as accessibility improves. For instance, in the case of households living outside the central city, an improvement of accessibility up to the average level of the central city would offset the effect of the number of working adults on the expected number of vehicles.
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to analyse to what extent the use of cross-section data will distort the estimated elasticities for car ownership demand when the observed variables do not correspond to a state equilibrium for some individuals in the sample. Our proposal consists of approximating the equilibrium values of the observed variables by constructing a pseudo-panel data set which entails averaging individuals observed at different points of time into cohorts. The results show that individual and aggregate data lead to almost the same value for income elasticity, whereas with respect to working adult elasticity the similarity is less pronounced.
Resumo:
The contributions of this paper are twofold: On the one hand, the paper analyses the factors determining the growth in car ownership in Spain over the last two decades, and, on the other, the paper provides empirical evidence for a controversial methodological issue. From a methodological point of view, the paper compares the two alternative decision mechanisms used for modelling car ownership: ordered-response versus unordered-response mechanisms. A discrete choice model is estimated at three points in time: 1980, 1990 and 2000. The study concludes that on the basis of forecasting performance, the multinomial logit model and the ordered probit model are almost undistinguishable. As for the empirical results, it can be emphasised that income elasticity is not constant and declines as car ownership increases. Besides, households living in rural areas are less sensitive than those living in urban areas. Car ownership is also sensitive to the quality of public transport for those living in the largest cities. The results also confirmed the existence of a generation effect, which will vanish around the year 2020, a weak life-cycle effect, and a positive effect of employment on the number of cars per household. Finally, the change in the estimated coefficients over time reflects an increase in mobility needs and, consequently, an increase in car ownership.
Resumo:
This paper provides a general treatment of the implications for welfare of legal uncertainty. We distinguish legal uncertainty from decision errors: though the former can be influenced by the latter, the latter are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty. We show that an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare. However, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always, even when there is complete legal uncertainty, when sanctions on socially harmful actions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one’s perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions. The first is that Effects-Based enforcement procedures may welfare dominate Per Se (or object-based) procedures and will always do so when sanctions are optimally set. The second is that optimal sanctions may well be higher under enforcement procedures involving more legal uncertainty.
Resumo:
In this paper we make three contributions to the literature on optimal Competition Law enforcement procedures. The first (which is of general interest beyond competition policy) is to clarify the concept of “legal uncertainty”, relating it to ideas in the literature on Law and Economics, but formalising the concept through various information structures which specify the probability that each firm attaches – at the time it takes an action – to the possibility of its being deemed anti-competitive were it to be investigated by a Competition Authority. We show that the existence of Type I and Type II decision errors by competition authorities is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal uncertainty, and that information structures with legal uncertainty can generate higher welfare than information structures with legal certainty – a result echoing a similar finding obtained in a completely different context and under different assumptions in earlier Law and Economics literature (Kaplow and Shavell, 1992). Our second contribution is to revisit and significantly generalise the analysis in our previous paper, Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), involving a welfare comparison of Per Se and Effects- Based legal standards. In that analysis we considered just a single information structure under an Effects-Based standard and also penalties were exogenously fixed. Here we allow for (a) different information structures under an Effects-Based standard and (b) endogenous penalties. We obtain two main results: (i) considering all information structures a Per Se standard is never better than an Effects-Based standard; (ii) optimal penalties may be higher when there is legal uncertainty than when there is no legal uncertainty.
Resumo:
In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.
Resumo:
Tal i com estableix la Carta de les Nacions Unides, el Consell de Seguretat determina l’existència d’una amenaça a la pau, un trencament de la pau o un acte d’agressió i decideix les mesures que han de fer-se servir per restaurar la pau i seguretat internacionals, també l’ús de la força. L’objectiu d’aquest article és explorar la legitimitat d’aquest ús de la força. Amb aquest objectiu, el text parteix d’una definició centrada en les seves dimensions legal, normativa i social. En segon lloc, s’analitzarà com aquestes dimensions estan representades als debats del Consell de Seguretat de la guerra d’Irak de 2003, un dels usos de la força més controvertits i que més debat ha generat als darrers anys. Finalment, l’anàlisi proposat permet treure algunes conclusions sobre les bases canviants de la legitimitat de l’ús de la força.