In search of the aim of the free movement of persons provisions: has the Court of Justice missed the point?

The Court of Justice has, over the years, often been vilified for exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction by interpreting the provisions of Community legislation in a way not seem originally envisaged by its drafters. A recent example of this approach was a cluster of cases in the context of the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment (Ritter-Coulais and its progeny), where the Court included within the scope of those provisions situations which, arguably, did not present a sufficient link with their (economic) aim. In particular, in that case law the Court accepted that the mere exercise of free movement for the purpose of taking up residence in the territory of another Member State whilst continuing to exercise an economic activity in the State of origin, suffices for bringing a Member State national within the scope of Articles 39 and 43 EC. It is argued that the most plausible explanation for this approach is that the Court now wishes to re-read the economic fundamental freedoms in such a way as to include within their scope all economically active Union citizens, irrespective of whether their situation presents a sufficient link with the exercise of an economic activity in a cross-border context. It is suggested that this approach is problematic for a number of reasons. It is, therefore, concluded that the Court should revert to its orthodox approach, according to which only situations that involve Union citizens who have moved between Member States for the purpose of taking up an economic activity should be included within the scope of the market freedoms.

Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgments on Copyright Work

EU law’s impact on the meaning of the copyright work for a long time seemed limited to software and databases. But recent judgments of the CJEU (Infopaq, BSA, FootballAssociation [Murphy], Painer) suggest we have entered an era of harmonization of copyright subject-matter, after decades of focus on the scope of exclusive rights and their duration. Unlike before however, it is the Court and not the legislator that takes centre stage in shaping pivotal concepts. This article reviews the different readings and criticisms the recent case law on copyright works evokes in legal doctrine across the EU. It puts them in the wider perspective of the on-goingdevelopment towards uniform law and the role of the preliminary reference procedure in that process.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

The European Court of Justice and the Draft Constitution: A Supreme Court for the Union? Research Paper in Law 8/2003

[Introduction]. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it examines selectively the provisions of the draft Constitution pertaining to the Court of Justice and assesses the ways in which the draft Constitution is likely to affect the jurisdiction and the function of the Court. Secondly, it discusses the challenges faced by the Court in relation to the protection of human rights by reference to the recent judgment in Schmidberger.1 Both aspects of the discussion serve to underlie that the Court is assuming the function of the Supreme Court of the Union whose jurisdiction is fundamentally constitutional in character. It has a central role to play not only in relation to matters of economic integration but also in deciding issues of political governance, defining democracy at European and national level, and contributing through the process of judicial harmonisation to the emergence of a European demos. This constitutional jurisdiction of the ECJ is not new but has acquired more importance in recent years and is set to be enhanced under the provisions of the new Constitution. The paper is divided as follows: The first section provides an overview of the way the new Constitution affects the ECJ. The subsequent sections examine respectively Article 28(1) of the draft Constitution, the appointment and tenure of the judiciary, locus standi for private individuals, sanctions against Member States, jurisdiction under the CFSP and the Chapter on freedom, security and justice, preliminary references, other provisions o f the Constitution pertaining to the Court, the principle of subsidiarity, and the judgment in Schmidberger. The final section contains some concluding remarks.