Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.

Computing Markov-Perfect Optimal Policies in Business-Cycle Models

Time-inconsistency is an essential feature of many policy problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). This paper presents and compares three methods for computing Markov-perfect optimal policies in stochastic nonlinear business cycle models. The methods considered include value function iteration, generalized Euler-equations, and parameterized shadow prices. In the context of a business cycle model in which a scal authority chooses government spending and income taxation optimally, while lacking the ability to commit, we show that the solutions obtained using value function iteration and generalized Euler equations are somewhat more accurate than that obtained using parameterized shadow prices. Among these three methods, we show that value function iteration can be applied easily, even to environments that include a risk-sensitive scal authority and/or inequality constraints on government spending. We show that the risk-sensitive scal authority lowers government spending and income-taxation, reducing the disincentive households face to accumulate wealth.

Economic growth and inequality: the role of fiscal policies

This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis

Independent regulatory agencies are one of the main institutional features of the 'rising regulatory state' in Western Europe. Governments are increasingly willing to abandon their regulatory competencies and to delegate them to specialized institutions that are at least partially beyond their control. This article examines the empirical consistency of one particular explanation of this phenomenon, namely the credibility hypothesis, claiming that governments delegate powers so as to enhance the credibility of their policies. Three observable implications are derived from the general hypothesis, linking credibility and delegation to veto players, complexity and interdependence. An independence index is developed to measure agency independence, which is then used in a multivariate analysis where the impact of credibility concerns on delegation is tested. The analysis relies on an original data set comprising independence scores for thirty-three regulators. Results show that the credibility hypothesis can explain a good deal of the variation in delegation. The economic nature of regulation is a strong determinant of agency independence, but is mediated by national institutions in the form of veto players.

Submission to the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government: Sustainable Residential Development in Urban Areas

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland is an all-island body which aims to improve health in Ireland by working to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health. The Institute promotes co-operation in research, training, information and policy in order to contribute to policies which tackle inequalities in health.   Over the past ten years the Institute has worked closely with the Department of Health and Children and the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety in Northern Ireland to build capacity for public health across the island of Ireland.   The Institute takes the view that health is determined by policies, plans and programmes in many sectors outside the health sector as well as being dependent on access to and availability of first class health services. The importance of other sectors is encapsulated in a social determinants of health perspective which recognises that health is largely shaped and influenced by the physical, social, economic and cultural environments in which people live, work and play. Figure 1 illustrates these multi-dimensional impacts on health and also serves to highlight the clear and inextricable links between health and sustainable development. Factors that impact on long-term sustainability will thus also impact on health.

IPH response to the Government Alcohol Advisory Group

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) welcomes the call for submissions by the Government Alcohol Advisory Group and commends the Justice Minister, Brian Lenihan TD., for establishing this group. IPH aims to improve health on the island of Ireland, by working to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health.  IPH promotes cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in research, training, information and policy.   A report from IPH, Inequalities in Mortality 1989-1998 – A report on all-Ireland mortality data found that those in the lowest occupational class are 280% more likely to die from alcohol abuse than those in the highest occupational class. The poorer you are the more likely your life will be negatively impacted by alcohol.  In addition, alcohol is a contributory factor to deaths from accidents, which also show a pronounced socio-economic gradient.

Consultation reponse to the NI Programme for Government

The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) aims to improve health on the island of Ireland, by working to combat health inequalities and influence public policies in favour of health. We promote cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in public health research, training, information and policy. IPH welcomes the opportunity to comment on the Draft Programme for Government 2008-2011. We support and welcome the vision of the Programme for Government (PfG) to promote a prosperous, fair and inclusive society and welcome the Executive’s vision of a better future for all. We think a better future for all should include a commitment to protect health and create opportunities for everyone to achieve the best possible level of health and well being. We believe that improving public health and reducing inequalities in health should be an overarching priority for the Northern Ireland Executive.

Guiding Principles for the Production of Hospital Visiting Policies (PDF 86 KB)

Hospital Visiting Policies

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.

Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

Framework for Corporate and Financial Governance for Regulatory Bodies under the aegis of the Department of Health and Children

The document should be read as supplementary to existing requirements as set out both in statute â?" particularly legislation specific to your organisation, the Health Acts 1947-2004, Ombudsman Act, 1980, Data Protection Acts 1988 & 2003, Freedom of Information Acts 1997-2003, Ethics in Public Office Acts 1995 & 2001, Ombudsman for Children Act, 2002 and the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993 – and in Government approved guidelines, including the Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies (2001), Public Financial Procedures, The Role and Responsibilities of Accounting Officers (2003) and Risk Management Guidance for Government Departments and Offices (2004). Read the report (PDF, 1.4mb)  

Attitudes of the public towards policies to address obesity

Key points Obesity and the related health burden is a growing problem in Ireland. Understanding public attitudes to policy interventions is important, as it provides a key indicator of the potential effectiveness of interventions and the readiness of the general public for policy implementation. The present research aimed to determine public acceptance of a range of policies to address obesity in Ireland. To this end, a survey of attitudes towards obesity-oriented policies among a nationally representative sample of the population of Irish adults was conducted. Strikingly high levels of public support were evident for a wide range of obesity-oriented interventions. The findings support prior research on behaviour change in key policy areas such as diet and smoking which demonstrates that support for interventions tends to decrease as the intrusiveness of interventions increases. Consistent with previous research, socio-demographic factors only explain a small portion (2 - 6%) of the variance in policy support. Overall, the findings indicate substantial public readiness for addressing obesity in Ireland, particularly through child-focused policies, informational measures, subsidies for healthy foods and co-operation between government and the food industry. - See more at: http://www.safefood.eu/Publications/Research-reports/Attitudes-of-the-public-towards-policies-to-addres

The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of Public Policies : Do the Objectives Conflict ?

This paper aims to provide empirical support for the use of the principal-agent framework in the analysis of public sector and public policies. After reviewing the different conditions to be met for a relevant analysis of the relationship between population and government using the principal-agent theory, our paper focuses on the assumption of conflicting goals between the principal and the agent. A principal-agent analysis assumes in effect that inefficiencies may arise because principal and agent pursue different goals. Using data collected during an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities, we show the existence of a gap between the goals of the population and those of the government. Consequently, inefficiencies as predicted by the principal-agent model may arise during the implementation of a public policy, i.e. an amalgamation project. In a context of direct democracy where policies are regularly subjected to referendum, the conflict of objectives may even lead to a total failure of the policy at the polls.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.