Experimental Economics Meets Language Choice

Roughly one half of World's languages are in danger of extinction. The endangered languages, spoken by minorities, typically compete with powerful languages such as En- glish or Spanish. Consequently, the speakers of minority languages have to consider that not everybody can speak their language, converting the language choice into strategic,coordination-like situation. We show experimentally that the displacement of minority languages may be partially explained by the imperfect information about the linguistic type of the partner, leading to frequent failure to coordinate on the minority language even between two speakers who can and prefer to use it. The extent of miscoordination correlates with how minoritarian a language is and with the real-life linguistic condition of subjects: the more endangered a language the harder it is to coordinate on its use, and people on whom the language survival relies the most acquire behavioral strategies that lower its use. Our game-theoretical treatment of the issue provides a new perspective for linguistic policies.

Efficient methods for empirical tests of behavioral economics theories in laboratory and field experiments

In the quest for a descriptive theory of decision-making, the rational actor model in economics imposes rather unrealistic expectations and abilities on human decision makers. The further we move from idealized scenarios, such as perfectly competitive markets, and ambitiously extend the reach of the theory to describe everyday decision making situations, the less sense these assumptions make. Behavioural economics has instead proposed models based on assumptions that are more psychologically realistic, with the aim of gaining more precision and descriptive power. Increased psychological realism, however, comes at the cost of a greater number of parameters and model complexity. Now there are a plethora of models, based on different assumptions, applicable in differing contextual settings, and selecting the right model to use tends to be an ad-hoc process. In this thesis, we develop optimal experimental design methods and evaluate different behavioral theories against evidence from lab and field experiments.

We look at evidence from controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects are presented with choices between monetary gambles or lotteries. Different decision-making theories evaluate the choices differently and would make distinct predictions about the subjects' choices. Theories whose predictions are inconsistent with the actual choices can be systematically eliminated. Behavioural theories can have multiple parameters requiring complex experimental designs with a very large number of possible choice tests. This imposes computational and economic constraints on using classical experimental design methods. We develop a methodology of adaptive tests: Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Designs (BROAD) that sequentially chooses the "most informative" test at each stage, and based on the response updates its posterior beliefs over the theories, which informs the next most informative test to run. BROAD utilizes the Equivalent Class Edge Cutting (EC²) criteria to select tests. We prove that the EC² criteria is adaptively submodular, which allows us to prove theoretical guarantees against the Bayes-optimal testing sequence even in the presence of noisy responses. In simulated ground-truth experiments, we find that the EC² criteria recovers the true hypotheses with significantly fewer tests than more widely used criteria such as Information Gain and Generalized Binary Search. We show, theoretically as well as experimentally, that surprisingly these popular criteria can perform poorly in the presence of noise, or subject errors. Furthermore, we use the adaptive submodular property of EC² to implement an accelerated greedy version of BROAD which leads to orders of magnitude speedup over other methods.

We use BROAD to perform two experiments. First, we compare the main classes of theories for decision-making under risk, namely: expected value, prospect theory, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and moments models. Subjects are given an initial endowment, and sequentially presented choices between two lotteries, with the possibility of losses. The lotteries are selected using BROAD, and 57 subjects from Caltech and UCLA are incentivized by randomly realizing one of the lotteries chosen. Aggregate posterior probabilities over the theories show limited evidence in favour of CRRA and moments' models. Classifying the subjects into types showed that most subjects are described by prospect theory, followed by expected value. Adaptive experimental design raises the possibility that subjects could engage in strategic manipulation, i.e. subjects could mask their true preferences and choose differently in order to obtain more favourable tests in later rounds thereby increasing their payoffs. We pay close attention to this problem; strategic manipulation is ruled out since it is infeasible in practice, and also since we do not find any signatures of it in our data.

In the second experiment, we compare the main theories of time preference: exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting, "present bias" models: quasi-hyperbolic (α, β) discounting and fixed cost discounting, and generalized-hyperbolic discounting. 40 subjects from UCLA were given choices between 2 options: a smaller but more immediate payoff versus a larger but later payoff. We found very limited evidence for present bias models and hyperbolic discounting, and most subjects were classified as generalized hyperbolic discounting types, followed by exponential discounting.

In these models the passage of time is linear. We instead consider a psychological model where the perception of time is subjective. We prove that when the biological (subjective) time is positively dependent, it gives rise to hyperbolic discounting and temporal choice inconsistency.

We also test the predictions of behavioral theories in the "wild". We pay attention to prospect theory, which emerged as the dominant theory in our lab experiments of risky choice. Loss aversion and reference dependence predicts that consumers will behave in a uniquely distinct way than the standard rational model predicts. Specifically, loss aversion predicts that when an item is being offered at a discount, the demand for it will be greater than that explained by its price elasticity. Even more importantly, when the item is no longer discounted, demand for its close substitute would increase excessively. We tested this prediction using a discrete choice model with loss-averse utility function on data from a large eCommerce retailer. Not only did we identify loss aversion, but we also found that the effect decreased with consumers' experience. We outline the policy implications that consumer loss aversion entails, and strategies for competitive pricing.

In future work, BROAD can be widely applicable for testing different behavioural models, e.g. in social preference and game theory, and in different contextual settings. Additional measurements beyond choice data, including biological measurements such as skin conductance, can be used to more rapidly eliminate hypothesis and speed up model comparison. Discrete choice models also provide a framework for testing behavioural models with field data, and encourage combined lab-field experiments.

Endogenous Timing in Pollution Control: Stackelberg versus Cournot-Nash Equilibria

27 p.

An integrated design approach to power systems : from power flows to electricity markets

Power system is at the brink of change. Engineering needs, economic forces and environmental factors are the main drivers of this change. The vision is to build a smart electrical grid and a smarter market mechanism around it to fulfill mandates on clean energy. Looking at engineering and economic issues in isolation is no longer an option today; it needs an integrated design approach. In this thesis, I shall revisit some of the classical questions on the engineering operation of power systems that deals with the nonconvexity of power flow equations. Then I shall explore some issues of the interaction of these power flow equations on the electricity markets to address the fundamental issue of market power in a deregulated market environment. Finally, motivated by the emergence of new storage technologies, I present an interesting result on the investment decision problem of placing storage over a power network. The goal of this study is to demonstrate that modern optimization and game theory can provide unique insights into this complex system. Some of the ideas carry over to applications beyond power systems.

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.

A propaganda negativa : estratégia e voto nas eleições brasileiras

Esta tese se insere no conjunto de pesquisas que procura entender como funcionam as eleições no Brasil. Especificamente, o objetivo é investigar a propaganda negativa durante as eleições presidenciais. Para tal foram desenvolvidos cinco capítulos. O primeiro situa o leitor no debate normativo sobre o papel da propaganda negativa para a democracia eleitoral. Nele, é debatida a importância dos ataques em uma série de circunstâncias, como mobilização política, ambiente informacional e decisão do voto. O segundo capítulo constitui ampla análise do conteúdo da propaganda negativa exibida no âmbito do Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral durante as eleições presidenciais de 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 e 2010, primeiro e segundo turnos. A metodologia seguiu as orientações formuladas por Figueiredo et all. (1998), mas adaptadas para as especificidades da propaganda negativa. Neste objetivo, tendências interessantes foram descobertas, a mais interessante, sem dúvida, é o baixo índice de ataques ocorrido entre os candidatos. O terceiro busca investigar o uso estratégico das inserções durante as campanhas presidenciais. Debato o caráter regulamentado do modelo brasileiro de propaganda. Ainda assim, aponto estratégias divergentes no uso estratégico das inserções negativas, sendo o horário noturno o lócus predominante dos ataques. O quarto capítulo procura criar um modelo de campanha negativa com base na teoria dos jogos. No modelo, procuro responder às seguintes questões: quem ataca quem, quando e por quê? Argumento que a propaganda negativa é o último recurso utilizado pelos candidatos na conquista por votos. Ela tem como propósito central alterar a tendência do adversário. Por essa razão, é utilizada principalmente por candidatos em situações de desvantagem nos índices de intenção de voto. O quinto e último capítulo desenvolve modelo estatístico para medir o impacto da propaganda negativa nos índices de intenção de voto.

Uma abordagem por meio da teoria dos jogos de um modelo em ecologia matemática

A presente dissertação propõe uma abordagem alternativa na simulação matemática de um cenário preocupante em ecologia: o controle de pragas nocivas a uma dada lavoura de soja em uma específica região geográfica. O instrumental teórico empregado é a teoria dos jogos, de forma a acoplar ferramentas da matemática discreta à análise e solução de problemas de valor inicial em equações diferenciais, mais especificamente, as chamadas equações de dinâmica populacional de Lotka-Volterra com competição. Essas equações, que modelam o comportamento predador-presa, possuem, com os parâmetros inicialmente utilizados, um ponto de equilíbrio mais alto que o desejado no contexto agrícola sob exame, resultando na necessidade de utilização da teoria do controle ótimo. O esquema desenvolvido neste trabalho conduz a ferramentas suficientemente simples, de forma a tornar viável o seu uso em situações reais. Os dados utilizados para o tratamento do problema que conduziu a esta pesquisa interdisciplinar foram coletados de material bibliográfico da Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária EMBRAPA.

O jogo e os jogos: o jogo da leitura, o jogo de xadrez e a sanidade mental em A defesa Lujin, de Vladimir Nabokov

No romance A defesa Lujin, de Vladimir Nabokov, publicado em russo em 1930, o texto procura levar o leitor a adotar processos mentais similares ao de um jogador de xadrez e de um esquizofrênico, características do personagem-título do romance. Delineiam-se as expectativas e circunstâncias de um ser de papel que se vê jogando um xadrez em que também é peça e traçam-se paralelos com as expectativas e circunstâncias do leitor perante esse texto literário. O prefácio de Nabokov à edição em inglês de 1964 é tomado como indício de um leitor e um autor implícitos que ele procura moldar. Para análise dos elementos textuais e níveis de abstração mental envolvidos, recorre-se à estética da recepção de Wolfgang Iser e a diversas ideias do psiquiatra e etnólogo Gregory Bateson, entre elas o conceito de duplo vínculo, com atenção às distinções entre mapa/território e play/game. Um duplo duplo vínculo é perpetrado na interação leitor-texto: 1) o leitor é convidado a sentir empatia pela situação do personagem Lujin e a considerá-lo lúcido e louco ao mesmo tempo; e 2) o leitor é colocado como uma instância pseudo-transcendental incapaz de comunicação com a instância inferior (Lujin), gerando uma angústia diretamente relacionável ao seu envolvimento com a ficção, replicando de certa forma a loucura de Lujin. A sinestesia do personagem Lujin é identificada como um dos elementos do texto capaz de recriar a experiência de jogar xadrez até para quem não aprecia o jogo. Analisa-se a conexão entre a esquizofrenia ficcional do personagem Lujin e a visão batesoniana do alcoolismo

Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.

Coalition and distribution in fuzzy dynamic supply chain systems

In this paper, two models of coalition and income's distribution in FSCS (fuzzy supply chain systems) are proposed based on the fuzzy set theory and fuzzy cooperative game theory. The fuzzy dynamic coalition choice's recursive equations are constructed in terms of sup-t composition of fuzzy relations, where t is a triangular norm. The existence of the fuzzy relations in FSCS is also proved. On the other hand, the approaches to ascertain the fuzzy coalition through the choice's recursive equations and distribute the fuzzy income in FSCS by the fuzzy Shapley values are also given. These models are discussed in two parts: the fuzzy dynamic coalition choice of different units in FSCS; the fuzzy income's distribution model among different participators in the same coalition. Furthermore, numerical examples are given aiming at illustrating these models., and the results show that these models are feasible and validity in FSCS.

Wykorzystanie gier decyzyjnych/symulacyjnych w naukach społecznych. Wybrane problemy

Treścią publikacji jest przedstawienie wybranych problemów prognozowania w naukach społecznych. W artykule skoncentrowano się na metodzie gier decyzyjnych/symulacyjnych, które – zwłaszcza wraz z rozwojem teorii gier oraz komputerów – są coraz częściej wykorzystywane w wielu dziedzinach. Na wybranych przykładach gier decyzyjnych/symulacyjnych – Poznań International Model United Nations 2013/POZiMUN; S.E.N.S.E. a także gry sieciowej EVE Online – wskazano jak ważne są takie ćwiczenia, by móc precyzyjniej przewidywać przyszłość. Zwrócono także szczególną uwagę na kwestię przypadku oraz czynników zakłócających, które mogą destabilizować proces przewidywania. Poruszono ponadto problem podejmowania decyzji w aspekcie klasycznej oraz kwantowej logiki.

Safe Compositional Specification of Networking Systems

The Science of Network Service Composition has clearly emerged as one of the grand themes driving many of our research questions in the networking field today [NeXtworking 2003]. This driving force stems from the rise of sophisticated applications and new networking paradigms. By "service composition" we mean that the performance and correctness properties local to the various constituent components of a service can be readily composed into global (end-to-end) properties without re-analyzing any of the constituent components in isolation, or as part of the whole composite service. The set of laws that would govern such composition is what will constitute that new science of composition. The combined heterogeneity and dynamic open nature of network systems makes composition quite challenging, and thus programming network services has been largely inaccessible to the average user. We identify (and outline) a research agenda in which we aim to develop a specification language that is expressive enough to describe different components of a network service, and that will include type hierarchies inspired by type systems in general programming languages that enable the safe composition of software components. We envision this new science of composition to be built upon several theories (e.g., control theory, game theory, network calculus, percolation theory, economics, queuing theory). In essence, different theories may provide different languages by which certain properties of system components can be expressed and composed into larger systems. We then seek to lift these lower-level specifications to a higher level by abstracting away details that are irrelevant for safe composition at the higher level, thus making theories scalable and useful to the average user. In this paper we focus on services built upon an overlay management architecture, and we use control theory and QoS theory as example theories from which we lift up compositional specifications.

Scientism and instrumentalism After the Bomb: Dr Strangelove, End Zone, Crash and The Wire

This thesis argues that through the prism of America’s Cold War, scientism has emerged as the metanarrative of the postnuclear age. The advent of the bomb brought about a new primacy for mechanical and hyperrational thinking in the corridors of power not just in terms of managing the bomb itself but diffusing this ideology throughout the culture in social sciences, economics and other such institutional systems. The human need to mitigate or ameliorate against the chaos of the universe lies at the heart of not just religious faith but in the desire for perfect control. Thus there has been a transference of power from religious faith to the apparent material power of science and technology and the terra firma these supposedly objective means supply. The Cold War, however was a highly ideologically charged opposition between the two superpowers, and the scientific methodology that sprang forth to manage the Cold War and the bomb, in the United States, was not an objective scientific system divorced from the paranoia and dogma but a system that assumed a radically fundamentalist idea of capitalism. This is apparent in the widespread diffusion of game theory throughout Western postindustrial institutions. The inquiry of the thesis thus examines the texts that engage and criticise American Cold War methodology, beginning with the nuclear moment, so to speak, and Dr Strangelove’s incisive satire of moral abdication to machine processes. Moving on chronologically, the thesis examines the diffusion of particular kinds of masculinity and sexuality in postnuclear culture in Crash and End Zone and finishing up its analysis with the ethnographic portrayal of a modern American city in The Wire. More than anything else, the thesis wishes to reveal to what extent this technocratic consciousness puts pressure on language and on binding narratives.

Reference groups and product line decisions: An experimental investigation of limited editions and product proliferation

Some luxury goods manufacturers offer limited editions of their products, whereas some others market multiple product lines. Researchers have found that reference groups shape consumer evaluations of these product categories. Yet little empirical research has examined how reference groups affect the product line decisions of firms. Indeed, in a field setting it is quite a challenge to isolate reference group effects from contextual effects and correlated effects. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious model that allows us to study how reference groups influence firm behavior and that lends itself to experimental analysis. With the aid of the model we investigate the behavior of consumers in a laboratory setting where we can focus on the reference group effects after controlling for the contextual and correlated effects. The experimental results show that in the presence of strong reference group effects, limited editions and multiple products can help improve firms' profits. Furthermore, the trends in the purchase decisions of our participants point to the possibility that they are capable of introspecting close to two steps of thinking at the outset of the game and then learning through reinforcement mechanisms. © 2010 INFORMS.

Studies on Understanding Individual Willingness to Disclose Genetic Information to Public and Private Stakeholders

While technologies for genetic sequencing have increased the promise of personalized medicine, they simultaneously pose threats to personal privacy. The public’s desire to protect itself from unauthorized access to information may limit the uses of this valuable resource. To date, there is limited understanding about the public’s attitudes toward the regulation and sharing of such information. We sought to understand the drivers of individuals’ decisions to disclose genetic information to a third party in a setting where disclosure potentially creates both private and social benefits, but also carries the risk of potential misuse of private information. We conducted two separate but related studies. First, we administered surveys to college students and parents, to determine individual attitudes toward and inter-generational influences on the disclosure decision. Second, we conducted a game-theory based experiment that assessed how participants’ decisions to disclose genetic information are influenced by societal and health factors. Key survey findings indicate that concerns about genetic information privacy negatively impact the likelihood of disclosure while the perceived benefits of disclosure and trust in the institution receiving the information have a positive influence. The experiment results also show that the risk of discrimination negatively affects the likelihood of disclosure, while the positive impact that disclosure has on the probability of finding a cure and the presence of a monetary incentive to disclose, increase the likelihood. We also study the determinants of individuals’ decision to be informed of findings about their health, and how information about health status is used for financial decisions.