A dynamic CGE modelling approach for analyzing trade-offs in climate change policy options: the case of Green Climate Fund

38 p.

Larval rearing and fry raising of Pangasius sutchi(Fowler)

Pangasius sutchi were artificially bred for determining the hatching success and larval growth response to live food in relation to varying stocking densities. The fertilized eggs were hatched out with successful hatching rates ranging between 60 and 63%. Newly hatched larvae of 4.4 mm average length were reared using Tubifex as live food in metallic trays with water temperature of 27 to 29.5°C and dissolved oxygen level of 3.88 to 6.22 mg/1 for 6-day with an average survival rate of75.56±13.25%. The P. sutchifry of9- day old were further reared using Tubifex in the polythene covered metallic trays at the stocking densities of 2-7 fry per litre of water for a period of 14 day. P. sutchi fry raising at 4 individual per litre of water for 14 day gives better results in terms of survival and growth.

A new method of Laminaria japonica strain selection and sporeling raising by the use of gametophyte clones

One-celled female and male gametophytes of three Laminaria japonica strains were isolated, cultured and gametophyte clones were formed. A technique combining strain selection with sporeling raising by the use of these female and male gametophyte clones was studied. Experiments on 9 different crossing combinations was conducted in November of 1997 in Qingdao, P. R. China. The main economic characteristics, frond length and fresh weight, of sporophytes of different crossing combinations were measured. F-1 sporophytes of No. 2 showed a higher fresh weight and longer length, therefore, No. 2 (Wh860 + x Lid) was selected as a good combination. Its parental female and male gametophyte clones are being mass cultured for sporeling production. By this method, the time needed for strain selection was shortened from 5-6 to 2 years. As compared with the routine method of sporeling raising by the collection of zoospores, the time of sporeling raising of this method decrease by 50%, and the production cost is also reduced by 50%. It is believed that this method will be labour and time saving and a more economic way for strain selection and sporeling raising in L. japonica cultivation industry.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.