Foreign direct investment and welfare

Includes bibliography.

International openness in transition countries: further evidence on foreign direct investment

The thesis focuses on the process of international openness of Transition Countries. This study provides a theoretical analysis based on reference literature, and an empirical analysis which is aimed at estimating some main effects of Foreign Direct Investment. Transition has represented a highly complex phenomenon, characterized by several aspects, whose interaction has shaped the developmental path of each country involved. Although the thesis focuses on economic issues it is outstanding to underline that Transition implies political, institutional, and even social deep changes, which must be taken into consideration in the general overview of the contex. The empirical part has been developed along two different ways: a country analysis and a firm analysis, thus allowing to widen the study and delve deeper into the use of econometric instruments. More specifically, in the first empirical stage both static (Fixed Effects) and dynamic (LSDV Corrected) methodologies have been implemented, whereas in the second stage the Cox Proportional Function has been chosen in order to handle with censored data.

The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth

Over the past four decades, the number of democracies in the world has increased exponentially. This project considers how democracy and FDI affect economic growth as well as whether the impact of FDI depends on the level of democracy in a country. Thus, I explore two major research questions: 1) Whether increased FDI speeds up economic growth, controlling for political regime type, urbanization and other developmental indicators; and 2) Whether an increase in political freedom helps or hinders economic growth, and specifically whether the impact of FDI varies depending on the political regime in the recipient country. To examine these questions, this paper used data from 150 countries over a period between 1980 and 2010 and utilized several models, testing variables such as institutions, agglomerations, urbanization, FDI and type of political regime, among others, for their impact on economic growth. I found that FDI does have a positive impact on economic growth, and that this impact is often magnified when it interacts with other relevant factors. I also found that, after controlling for other variables, FDI inflows do not have a different impact on economic growth in autocracies than they do in democracies. This may be partially explained by autocratic outliers such as China and the OPEC states, which have recently experienced rapid export-led growth. This suggests that factors such as education could have a greater impact on a country¿s economic growth than does its political system.

Food Security and Agri-Foreign Direct Investment in Weak States: Finding the Governance Gap to Avoid ‘Land Grab’

Food security is important. A rising world population coupled with climate change creates growing pressure on global world food supplies. States alleviate this pressure domestically by attracting agri-foreign direct investment (agri-FDI). This is a high-risk strategy for weak states: the state may gain valuable foreign currency, technology and debt-free growth; but equally, investors may fail to deliver on their commitments and exploit weak domestic legal infrastructure to ‘grab’ large areas of prime agricultural land, leaving only marginal land for domestic production. A net loss to local food security and to the national economy results. This is problematic because the state must continue to guarantee its citizens’ right to food and property. Agri-FDI needs close regulation to maximise its benefit. This article maps the multilevel system of governance covering agri-FDI. We show how this system creates asymmetric rights in favour of the investor to the detriment of the host state’s food security and how these problems might be alleviated.

Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture: Land Grab or Food Security Improvement?

“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examination. But is there something really new about land grab except in its extent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment contracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical cooperation by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of business is business!” And why would the governments signing those contracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for their country, and how to attract them? This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National governance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there is an international dimension involving investor home states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. This chapter deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. I address this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parliaments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and international regulators do, if anything?

The Value of Waiting: Foreign Direct Investment with Uncertainty and Imperfect Local Knowledge

This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.

Trade, Foreign Investment and Myanmar's Economic Development during the Transition to an Open Economy

Throughout the 1990s and up to 2005, the adoption of an open-door policy substantially increased the volume of Myanmar's external trade. Imports grew more rapidly than exports in the 1990s owing to the release of pent-up consumer demand during the transition to a market economy. Accordingly, trade deficits expanded. Confronted by a shortage of foreign currency, the government after the late 1990s resorted to rigid controls over the private sector's trade activities. Despite this tightening of policy, Myanmar's external sector has improved since 2000 largely because of the emergence of new export commodities, namely garments and natural gas. Foreign direct investments in Myanmar significantly contributed to the exploration and development of new gas fields. As trade volume grew, Myanmar strengthened its trade relations with neighboring countries such as China, Thailand and India. Although the development of external trade and foreign investment inflows exerted a considerable impact on the Myanmar economy, the external sector has not yet begun to function as a vigorous engine for broad-based and sustainable development.

U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007

The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of the high-tech sector. The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel.

Law and Foreign Direct Investment. IES WORKING PAPER 4/2011

In this paper we examine the effect of law on foreign direct investment outflows with a specific interest in the relationship between international investment law and domestic private property laws. Our results indicate that FDI investor is indifferent to host country property rights, hence shareholder protection by law is not a significant determinant of FDI outflows. We argue that FDI, in contrast with other types of capital flows, can effectively mitigate the agency problem through majority ownership and control, hence reduce exposure to ex-post expropriation by the affiliate. On the other hand, FDI investor remains exposed to risk of expropriation by the host government and is strongly sensitive to the enforcement of law in the host country. In contrast with recent literature we conclude that there are no causal relationship between bilateral investment treaties and FDI.