Preventing the rise of sovereign borrowing costs in the Eurozone: what can the ESM and the ECB achieve? Egmont Paper No. 56, November 2012

This paper focuses on the possible instruments for ‘ex-ante’/’preventive’/’precautionary’ interventions which can be deployed by the ESM and the ECB in order to prevent a debt crisis in a eurozone country. The potential of Eurobonds will also be discussed in this crisis management perspective. The first part of this paper traces the underlying trends of the evolution of interest rates in eurozone countries over the last decades. The second part discusses the principles of a preventive intervention in sovereign bond markets for the purpose of lowering borrowing costs of countries facing refinancing constraints; the limits and main issues of an ex-ante intervention will be underlined. In the third part, the properties of the ESM’s precautionary financial assistance and secondary market support facility will be discussed in details. The ECB preemptive intervention policies and, in particular, the OMT will be analyzed in the fourth part of the paper. The most likely course of action – a combined intervention by the ESM and the ECB – will be discussed in the fifth part. Finally, I will point out the core challenges of introducing Eurobonds as additional instruments to mitigate the rise of borrowing costs in the short term.

A Historical Materialist Approach to the Eurozone Crisis: Fictitious Capital, States, and Capital Accumulation

This dissertation examines the ongoing European sovereign debt crises that began with Greece in 2009, in the wake of the US subprime mortgage crisis. Through the application of a historical materialist approach, I attempt to understand the on-going crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU) by investigating root causes of sovereign debt crises, relations of power, and main beneficiaries of the policy responses. My theoretical framework hinges on three contradictions in capitalism: the tendency towards overaccumulation, the tension between fictitious capital and the productive base, and the contradiction inherent in capitalist states between their role as a national state and as a class state. In contrast to the dominant positions that locate the cause of the crisis within either: debtor states; creditor states; or the framework at the EMU, I argue that these sovereign debt crises are actually a broader crisis of crisis of capitalism within the EMU itself. In order to do so, I trace the evolution of the political economy of the Eurozone in the post-Bretton woods era, with a particularly focus on the credit system. More specifically, I argue that these crises are the result of an interaction between three meso-level contradictions that have developed within the EMU region: 1) Germany’s postwar accumulation regime, which has produced a deep crisis of overaccumulation; 2) the contradictory processes associated with the neoliberal logic of the EMU, by which I mean the rush to lower barriers to credit and finance at the expense of all else; and 3) credit-fueled, consumption-based EMU integration in the periphery; and. These three contradictions came together in the wake of the 2007-2008 US subprime crisis to form an overall crisis of capitalism in the Eurozone, expressed, as I suggest, as a crisis of fictitious capital. This dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing project among critical political economists to de-naturalize and re-politicize money, while challenging the hegemony of monetarism within neoliberalism. Second, there has yet to be a comprehensive study that examines the EMU, Germany, and the crises in the periphery from a holistic, historical materialist analysis.

The sovereign CDS-Bond basis: From a crisis perspective

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.

An update on EMU sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis: A panel data analysis

We empirically investigate the determinants of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund. Using panel data techniques, we examine the role of a wide set of potential drivers. To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables used in the literature to study the behaviour of sovereign yield spreads and, in particular, to gauge the effect on these spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion. We use a sample of both central and peripheral countries from January 1999 to December 2012 and assess whether there were significant changes after the outbreak of the euro area debt crisis. Our results suggest that the rise in sovereign risk in central countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries.

Dinámicas de las relaciones políticas franco-alemanas en el marco de la Unión Europea. Un análisis en el contexto de la crisis griega. Período 8 de diciembre del 2009- 21 de febrero del 2012

La crisis griega no condicionó de manera especial la manera de negociar de Francia y Alemania. Si se comparan las ruedas de negociación para votar los salvavidas económicos y las negociaciones que se dieron para la firma del Tratado de Maastricht, se puede concluir que, en general, negociaron de una manera similar.

What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

The role of politicians in inciting financial markets to attack the eurozone. EuropEos Commentary No. 4, 21 June 2010

While acknowledging that the sustainability of sovereign debt is a serious issue that must be confronted, this EuropEos Commentary finds that financial markets have blown the problem completely out of proportion, leading to a full-scale confidence crisis. The authors present evidence suggesting that politicians’ public disagreements and careless statements at critical junctures may have added oil to incipient fire. By creating the impression that domestic political interests would take precedence over orderly management of the Greek debt crisis, they raised broader doubts about their ability to address fundamental economic divergences within the area, which are the real source of debt sustainability problems in the medium term.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

State Transformation and the European Integration Project. Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm. CEPS Special Report No. 130/February 2016

The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy. In light of the experience of the financial crisis, the final question is whether the nation state (given the large real inequalities among the EU member states) currently functions as a brake or as an engine for future European integration.

El papel de las organizaciones Internacionales en la imagen de los Estados en el escenario internacional: La crisis Financiera de Argentina y la actuación del Fondo Monetario Internacional 2000- 2010

El presente trabajo de investigación tiene como objetivo identificar el papel que tuvo el Fondo Monetario Internacional [FMI] en el cambio de la imagen del Estado argentino después de la crisis financiera que estalló en el 2001. Como consecuencia de la declaración de default por parte del gobierno argentino se da un cambio en la imagen financiera del país, influenciada por el FMI, que convierte a Argentina en un paria internacional en temas financieros y comerciales alejándolo de los mercados internacionales. Este estudio de caso tendrá un acercamiento cualitativo dado que se analizarán las características, actuaciones y las bases crean el lazo entre las variables de la crisis financiera y el rol del FMI en Argentina y así poder entender su relación.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Latin America: the missing financial crisis

Includes bibliography

Essays on credit rating agencies and the assessment of sovereign risk

Sovereign ratings have only recently regained attention in the academic debate. This seems to be somewhat surprising against the background that their influence is well-known and that rating decisions have often been criticized in the past (as for example during the Asian crisis in the 90s). Sovereign ratings do not only assess the creditworthiness of governments: They are also included in the calculation of ratings for sub-sovereign issuers whereby their rating is usually restricted to the upper bound of the sovereign rating (sovereign ceiling). Earlier studies have also shown that the downgrade of a sovereign often leads to contagion effects on neighbor countries. This study focuses first on misleading incentives in the rating industry before chapter three summarizes the literature on the influence and determinants of sovereign ratings. The fourth chapter explores empirically how ratings respond to changes in sovereign debt across specific country groups. The fifth part focuses on single rating decisions of four selected rating agencies and investigates whether the timing of decisions gives reason for herding behavior. The final chapter presents a reform proposal for the future regulation of the rating industry in light of the aforementioned flaws.rn