Energy and climate - What is the new European Commission thinking? EPC Commentary, 30 September 2014

A visible change of priorities and re-structuring of portfolios in the new European Commission have raised questions about related policy implications especially for climate and energy policies. On the one hand, it is seen that the new structure with Vice Presidents as team leaders for groups of Commissioners could encourage much needed policy coordination between policy areas, such as climate and energy policies. At the same time there are questions over what this could mean for political priorities, to what extent the Vice Presidents will be able to guide policy-making and how responsibilities will be divided. No matter what the structure of the Commission, it is in the EU’s interest to ensure that its climate and energy policies form a framework for action that helps to reduce global emissions, fight climate change locally and globally, secure energy supplies, promote wider socio-economic interests and increase competitiveness – all at the same time.

The European Commission and International Trade Negotiations: A Principal-Agent Approach. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2011

Starting from the concept of delegation of power in external trade policy, this paper aims to investigate the dynamics surrounding the European Union’s position in international trade negotiations. The analysis centres on the role of the European Commission (the agent), which by means of Treaty-based delegation and as mandated by the Council (the principal) acts as the sole trade negotiator in the international sphere on behalf of the European Union (EU). The broader negotiating process is thus conceptualised as a threelevel game, where the Commission holds an intermediary position between the European and international levels and also interacts with the Member States in the Council. After an insight into the European decision-making process for external trade, the paper further analyses the Commission’s role during the multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Development Round. By applying the principal-agent theory to international trade negotiations in general, and subsequently to the controversial agricultural negotiations, this paper seeks to investigate some of the potential sources of autonomy that the Commission can draw upon while upholding an EU position at the international level, in addition to the “hardball” job of balancing the interests of the Member States with those of World Trade Organisation (WTO) partners. Along these lines, the paper finally aims to contribute to the literature concerning agency autonomy in EU external trade relations but also to provide a better understanding of inter-institutional relations within the EU as they may unfold in practice.