The Spanish system of food controls - its administration and enforcement

Following a number of major food safety problems in Europe, including in particular the issues of BSE and dioxin, consumers have become increasingly concerned about food safety. This has led authorities in Europe to revise their systems of food control. The establishment of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is one of the main structural changes made at the moment within the European Union, and similar action at national level has been or is being taken by many EU member states. In Spain a law creating the Spanish Agency of Food Safety has been approved. This has general objectives that include the promotion of food security and offering guarantees and the provision of objective information to consumers and food businesses in the Spanish agrifood sector. This paper reviews the general structure of the current food control system in Spain. At a national level this involves three different Ministries. Spain however also has a devolved system involving Autonomous Communities the paper considers Castilla y Leon as an example. In conclusion the paper recognises that Spain has a complex system for food control. and considers that it will take time before a full evaluation of the new system is possible. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Real-time context-aware network security policy enforcement system (RC-NSPES)

The major technical objectives of the RC-NSPES are to provide a framework for the concurrent operation of reactive and pro-active security functions to deliver efficient and optimised intrusion detection schemes as well as enhanced and highly correlated rule sets for more effective alerts management and root-cause analysis. The design and implementation of the RC-NSPES solution includes a number of innovative features in terms of real-time programmable embedded hardware (FPGA) deployment as well as in the integrated management station. These have been devised so as to deliver enhanced detection of attacks and contextualised alerts against threats that can arise from both the network layer and the application layer protocols. The resulting architecture represents an efficient and effective framework for the future deployment of network security systems.

On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.

The trees and the bees: using enforcement and income projects to protect forests and rural livelihoods through spatial joint production

Forest managers in developing countries enforce extraction restrictions to limit forest degradation. In response, villagers may displace some of their extraction to other forests, which generates “leakage” of degradation. Managers also implement poverty alleviation projects to compensate for lost resource access or to induce conservation. We develop a model of spatial joint production of bees and fuelwood that is based on forest-compatible projects such as beekeeping in Thailand, Tanzania, and Mexico. We demonstrate that managers can better determine the amount and pattern of degradation by choosing the location of both enforcement and the forest-based activity.

Protecting developing countries' forests: enforcement in theory and practice

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing forest and wildlife management access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly from Tanzania and eastern India, provide detail of the key pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identify large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple tiers of enforcement and the incentives facing enforcement officers, and conflict between protected area managers and rural people's needs.

The impact of buffer zone size and management on illegal extraction, park protection and enforcement

Many protected areas or parks in developing countries have buffer zones at their boundaries to achieve the dual goals of protecting park resources and providing resource benefits to neighbouring people. Despite the prevalence of these zoning policies, few behavioural models of people’s buffer zone use inform the sizing and management of those zones. This paper uses a spatially explicit resource extraction model to examine the impact of buffer zone size and management on extraction by local people, both legal and illegal, and the impact of that extraction on forest quality in the park’s core and buffer zone. The results demonstrate trade-offs between the level of enforcement, the size of a buffer zone, and the amount of illegal extraction in the park; and describe implications for “enrichment” of buffer zones and evaluating patterns of forest degradation.

Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.

Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania

In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.

Enforcement in environmental law: an economic analysis of citizen suits

Previous to 1970, state and federal agencies held exclusive enforcement responsibilities over the violation of pollution control standards. However, recognizing that the government had neither the time nor resources to provide full enforcement, Congress created citizen suits. Citizen suits, first amended to the Clean Air Act in 1970, authorize citizens to act as private attorney generals and to sue polluters for violating the terms of their operating permits. Since that time, Congress has included citizen suits in 13 other federal statutes. The citizen suit phenomenon is sufficiently new that little is known about it. However, we do know that citizen suits have increased rapidly since the early 1980's. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of citizen suits jumped from 41 to 266. Obviously, they are becoming a widely used method of enforcing the environmental statutes. This paper will provide a detailed description, analysis and evaluation of citizen suits. It will begin with an introduction and will then move on to provide some historic and descriptive background on such issues as how citizen suit powers are delegated, what limitations are placed on the citizens, what parties are on each side of the suit, what citizens can enforce against, and the types of remedies available. The following section of the paper will provide an economic analysis of citizen suits. It will begin with a discussion of non-profit organizations, especially non-profit environmental organizations, detailing the economic factors which instigate their creation and activities. Three models will be developed to investigate the evolution and effects of citizen suits. The first model will provide an analysis of the demand for citizen suits from the point of view of a potential litigator showing how varying remedies, limitations and reimbursement procedures can effect both the level and types of activities undertaken. The second model shows how firm behavior could be expected to respond to citizen suits. Finally, a third model will look specifically at the issue of efficiency to determine whether the introduction of citizen enforcement leads to greater or lesser economic efficiency in pollution control. The database on which the analysis rests consists of 1205 cases compiled by the author. For the purposes of this project this list of citizen suit cases and their attributes were computerized and used to test a series of hypotheses derived from three original economic models. The database includes information regarding plaintiffs, defendants date notice and/or complaint was filed and statutes involved in the claim. The analysis focuses on six federal environmental statutes (Clean Water Act} Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act) because the majority of citizen suits have occurred under these statutes.