The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

The red triangle, being some further chronicles of Martin Hewitt, investigator,

Mode of access: Internet.

The triangle arithmetics /

Mode of access: Internet.

The minimal properties of the isogonal centers of a triangle /

Thesis (M. A.)--Cornell University, Dec., 1921.

Principes de la nouvelle géométrie du triangle.

"Extrait des comptes rendus du Congrès scientifique international des Catholiques tenue à Paris du 1er au 6 avril 1891."

The triangle /

Sabin 103231.

Contributions to the geometry of the triangle,

Mode of access: Internet.

The triangle's end, a novelette.

Mode of access: Internet.

A plan of topo. survey for the grounds and adjoining triangle. The Ravinia School. Highland Park, Illinois.

Pencil, yellow, black ink on linen; some elevations, revisions, additions in pencil; unsigned. 120x90 cm. Scale: 1"=20' [from photographic copy by Lance Burgharrdt]

Export processing zones and growth triangle development: The case of the BIMP-EAGA, Southeast Asia

Exorts processing zones (EPZs) and growth triangles have been two common Asian initiatives to increase wealth and regional competitiveness in the world economy. Since they are seldom analysed jointly, this paper investigates their mutuality in the development process. Taking the problematic case of the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) triangle, we explore the role of EPZs in enhancing regional collaboration, competitiveness, and domestic linkages. Despite the triangle's weak economic complementarities, its processing zones are found capable of advancing development by furthering opportunities in regionalisation/localisation of production. Latterly, trade and investment liberalisation within ASEAN raises broad questions about the rationale of EPZs and growth triangles. Zone-triangle nexuses will require rethinking as, under different regulatory conditions, the zones compete more directly across ASEAN and also with global rivals. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Maximal triangle trades with foundation 5 (mod 6) - the final case

The maximum possible volume of a simple, non-Steiner (v, 3, 2) trade was determined for all v by Xhosrovshahi and Torabi (Ars Combinatoria 51 (1999), 211-223), except that in the-case v equivalent to 5 (mod 6), v >= 23, they were only able to provide an upper, bound on the volume. In this paper we construct trades with volume equal to that bound for all v equivalent to 5 (mod 6), thus completing the problem.

The United Kingdom between Mars and Venus:bridge or Bermuda triangle?

The concept of the United Kingdom acting as a bridge between Europe and the United States has been a key element in British foreign policy for six decades. Under the second Blair Premiership it reached both its apogee and its nadir. This paper analyses these developments focusing both on the transatlantic and European ends. Particular attention is paid to the failure of the Blair government either to establish a secure place for Britain as a co-leader or to make the British people more comfortable in their European skins. This failure occurred at a period when the EU is characterised by leadership transition and confusion. New leaderships will emerge in the EU over the next two years but it seems unlikely that Britain, characterised by a continuing disconnect between a Euro-sceptic public discourse and deep involvement at a governmental level will develop a European policy narrative that is regarded as convincing at either the EU or domestic level. This weakness is compounded by a failure to develop new thinking about the rise of new powers such as China and India.