Dispute Settlement Alternatives in Future EU BITS. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2012

Following the inclusion of the Common Commercial Policy in the exclusive competences of the European Union, a handful of policy adjustments have occurred. Among these adjustments, investment protection has been a remarkable one - given its new, exclusive framework and an already established, state-level practice. As the new policy stands, Bilateral Investment Treaties, which had been negotiated and executed by the EU Member States in the pre-Lisbon period, can now only be negotiated and executed by the EU. These prospective ‘EU BITs’, inter alia, aim for an even stronger mechanism for the protection of investors both in the EU and in third states. A strong protection mechanism inevitably calls for a strong Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and the establishment of a DSM may prove to be challenging. The EU currently faces several questions on its path to a tangible and reliable ‘EU BIT’, and arguably the most outstanding one is the question of the DSMs to be incorporated in these new agreements. What are the alternatives of a DSM for these new BITs? Which alternatives are currently utilizable and which ones are not? What are the current problems that the EU face, and how can those problems be tackled? Is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes an alternative, and if not, why? Following a thorough overview, this paper aims to analyse the DSM alternatives for the EU to be used in the new EU BITs and ultimately provide a solid DSM proposal.

Investor-State Dispute Resolution as an Issue in Transatlantic Trade Negotiations: Lessons from NAFTA. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 3, August 2015

A major issue in the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations is investor-state dispute resolution as it relates to foreign investments. The United States would like to have strong investor protections similar to those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) included in the TTIP agreement. Civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic object to binding arbitration of investment disputes, fearing that arbitration awards could endanger environmental and other types of regulations. This paper examines the experience with investor-state dispute resolution under NAFTA to determine whether judgments rendered in these cases have had adverse effects.

Why Do Some International Institutions Contain Strong Dispute Settlement Provisions: New Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements

To understand why some international institutions have stronger dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) than others, we investigate the dispute settlement provisions of nearly 600 preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which possess several desirable case-selection features and are evoked more than is realized. We broaden the study of dispute settlement design beyond “legalization” and instead reorient theorizing around a multi-faceted conceptualization of the strength of DSMs. We posit that strong DSMs are first and foremost a rational response to features of agreements that require stronger dispute settlement, such as depth and large memberships. Multivariate empirical tests using a new data set on PTA design confirm these expectations and reveal that depth – the amount of policy change specified in an agreement – is the most powerful and consistent predictor of DSM strength, providing empirical support to a long-posited but controversial conjecture. Yet power also plays a sizeable role, since agreements among asymmetric members are more likely to have strong DSMs due to their mutual appeal, as are those involving the United States. Important regional differences also emerge, as PTAs across the Americas are designed with strong dispute settlement, as are Asian PTAs, which contradicts the conventional wisdom about Asian values and legalization. Our findings demonstrate that rationalism explains much of international institutional design, yet it can be enhanced by also incorporating power-based and regional explanations.

Principles underlying labor-dispute disqualification,

"Prepared at the request of the Bureau of Employment Security by Marsile J. Hughes of the Illinois Division of Placement and Unemployment Compensation." -- Foreword.

Report and recommendations of the fact finding panel in the Greyhound bus dispute. February 21, 1946.

"Minority report of labor member": p. 61-67.

By a Committee appointed by the National Mediation Board in the matter of the application of : Air Line Pilots Association, International alleging representation dispute pursuant to Section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act and Flight Engineers' International Association involving employees of United Air Lines, Incorporated. Findings upon investigation January 17, 1961.

File no. C-2946.

Report to the President to investigate an unadjusted dispute between American Airlines, inc. : a carrier, and certain of its employees represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International, a labor organization.

Sign: James Healy, Maynard E. Pirsig, Benjamin C. Roberts.

Problems and policies of dispute settlement and wage stabilization during World War II.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed June 15, 1950, pursuant to section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, to investigate an unadjusted dispute between the Boston & Albany Railroad Company and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. NMB Case No. A-3392. Boston, Mass., July 6, 1950. No. 86.

Mode of access: Internet.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed February 4, 1950, by Executive order 10105, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate and report in respect to a dispute between the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a carrier, and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (NMB case A-3065), Denver, Colorado, February 28, 1950.

Signed: Robert G. Simmons, chairman, Robert O. Boyd, member, Harold R. Korey, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board ... to investigate and report in respect to the dispute between the Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Railway Co., Chicago & North Western Railway, Great Northern Railway, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway, and certain of their employees as represented by the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express, and Station Employees.

Cover title.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board created June 23, 1948 by Executive order 9971 pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act : to investigate and report upon a dispute between the Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co., Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., Wabash Railroad and the Ann Arbor Railroad Co. and certain of its employees represented by the National Maritime Union of America, N.M.B. cases A-2801, A-2802, A-2803, A-2804, Detroit, Michigan, July 20, 1948.

Signed: Robert G. Simmons, chairman, Thomas F. Gallagher, member, Joseph L. Miller, member.

Report to the President by the Emergency Board appointed September 15, 1949, by Executive order 10078, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended : to investigate an unadjusted dispute between the Monongahela Connecting Railroad Company and certain of its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a labor organization (N.M.B. no. A-3220), Pittsburgh, Pa., October 7, 1949.

Signed: Harry H. Schwartz, chairman, Francis J. Robertson, member, Andrew Jackson, member.