Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & C��rte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Women's decision making and experience of subsequent pregnancy following stillbirth.

INTRODUCTION: This study sought to increase understanding of women's thoughts and feelings about decision making and the experience of subsequent pregnancy following stillbirth (intrauterine death after 24 weeks' gestation). METHODS: Eleven women were interviewed, 8 of whom were pregnant at the time of the interview. Modified grounded theory was used to guide the research methodology and to analyze the data. RESULTS: A model was developed to illustrate women's experiences of decision making in relation to subsequent pregnancy and of subsequent pregnancy itself. DISCUSSION: The results of the current study have significant implications for women who have experienced stillbirth and the health professionals who work with them. Based on the model, women may find it helpful to discuss their beliefs in relation to healing and health professionals to provide support with this in mind. Women and their partners may also benefit from explanations and support about the potentially conflicting emotions they may experience during this time.

A Salience Theory of Choice Errors

We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality of the agent (his general propensity to consider all alternatives). The model turns out to include a logit formulation as a special case. In general, it has a rich set of implications both for exogenous parameters and for a situation in which alternatives can a��ect their own salience (salience games). Such implications are relevant to assess the link between 'revealed' preferences and 'true' preferences: for example, less rational agents may paradoxically express their preference through choice more truthfully than more rational agents.

Effects of anxiety on visuospatial pattern discrimination and decision-making processes: what can we learn from brain dynamics ?

Detection and discrimination of visuospatial input involve at least extracting, selecting and encoding relevant information and decision-making processes allowing selecting a response. These two operations are altered, respectively, by attentional mechanisms that change discrimination capacities, and by beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events. Information processing is tuned by the attentional level that acts like a filter on perception, while decision-making processes are weighed by subjective probability of risk. In addition, it has been shown that anxiety could affect the detection of unexpected events through the modification of the level of arousal. Consequently, purpose of this study concerns whether and how decision-making and brain dynamics are affected by anxiety. To investigate these questions, the performance of women with either a high (12) or a low (12) STAI-T (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Spielberger, 1983) was examined in a decision-making visuospatial task where subjects have to recognize a target visual pattern from non-target patterns. The target pattern was a schematic image of furniture arranged in such a way as to give the impression of a living room. Non-target patterns were created by either the compression or the dilatation of the distances between objects. Target and non-target patterns were always presented in the same configuration. Preliminary behavioral results show no group difference in reaction time. In addition, visuo-spatial abilities were analyzed trough the signal detection theory for quantifying perceptual decisions in the presence of uncertainty (Green and Swets, 1966). This theory treats detection of a stimulus as a decision-making process determined by the nature of the stimulus and cognitive factors. Astonishingly, no difference in d' (corresponding to the distance between means of the distributions) and c (corresponds to the likelihood ratio) indexes was observed. Comparison of Event-related potentials (ERP) reveals that brain dynamics differ according to anxiety. It shows differences in component latencies, particularly a delay in anxious subjects over posterior electrode sites. However, these differences are compensated during later components by shorter latencies in anxious subjects compared to non-anxious one. These inverted effects seem indicate that the absence of difference in reaction time rely on a compensation of attentional level that tunes cortical activation in anxious subjects, but they have to hammer away to maintain performance.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with J��r��mie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with J��r��mie Cabessa and Andr��s Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind: Is there an association?

Introduction. In autism and schizophrenia attenuated/atypical functional hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind impairments have been reported, suggesting common underlying neuroscientific correlates. We here investigated whether impaired theory of mind performance is associated with attenuated/atypical hemispheric asymmetry. An association may explain the co-occurrence of both dysfunctions in psychiatric populations. Methods. Healthy participants (n 129) performed a left hemisphere (lateralised lexical decision task) and right hemisphere (lateralised face decision task) dominant task as well as a visual cartoon task to assess theory of mind performance. Results. Linear regression analyses revealed inconsistent associations between theory of mind performance and functional hemisphere asymmetry: enhanced theory of mind performance was only associated with (1) faster right hemisphere language processing, and (2) reduced right hemisphere dominance for face processing (men only). Conclusions. The majority of non-significant findings suggest that theory of mind and functional hemispheric asymmetry are unrelated. Instead of ''overinterpreting'' the two significant results, discrepancies in the previous literature relating to the problem of the theory of mind concept, the variety of tasks, and the lack of normative data are discussed. We also suggest how future studies could explore a possible link between hemispheric asymmetry and theory of mind.

A Grounded Theory Model of the Counselling Referral Process in Primary Care Methadone Treatment in Ireland.

In terms of the treatment of illicit drug abuse, methadone maintenance is a well researched and widely applied systematic response. The approach to primary care methadone treatment in Ireland is based on the methadone protocol. Primary care plays a central role in the delivery of methadone treatment. Beginning with a view that a system evolves within the constraints and influencing factors of its context, the aim of this thesis is to model the process that has developed by which patients on primary care methadone treatment are referred to counselling. It investigates the role primary care practitioners perceive they have in relation to managing the psychosocial aspects of the methadone patient's treatment regime. It analyzes individual medical practitioner counselling referral mechanisms to determine what common processes operate across different practitioners. It identifies the factors that influence the use of counselling on primary care methadone programmes and structures these in a cause/effect model. This research used interviews and documentary analysis to acquire grounded data. The sample consisted primarily of medical practitioners involved in the delivery of methadone programmes. Others closely involved in the implementation of drug treatment in the primary care context made up the balance of interviewees. The study used a grounded theory methodology to induce the process that was latent in the grounded data. Concepts emerging were grouped under the headings of referral factors, decision making factors and factors related to the unique positioning of primary care at the interface between medicine and society. The core finding was that, in primary care in Ireland, there is no psychological model to complement the pharmacological intervention of methadone substitution. The findings from this study offer insight into the factors at work and their impacts, in the context of the use of counselling in primary care methadone treatment. The study suggests a possible direction for further evolution of opiate abuse treatment in Ireland which would transform it from a harm reduction to a holistic patient centric paradigm.This resource was contributed by The National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.

Accepting Methadone: The Evolution of an Institutional Decision

This is a study of organisational decision making among senior civil servants in the Department of Health (DOH) in relation to the acceptance of methadone maintenance as a valid treatment modality for opiate misuse in Ireland. A qualitative strategy was adopted with an emergent design and grounded theory perspective. The data was collected using a naturalistic mode of inquiry and comprised of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The aspects of decision making chosen for the study were: 1. Identifying the actors involved considering the heretofore dominant 'corporation sole' culture of the Irish public administration. 2. Identifying two (out of the myriad) processes involved in decision making. 3. Identifying what theoretical model(s) of decision making most closely approximates to this case. The findings were as follows: 1. Actors involved at all levels of the decision making could be identified, albeit with some difficulty. This as a result of the strategic management initiative. Previously, it may not have been possible. Stages or phases could not, in this case, be readily identified though limitations of this study may prove significant. 2. Both the processes selected in decision-making in this case were confirmed. Personal and professional support provided by peers and seniors is crucial to decision making. Decision making does occur within networks: these tend to be those that are formally appointed rather than informal ones. 3. The model closest to that of this case was that of incremental decision making within network settings.This resource was contributed by The National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.

Using problem-based learning for introducing producer theory and market structure in intermediate microeconomics

This paper shows how instructors can use the problem���based learning method to introduce producer theory and market structure in intermediate microeconomics courses. The paper proposes a framework where different decision problems are presented to students, who are asked to imagine that they are the managers of a firm who need to solve a problem in a particular business setting. In this setting, the instructors��� role isto provide both guidance to facilitate student learning and content knowledge on a just���in���time basis

Entrepreneurial decision-making using the knightian uncertainty approach

The article discusses the behavioral aspects that affect the entrepreneurs' decision making under the Knightian uncertainty approach. Since the profit arising from entrepreneurial activity represents the reward of an immeasurable and subjective risk, it has been hypothesized that innovative entrepreneurs have excessive optimism and confidence, which leads them to invest in high-risk activities. A behavioral model of decision making under uncertainty is used to test the hypothesis of overconfidence. This model is based on Bayesian inference, which allows us to model the assumption that these entrepreneurs are overconfident. We conclude that, under the hypothesis of overconfidence, these entrepreneurs decide to invest, despite the fact that the expected utility model indicates the contrary. This theoretical finding could explain why there are a large number of business failures in the first years of activity.

Measurement with Some Theory: a New Approach to Evaluate Business Cycle Models

We propose a method to evaluate cyclical models which does not require knowledge of the DGP and the exact empirical specification of the aggregate decision rules. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks and others to evaluate the model or contrast sub-models. The approach has good size and excellent power properties, even in small samples. We show how to examine the validity of a class of models, sort out the relevance of certain frictions, evaluate the importance of an added feature, and indirectly estimate structural parameters.

Salience theory of choice under risk

We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor of salient payoffs. By endogenizing decision weights as a function of payoffs, our model provides a novel and unified account of many empirical phenomena, including frequent risk-seeking behavior, invariance failures such as the Allais paradox, and preference reversals. It also yields new predictions, including some that distinguish it from Prospect Theory, which we test.

Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specificationof the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use someto identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. Theapproach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. Themethod is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers)in a standard class of models.

A theory of reference-dependent behavior

Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.