An export strategy and technology networks in the Republic of Korea

In Korea, trade with Japan has had a deficit since the normalization of Japan-Korea diplomatic relations in 1965. Korea’s trade balance with Japan has remained in deficit since then, although Korean companies have become bigger compared to Japanese companies. My hypothesis is that the problem has been caused because Korea introduced technologies from Japan. However, in recent years Korean companies could not introduce technologies through technical cooperation with Japan like in the 1990s. In addition, the Korean government seemed to encourage domestic production for import substitution. Nevertheless, the deficit has continued. I thought it necessary to check my hypothesis in order to discover whether or not it was persuasive.

Did Japanese direct investment in Korea suppress indigenous industrialization in the 1930s? : evidence from country-level factory entry patterns

Foreign direct investment (FDI) can deliver both positive and negative spillovers to the local economy. Negative effects such as crowding-out or entry-barrier effects might outweigh the positive ones when the technological gap between foreign and local firms is significant. This paper examines the impact of Japanese direct investment into Korea under colonization in the 1930s on the entry of Korean-owned factories. By using the census of manufacturing factories in Korea, we exploit variations in the share of Japanese factories and their entry rates across counties within the same subsectors. We find that within a subsector, entry rates of Korean factories were higher in counties with higher presence and entry of Japanese factories. Positive correlations are also found between subsectors. The results imply that Japanese direct investment did not suppress the entry of Korean factories and that FDI could exert positive entry spillovers on indigenous firms, even at a very early stage of industrialization.

China's Strategic Choices towards North Korea and Iran

This study tests two hypotheses. First, China cooperates with the United States only when it is able to obtain material rewards. Second, without material incentives from the United States, China straddles between the United States on one hand and Iran and North Korea on the other. My findings show that neither Structural Realism, which holds anti-hegemonism alliance, nor Constructivism, which holds positive assimilation of the nuclear nonproliferation norm explains Chinese international behavior comprehensively. My balance of interest model explains Chinese foreign policy on the noncompliant states better. The cases cover the Sino-North Korean and Sino-Iranian diplomatic histories from 1990 to 2013 vis-à-vis the United States. The study is both a within-case comparison—that is, changes of China’s stance across time—and a cross-case comparison in China’s position regarding Iran and North Korea. My comparisons contribute to theoretical and empirical analyses in international relations literature. Theoretically, the research creates different options for the third party between the two antagonistic actors. China will have seven different types of reaction: balancing, bandwagoning, mediating, and abetting that foster strategic clarity versus hiding, delaying, and straddling which are symptomatic of strategic ambiguity. I argue that there is a gradation between pure balancing and pure supporting. Empirically, the test results show that Chinese leaders have tried to find a balance between its material interests and international reputation by engaging in straddling and delaying inconsistently. There are two major findings. First, China’s foreign policy has been reactive. Whereas prior to 2006, balancing against the U.S. had been a dominant strategy, since 2006, China has shown strategic ambiguity. Second, Chinese leaders believe that the preservation of stability in the region outweighs denuclearization of the noncompliant states, because it is in China’s interest to maintain a manageable tension between the U.S. and the noncompliant states. The balance of interest model suggests that the best way to understand China’s preferences is to consider them as products of rough calculation of risks and rewards on both the U.S. and the noncompliant states.

North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program : A Critical Analysis

North Korea's regime has one goal, to guarantee its survival. To accomplish that goal it desired the U.S. to maintain a strong presence on the Korean Peninsula to act as an international deterrent against possible foreign occupation of its nation. The DPRK encouraged the U.S. by signing the 1994 Agreed Framework, a formal commitment between the two countries that froze North Korea's nuclear programs in exchange for U.S. energy aid. In 2002 the Bush Administration did not honour its commitment and blamed North Korea for the Agreed Framework's collapse. North Korea retaliated by choosing to become a nuclear nation, an action guaranteed to insure a constant U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula.

Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Future of the Troubled State after Kim Jong-Il

Since 2008, international speculation about the viability of Kim Jong-Il's leadership in North Korea has been at the forefront of diplomatic discussions. North Korea is known to be a secretive state where human rights violations abound. This paper discusses the history of leadership and government in North Korea since World War II, the current human rights situation in the country, the role of China, and potential successors to Kim Jong-Il. The ramifications of impending regime change are discussed in terms of North Korea's human rights issues and economic problems. While current efforts at diplomacy have proved ineffective, the need for concerned nations, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations to be prepared to engage North Korea after Kim Jong-Il is imperative.

East China Sea and Yellow Sea Regions, China, North Korea, and South Korea, 1749 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Carte du Katay : ou, Empire de Kin, pour servir a l'histoire de Jenghiz Khan ; raportée dans l'histoire generale des voyages, tirée de l'Anglois = Kaart van Kitay, of 't Ryk der Kin, dienende tot de historie van Jenghiz Khan, uit de Engelsche in dit Bestek gebragt. ; J.V. Schley direx. It was published by Pierre de Hondt in 1749. Scale [ca. 1:1,500,000]. Covers the East China Sea and Yellow Sea regions, China, North Korea, and South Korea. Map in French and Dutch. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the World Miller Cylindrical projected coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, territorial boundaries, shoreline features, and more. Shows also the Great Wall of China and the travels of Genghis Khan. Relief shown pictorially. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

China, North Korea, and South Korea, 1749 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: La Chine avec la Korée, et les parties de la Tartarie les plus voisines : tirées des cartes que les Jesuites Missionaires ont levées les années 1708, jusqu'en 1717, J. V. Schley direx. It was published by Pierre de Hondt in 1749. Scale [ca. 1:2,100,000]. Covers East and Central China, and North and South Korea, and a small portion of Mongolia. Map in French and Dutch.The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Asia North Lambert Conformal Conic coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, territorial boundaries, shoreline features, the Great Wall of China, and more. Relief shown pictorially. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.

China, North Korea, and South Korea, 1808 (Raster Image)

This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: China, Neele sculpt. It was published by Longman & Co, Paternoster Row in Jany. 1, 1808. Scale [ca. 1:9,600,000]. Covers East and Central China, and North and South Korea, and a small portion of Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, India, Japan, and Russia. Map in French and Dutch. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Asia North Lambert Conformal Conic coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, territorial boundaries, shoreline features, and more.This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.