971 resultados para DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Resumo:
オリンピックを見ていてふと我に返ることがあった。自分はなぜ日本人選手ばかり応援しているのだろうか、と。自分の中にはそれほど強い国粋主義が眠っているのだろうか。しかし、日本人を応援するのは私ばかりではないように思える。サッカーのワールドカップやオリンピックとなると日本の多くの人々が日本チームや日本人選手を応援する。それは日本人の関心や嗜好が内向きになっていることを示しているのだろうか。(以下略)
Resumo:
Independent Myanmar and Japan had long held the strongest ties among Asian countries, and they were often known as having "special relations" or a "historically friendly relationship." Such relations were guaranteed by the sentiments and experiences of the leaders of both countries. Among others, Ne Win, former strongman throughout the socialist period (1962-1988), was educated and trained by the Japanese army officers of the Minami Kikan, leading to the birth of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). Huge official development assistance provided by the Japanese government also cemented this special relationship. However, the birth of the present military government (SLORC/SPDC) in 1988 drastically changed this favorable relationship between the two countries. When the military seized power in a coup, Japan was believed to be the only country that possessed sufficient meaningful influence on Myanmar to encourage a move toward national reconciliation between the junta and the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi. In reality, Japan failed to exert such an influence due to its sour relations with the military government and reduced influence in the new international and regional political landscape. What is worse, Japan seems to be losing its say on Myanmar issues in the international political arena, as it has been wavering in limbo between the sanctionist forces, such as the United States and the European Union, and engagement forces, such as China and ASEAN.
Resumo:
Per capita food availability in the developing world has increased by 20% since the early 1960s, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, and today the world has twice as many people but 150 million fewer hungry people than in 1960. The world agricultural system has not done too bad a job over the past 35 years. It is likely that global agricultural production will continue to at least match growth in food demand over the next decade, assuming no major weather anomalies. Continued support of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research and programs involving U.S. universities is important to sharing knowledge about agriculture with colleagues in the developing world. This paper explores the reasons for providing agricultural development assistance, the benefits to the United States that come from doing so, and the special challenges facing the world over the next few decades.
Resumo:
Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center, McLean, Va.
Resumo:
"ED/OPP93-43"--P. [C-7] (v. 1).
Resumo:
"The work that provided the basis for this publication was supported by funding under an award with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The substance and findings of the work are dedicated to the public. The author and publisher are soley responsible for the accuracy of the statements and interpretations contained in this publication. Such interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government."
Resumo:
Paridades de poder adquisitivo para América Latina y el Caribe, 2005-2013: métodos y resultados / Hernán Epstein y Salvador Marconi .-- Asistencia oficial para el desarrollo, capital social y crecimiento en América Latina / Isabel Neira, Maricruz Lacalle-Calderón y Marta Portela .-- Perú, 2002-2012: crecimiento, cambio estructural y formalización / Juan Chacaltana .-- Descentralización fiscal y crecimiento económico en Colombia: evidencia de datos de panel a nivel regional / Ignacio Lozano y Juan Manuel Julio .-- Efecto de las TIC en el rendimiento educativo: el Programa Conectar Igualdad en la Argentina / María Verónica Alderete y María Marta Formichella .-- Brasil: dinámica de la industria de bienes de capital en el ciclo de expansivo 2003-2008 y tras la crisis mundial / Guilherme Riccioppo Magacho .-- Segregación socioeconómica escolar en Chile: elección de la escuela por los padres y un análisis contrafactual teórico / Humberto Santos y Gregory Elacqua .-- Desigualdad de ingresos en Costa Rica a la luz de las Encuestas Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares 2004 y 2013 / Andrés Fernández Aráuz .-- Contenido de trabajo en las exportaciones manufactureras mexicanas, 2008 y 2012 / Gerardo Fujii G., Rosario Cervantes M. y Ana Sofía Fabián R. .-- La terciarización en Chile. Desigualdad cultural y estructura ocupacional / Modesto Gayo, María Luisa Méndez y Berta Teitelboim.
Resumo:
En este trabajo se examina la relación entre la asistencia oficial para el desarrollo (AOD), el capital social y el crecimiento económico en América Latina, con miras a determinar si el efecto de dicha asistencia en el crecimiento depende de las reservas de capital social del país receptor. Con ese objetivo se utiliza la “confianza” para medir el capital social en un panel incompleto de 18 países latinoamericanos en el período 2001-2010. Después de explicar los efectos relativos al país y al tiempo en un modelo de datos de panel dinámico, los resultados permiten ver que el efecto de la AOD en el crecimiento depende, de hecho, del nivel de confianza que existe. Esto sugiere que esa asistencia será más eficaz cuando se utilice en un ambiente donde dicho nivel sea elevado.
Resumo:
Although considerable attention has been given to ethical issues related to clinical research in developing countries, in particular related to HIV therapy, there has been limited focus on health systems research, despite its increasing importance in the light of current trends in development assistance. This paper examines ethical issues related to health systems research in 'post'-conflict situations, addressing both generic issues for developing countries and those issues specific to 'post'-conflict societies, citing examples from the author's Cambodian experience. It argues that the destruction of health infrastructure results in a loss of structures and processes that would otherwise protect prospective research subjects who are part of vulnerable populations. It identifies the growth of health systems research as part of a trend towards sectoral and programmatic development assistance, the emergence of 'knowledge generation' as a form of research linked to development, and the potential for conflict where multilateral and bilateral donors are both primary funders and users of health systems research. It also examines the position of the health system researcher in relation to the sponsors of this research, and the health system being analysed.
Resumo:
When comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, it has tended to be solely vis-a-vis the ‘development state’ East Asian experience. This paper broadens the analysis and considers lessons which African countries can learn from other so-called ‘tiger’ economies including Ireland and the East and South Asian countries. We recognise that the latter are indeed clearly significant as many African countries at the time of independence had economic structures and levels of income quite similar to East Asian countries, yet have grown at vastly different rates since then. Exploring why this has been the case can thus offer important insights into possibilities for industrial policy. Yet this comes with some health warnings over East Asian experience. We suggest that another important contribution can come by looking at the Irish example, given its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state direction in the operation of industrial policy. The Irish model is also more democratic in some senses and has protected workers’ rights during the development process in contrast to the often highly dirigisite East Asian model. Overall we suggest that some immediate actions are needed, notably with regard to the financial system in small African economies. Without such changes, a poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low levels. In relation to the small size of the African economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient overseas development assistance (ODA) for infrastructural development. It is also critical to note that the various small African economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, and that a ‘one size fits all’ approach is not appropriate; rather the key is to tailor policies and systems to the unique opportunities and development challenges in each African country.
Resumo:
This article seeks to investigate the relative contributions of foreign direct investment, official development assistance and migrant remittances to economic growth in developing countries. We use a systems methodology to account for the inherent endogeneities in these relationships. In addition, we also examine the importance of institutions, not only for growth directly, but for the interactions between institutions and the other sources of growth. It is, we believe, the first article to consider each of these variables together. We find that all sources of foreign capital have a positive and significant impact on growth when institutions are taken into account. © 2013 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
Resumo:
The accession of the East-Central European (ECE) countries carried a promise of enhancing and enriching the EU’s Eastern policy. The new member states had the strongest interests among EU member states to ensure that countries in the East are prosperous, stable and democratic. Yet, EU’s Eastern policy has been largely criticised for its ineffectiveness. So why have they not been able to address the shortcomings in the EU’s Eastern policies? The article argues that the ECE countries supported the way the EU’s Eastern policies were conceived and implemented because they saw it as a potent vehicle to promote their own transition experience not only in the region but also within the EU. We argue that the ECE states have experienced three types of challenges when promoting their transition experience. First, uploading to the EU level remained largely at a rhetorical level. Second, there are conceptual and practical difficulties in defining what constitutes transition experience and harnessing it, as well as coordinating its transfer between the ECE states. Finally, while using transition experience as the basis for their development assistance strategies, the ECE countries actually insufficiently conceptualised the ‘development’ aspect in these policies. Being so driven by their own experience, they have not drawn the lessons from enlargement to use in a non-accession context, especially by incorporating the broader lessons with regard to development.
Resumo:
Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.
Resumo:
Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.
Resumo:
The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey's involvement in the promotion of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, and World Bank.^ My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels. These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first, to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.^ I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the field is that I documented Turkey's case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of Turkey's involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between the identity and strategic interests in states' foreign policy decisions.^