Understanding Insurance Company Financial Stability Ratings, January 2007

Choosing a financially strong insurance company is important when buying health insurance. You want the company to still be in business when you have claims, which can be 20 to 30 years from now. Insurance companies selling insurance in Iowa have met the minimum legal standards to be licensed by the State of Iowa Insurance Division. This licensure doesn’t mean the company has a high financial stability rating. Several independent rating agencies evaluate the financial stability of insurance companies. The rating for an individual insurance company is an opinion as to its financial strength and ability to pay claims in the future. When evaluating a company, a rating agency may consider a company's balance sheet strength, operating performance and business management and strategies.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Cards on Student Incomes: Proceed With Caution – and Shop With Care, Fall 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Cards on Student Incomes: Proceed With Caution – and Shop With Care.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Bank Credit Card Information, Fall 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Bank Credit Card Information

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt, October 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: More Sources on Students and Credit Card Debt Suggested by the Office of Attorney General Tom Miller

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to Deal With Credit Card Offers, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to Deal With Credit Card Offers

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Get Your FREE Credit Reports, June 2006

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Get Your FREE Credit Reports

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Credit Card Protection Plans" -- Paying for What You Can Do for Free?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Advance Fee Loans and Credit Repair Schemes

Credit cycles in theory and experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.