Discourses of Corporate crime as natural disaster: the case of the Paddington Rail Crash

Drawing on the literature in criminology and media studies on the nature of social understandings of corporate crime and its representation in the media, this paper takes one small but important step in this direction by carrying out a linguistic case study on the news coverage of one sequence of events which resulted from corporate negligence – the Paddington rail crash, a sequence of news events that were important as they led to legal change as regards corporate responsibility in Britain. The paper concludes by showing that while the news coverage played an important part in leading to a change in the law regarding corporate responsibility, although this received little coverage in the press.

Overestimated crash risks of young and elderly drivers

Young and elderly drivers are reported to have markedly greater crash rates than drivers of other ages, but they travel less frequently and represent a minority of road users. Consequently, many crashes involving young or elderly drivers also involve drivers of middle age ranges who travel more frequently.

Multibody modelling of a TB31 and a TB32 crash test with vertical portable concrete barriers: model verification and sensitivity analysis.

In this article the multibody simulation software package MADYMO for analysing and optimizing occupant safety design was used to model crash tests for Normal Containment barriers in accordance with EN 1317. The verification process was carried out by simulating a TB31 and a TB32 crash test performed on vertical portable concrete barriers and by comparing the numerical results to those obtained experimentally. The same modelling approach was applied to both tests to evaluate the predictive capacity of the modelling at two different impact speeds. A sensitivity analysis of the vehicle stiffness was also carried out. The capacity to predict all of the principal EN1317 criteria was assessed for the first time: the acceleration severity index, the theoretical head impact velocity, the barrier working width and the vehicle exit box. Results showed a maximum error of 6% for the acceleration severity index and 21% for theoretical head impact velocity for the numerical simulation in comparison to the recorded data. The exit box position was predicted with a maximum error of 4°. For the working width, a large percentage difference was observed for test TB31 due to the small absolute value of the barrier deflection but the results were well within the limit value from the standard for both tests. The sensitivity analysis showed the robustness of the modelling with respect to contact stiffness increase of ±20% and ±40%. This is the first multibody model of portable concrete barriers that can reproduce not only the acceleration severity index but all the test criteria of EN 1317 and is therefore a valuable tool for new product development and for injury biomechanics research.

Vehicle-barrier tracking of a scaled crash test for roadside barrier design

In this paper the tracking system used to perform a scaled vehicle-barrier crash test is reported. The scaled crash test was performed as part of a wider project aimed at designing a new safety barrier making use of natural building materials. The scaled crash test was designed and performed as a proof of concept of the new mass-based safety barriers and the study was composed of two parts: the scaling technique and of a series of performed scaled crash tests. The scaling method was used for 1) setting the scaled test impact velocity so that energy dissipation and momentum transferring, from the car to the barrier, can be reproduced and 2) predicting the acceleration, velocity and displacement values occurring in the full-scale impact from the results obtained in a scaled test. To achieve this goal the vehicle and barrier displacements were to be recorded together with the vehicle accelerations and angular velocities. These quantities were measured during the tests using acceleration sensors and a tracking system. The tracking system was composed of a high speed camera and a set of targets to measure the vehicle linear and angular velocities. A code was developed to extract the target velocities from the videos and the velocities obtained were then compared with those obtained integrating the accelerations provided by the sensors to check the reliability of the method.

Economic Ideas and the Political Construction of the Financial Crash of 2008

This article is a short introduction to a special section on economic ideas and the political construction of the financial crash. It begins by explaining why economic ideas and the politics of appeals to certain ideas are so integral to the historical significance of the crash of 2008 and the question of whether it can be considered a crash at all. The first section covers the literature on ideas and economic crisis. The second section highlights that the contribution of the special section is to engage in a stock taking exercise of the empirical and conceptual patterns concerning the politics of ideational change underway in the areas of: comparative fiscal policy; monetary policy and Euro zone debt management; capital controls; and financial and securities market regulation and standard setting. The final section outlines the structure of this special section and content of the individual articles.

Car Crash

A student crashes a car through the main entrance of Brock University and ransacks the office of the University President. The Buick La Sabre is driven through the glass doors of the Schmon Tower in the early morning, just as staff are beginning to report for work. The occupant of the vehicle proceeds to the tower's thirteenth floor, where he overturns furniture in the President's offices and breaks windows. University officials find him sitting in the President's chair, claiming he is God or Jesus.

Lower Bounds for Achieving Synchronous Early Stopping Consensus with Orderly Crash Failures

In this paper, we discuss the consensus problem for synchronous distributed systems with orderly crash failures. For a synchronous distributed system of n processes with up to t crash failures and f failures actually occur, first, we present a bivalency argument proof to solve the open problem of proving the lower bound, min (t + 1, f + 2) rounds, for early-stopping synchronous consensus with orderly crash failures, where t < n - 1. Then, we extend the system model with orderly crash failures to a new model in which a process is allowed to send multiple messages to the same destination process in a round and the failing processes still respect the order specified by the protocol in sending messages. For this new model, we present a uniform consensus protocol, in which all non-faulty processes always decide and stop immediately by the end of f + 1 rounds. We prove that the lower bound of early stopping protocols for both consensus and uniform consensus are f + 1 rounds under the new model, and our proposed protocol is optimal.

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes

In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.

Speleothems as sensitive recorders of volcanic eruptions - the Bronze Age Minoan eruption recorded in a stalagmite from Turkey

Mounting evidence exists that variations in sulphur content in stalagmites are closely linked to changes in volcanic or anthropogenic atmospheric sulphur. The strong dependency of sulphur on soil pH and ecosystem storage, however, can result in a delay of several years to decades in the registration of volcanic eruptions and anthropogenic emissions by stalagmites. Here we present synchrotron-radiation based trace element analysis performed on a precisely-dated section of a stalagmite from Sofular Cave in Northern Turkey. As this section covers the time interval of the intensively studied Minoan volcanic eruption between 1600 and 1650 BC, we can test whether this vigorous eruption can be traced in a stalagmite. Of all measured trace elements, only bromine shows a clear short-lived peak at 1621±251621±25 BC, whereas sulphur and molybdenum show peaks later at 1617±251617±25 and 1589±251589±25 respectively. We suggest that all trace element peaks are related to the Minoan eruption, whereas the observed phasing of bromine, molybdenum and sulphur is related to differences in their retention rates in the soil above Sofular Cave. For the first time, we can show that bromine appears to be an ideal volcanic tracer in stalagmites, as it is a prominent volatile component in volcanic eruptions, can be easily leached in soils and rapidly transferred from the atmosphere through the soil and bedrock into the cave and stalagmite respectively. Highly resolved oxygen and carbon isotope profiles indicate that the Minoan eruption had no detectable climatic and environmental impact in Northern Turkey.

Stock Markets and Household Wealth: Can a Stock Market Crash Cause a Recession in The U.S. Economy?

Stock market wealth effects on the level of consumption in the United States economy have been constantly debated; there is evidence for arguments for and against its prominence and its symmetry. This paper seeks to investigate the strength of its negative effect by creating models to analyze unexpected shocks to the Standard and Poor's 500 index. First, a transmission mechanism between the stock market and GDP is established through the use of second-order vector autoregressive models. Following which, theory from the life cycle model and adaptations of previous researchers' models are used to create a structural model. This paper finds that stock market wealth effects are small, but important to consider, especially if markets are overpriced; this claim is corroborated by evidence from simulation of 'alternative scenarios' and the historical experiences of 1987 and 2001.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.