Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

Un résumé en français est également disponible

Regulatory History Material as an Extrinsic Aid to Interpretation: An Empirical Study on the Use of RIAS by the Federal Court of Canada

Since 1986, the Canadian Public Administration is required to analyze the socio-economic impact of new regulatory requirements or regulatory changes. To report on its analysis, a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) is produced and published in the Canada Gazette with the proposed regulation to which it pertains for notice to, and comments by, interested parties. After the allocated time for comments has elapsed, the regulation is adopted with a final version of the RIAS. Both documents are again published in the Canada Gazette. As a result, the RIAS acquires the status of an official public document of the Government of Canada and its content can be argued in courts as an extrinsic aid to the interpretation of a regulation. In this paper, an analysis of empirical findings on the uses of this interpretative tool by the Federal Court of Canada is made. A sample of decisions classified as unorthodox show that judges are making determinations on the basis of two distinct sets of arguments built from the information found in a RIAS and which the author calls “technocratic” and “democratic”. The author argues that these uses raise the general question of “What makes law possible in our contemporary legal systems”? for they underline enduring legal problems pertaining to the knowledge and the acceptance of the law by the governed. She concludes that this new interpretive trend of making technocratic and democratic uses of a RIAS in case law should be monitored closely as it may signal a greater change than foreseen, and perhaps an unwanted one, regarding the relationship between the government and the judiciary.

"Judicial Activism in the ""Eye of the Beholder"" : the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Human Rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories"

Il est mondialement reconnu que les institutions judiciaires jouent un rôle central dans le processus de prise de décisions politiques, à la fois au niveau national et international. C’est d’ailleurs le cas à la Haute Cour de justice d’Israël. L’étendue de son succès (ou de son échec) dans la tentative de trouver une solution aux violations des droits humains dans les territoires occupés est un problème qui continue de faire l’objet de bien des débats et de recherches académiques. À cet égard, il a été suggéré que, malgré l’absence de constitution écrite et l’existence d’un état d’urgence prolongé en Israël, la Haute Cour de justice a réussi à adopter une approche « judiciairement active » quant à la protection et la promotion des droits de l’homme de manière générale, y compris ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur le processus d’examen judiciaire de la Haute Cour de Justice tient pour acquise la notion qu’Israël est une démocratie. Ainsi, cet article cherche à examiner cette hypothèse. Premièrement, en adoptant la position que le processus de révision judiciaire est compatible avec la démocratie et la règle de loi. Deuxièmement, il examine l’approche « judiciairement active » de la Cour et soumet un bref aperçu du processus, des outils et des principes légaux que la Cour adopte pour examiner les actions des autorités israéliennes, y compris l’armée, et imposer une loi commune de protection des droits de la personne, donc ceux des Palestiniens dans les territoires occupés. L’article argumente également que le contrôle prolongé des territoires occupés par Israël a eu des conséquences significatives, car tout effort fourni par la Cour pour garantir le respect des droits humains de la population civile palestinienne doit se faire sans compromettre la sécurité du pouvoir israélien. La conclusion à laquelle on arrive ici dépend de la façon dont on qualifie ce contrôle: une occupation à long terme ou une annexion (ce qui n’est pas réglementaire par rapport à loi internationale), ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur le rôle que la Haute Cour de justice peut effectivement jouer pour faire respecter les droits de la personne dans les territoires occupés.

The Supreme Court of Canada Ruling in Carter v. Canada: A New Era of End-of-Life Care for Canadians

La tribune de l'éditeur / Editor's Soapbox

Translation of the Decision of the International Court of Justice related to the Case concerning the dispute regarding navigational and related rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) Judgment

--

The Right to Water in the Case-Law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

The human right to water is nowadays more broadly recognised, mainly due to the essential societal function that this resource plays; likewise, because of the present water scarcity is generating conflicts between its different uses. Thus, this right aims at protecting human beings by guaranteeing access to clean water that is essential to satisfy vital human needs. Similarly, access to clean water is an important element to guarantee other rights including the right to life and health. The recognition of the right to water is mainly achieved in two ways: as a new and independent right and as a subordinate or derivative right. Concerning the latter, the right to water can emanate from civil and political rights, such as the right to life; or can be derived from economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to housing. This contribution explores the position of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the right to water, and analyses whether the Court has recognised the right to water and, if so, in which manner.

The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.