Managerial approaches to deal with corruption and bribery in a host country

This paper discusses two current managerial approaches in dealing with corruption and bribery in a multinational business context, namely the 'when in Rome approach' and 'the legal compliance approach'. It briefly revisits the impact of corruption on business and society and proposes a third approach, that is, 'stakeholder compliance approach' on part of multinational business managers in dealing with corruption/bribery.

Interpretations of corruption in intercultural bargaining

There is a fine line in business negotiations between being perceived as corrupt and having proper engagement with the natural tension and excitement of the business bargaining process. Combining literature review and experiential observation we provide a framework that will assist global business managers to more successfully negotiate cross-cultural business transactions. We identify some archetypal underpinnings of bargaining in a business context and question the established perceptions of corruption in intercultural business dealings. We conclude that different cultural systems produce variations of negotiating behaviour that need to be judged with a deeper local knowledge to avoid simply transferring inappropriate labels.

Social media's impact on journalism : a study of media's coverage of anti-corruption protests in India

The year 2011 was memorable for many in India – for those who participated in numerous anti-corruption protests, and for those who witnessed these protests via all pervasive mainstream news media. This paper will use inter-media agenda-setting discourse to explain the Indian media’s coverage of the so-called ‘Anna movement’. It will outline how the use of mobile and social media platforms by the ‘India Against Corruption’ organisers and the educated middle class influenced the mainstream media’s coverage of the protests. The paper will consider the implication of this coverage, in the light of the unique position of power the Indian news media has in this transitioning society.

Babes in the sand and flying predators : touristic corruption, exoticism and neocolonialism in Chandani Lokugé’s 'Turtle Nest'

In Chandani Lokugé’s Turtle Nest the Sri Lankan beach is a savage environment, a dystopia, where local children are molested by Western paedophile tourists. This essay examines representations of child vulnerability, exoticism, neocolonialism and envy in the novel. It reads these issues in the context of postcolonial tourism in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. It establishes connections between the commodification of children in Lokugé’s story and the real-world progress of exoticist tourism.

How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Estimating the effect of discretionary spending on corruption: evidence from Brazilian municipalities

O presente artigo estuda a relação entre corrupção e discricionariedade do gasto público ao responder a seguinte pergunta: regras de licitação mais rígidas, uma proxy para discricionariedade, resultam em menor prevalência de corrupção nos municípios brasileiros? A estratégia empírica é uma aproximação de regressões em dois estágios (2SLS) estimadas localmente em cada transição de regras de licitação, cuja fonte de dados de corrupção é o Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteio da CGU e os dados sobre discricionariedade são derivados da Lei 8.666/93, responsável por regular os processos de compras e construção civil em todas as esferas de governo. Os resultados mostram, entretanto, que menor discricionariedade está relacionada com maior corrupção para quase todos os cortes impostos pela lei de licitações.

Reelection incentives and political corruption : evidence from Brazil’s municipal audit reports

This paper uses a unique dataset of political corruption, constructed from municipal audit reports obtained from Brazil’s randomized anti-corruption program, to test whether reelection incentives affect the level of rent extraction of incumbent politicians. In order to identify reelection incentives, we use the existence of a term limit in Brazil’s municipal elections. We find that in municipalities where mayors are in their second and final term, there is significantly more corruption compared to similar municipalities where mayors are in their first-term. In particular, in municipalities with second-term mayors there is, on average, R$188,431 more diversion of resources and the incidence of irregularities is 23% higher. We also find more pronounced effects where the costs of rent-extraction are lower (municipalities without media and judicial presence), and the density of pivotal voters is higher (more political competition). Finally, we show that first-term mayors, while less corrupt, have a larger incidence of poor administration suggesting that there may exist a trade-off between corruption and quality in public good provision.