969 resultados para Constitutional judge


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Direct legislation in the United States is a subject that has received a great deal of attention recently. A large proportion of this attention however has been focused on the potential for direct legislation to harm minority groups. An example of this negative potential can be seen in a group of ballot propositions that were presented to California voters in the 1990s. These initiatives can all be interpreted as targeting various minority groups in California. As California is the state which makes use of the ballot initiative more frequently than any other, this is a cause for concern. There are however several other factors that make it unclear whether direct legislation will more often lead to negative outcomes for minorities. There is also a noticeable effect of direct democracy generally on political participation. Several studies have found a positive correlation between the extent that a state uses ballot initiatives and referenda with political participation indexes such as voting rates. These findings complicate the negative attention that ballot initiatives have recently received.

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This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

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One of the primary accomplishments of Governor Forrest Anderson in 1969-71 was the reorganization of the Executive Branch of Montana government, something that had been attempted six different times between 1919 and 1962 as state government had grown from twenty agencies to almost 200 uncontrolled boards, bureaus and commissions. The chaotic structure of the executive branch disempowered governors of both parties and empowered the private corporations and organizations that were the power structure of Montana. With remarkable political acumen, Governor Anderson figured out how to get that near impossible job done. Central to his efforts was the creation of an Executive Reorganization Commission, including eight legislators and the Governor, the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment that limited the executive branch to no more than twenty departments under the Governor, and the timely completion of a massive research effort to delineate the actual structure of the twenty departments. That story is told in this episode by three major players in the effort, all involved directly with the Executive Reorganization Commission: Tom Harrison, Diana Dowling and Sheena Wilson. Their recollections reflect an insider’s perspective of this significant accomplishment that helped change Montana “In the Crucible of Change.” Tom Harrison is a former Republican State Representative and State Senator from Helena, who was a member of the Executive Reorganization Commission. As Majority Leader in the Montana House of Representatives in 1971, he was the primary sponsor of the House’s executive reorganization bill and helped shepherd the Senate’s version to passage. Harrison was the Republican candidate for Attorney General in 1976 after which he practiced private law for 3 more decades. He served in the Montana Army National Guard for almost 34 years, rising to the rank of Colonel in the position of Judge Advocate General. He was a founding Director of Federal Defenders of Montana (legal representation for indigents accused within the Federal Judicial System); appointed Chairman of the original Montana State Fund (workers' compensation insurance) by Gov. Stephens; served as President of the Montana Trial Lawyers Association, Helena Kiwanis Club and St. Peter's Community Hospital Foundation, as well as Chairman and Director of AAA MountainWest; and was a founder, first Chairman and Director of the Valley Bank of Helena for over 25 years. Diana Dowling was an attorney for the Executive Reorganization Commission and helped draft the legislation that was passed. She also worked for Governor Forrest Anderson and for the 1972 Constitutional Convention where she prepared and directed publication of official explanation of the new Constitution that was mailed to all Montana voters. Diana was Executive Director of the Montana Bar Association and for 20 years held various legal positions with the Montana Legislative Council. For 12 years she was a commissioner on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and for 7 years was a member of Montana State Board of Bar Examiners. Diana was the first director of the Montana Lottery, an adjunct professor at both Carroll College and the UM Law School, and an administrative officer for Falcon Press Publishing Co. Diana is currently - and intends to continue being - a perpetual college student. Sheena Wilson came fresh out of the University of Montana to become a Research Assistant for the Executive Reorganization Commission. Later she worked for seven years as a field representative in Idaho and Montana for the Mountain Plains Family Education Program, for thirteen years with Congressman Pat Williams as Executive Assistant in Washington and Field Assistant here in Montana, owned and managed a Helena restaurant for seven years, worked as Executive Assistant for State Auditor John Morrison and was Deputy Chief of Staff for Governor Brian Schweitzer his full 8 years in the Governorship. Though currently “retired”, Sheena serves on the Montana Board of Investments, the Public Employees Retirement Board and the Capitol Complex Advisory Council and is a partner in a dry-land wheat farm in Teton County that was homesteaded by her great uncle.

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During the lead-up to Montana second progressive era, Lee Metcalf and Forrest Anderson, along with others, kept the progressive flame lit in Montana. Metcalf’s political history is replete with close electoral wins because of his commitment to progressive ideals when the times were not always politically favorable for that. As State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice, Congressman and eventually as US Senator, Lee won races by as little as 55 votes because he stuck to his guns as a progressive. In Forrest Anderson’s career as a County Attorney, State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice and 12 years as MT Attorney General he was respected as a pragmatic practitioner of politics. But during that entire career leading up to his election as Governor, Forrest Anderson was also a stalwart supporter of the progressive agenda exemplified by FDR and the New Deal, which brought folks out of the Great Depression that was brought on by the bad policies of the GOP and big business. As MT’s second progressive period began in 1965, the first important election was Senator Metcalf’s successful re-election battle in 1966 with the sitting MT Governor, Tim Babcock. And the progressive express was really ignited by the election of Forrest Anderson as Governor in 1968 after 16 years of Republican Governors in MT. Gordon Bennett played a rather unique role, being a confidant of Metcalf and Anderson, both who respected his wide and varied experience, his intellect, and his roots in progressivism beginning with his formative years in the Red Corner of NE Montana. Working with Senator Metcalf and his team, including Brit Englund, Vic Reinemer, Peggy McLaughlin, Betty Davis and Jack Condon among others, Bennett helped shape the progressive message both in Washington DC and MT. Progressive labor and farm organizations, part of the progressive coalition, benefitted from Bennett’s advice and counsel and aided the Senator in his career including the huge challenge of having a sitting popular governor run against him for the Senate in 1966. Metcalf’s noted intern program produced a cadre of progressive leaders in Montana over the years. Most notably, Ron Richards transitioned from Metcalf Intern to Executive Secretary of the Montana Democratic Party (MDP) and assisted, along with Bennett, in the 1966 Metcalf-Babcock race in a big way. As Executive Secretary Richards was critical to the success of the MDP as a platform for Forrest Anderson’s general election run and win in 1968. After Forrest’s gubernatorial election, Richards became Executive Assistant (now called Chief of Staff) for Governor Anderson and also for Governor Thomas Judge. The Metcalf progressive strain, exemplified by many including Richards and Bennett, permeated Democratic politics during the second progressive era. So, too, did the coalition that supported Metcalf and his policies. The progressivism of the period of “In the Crucible of Change” was fired up by Lee Metcalf, Forrest Anderson and their supporters and coalitions, and Gordon Bennett was in the center of all of that, helping fire up the crucible, setting the stage for many policy advancements in both Washington DC and Montana. Gordon Bennett’s important role in the 1966 re-election of Senator Lee Metcalf and the 1968 election of Governor Forrest Anderson, as well as his wide experience in government and politics of that time allows him to provide us with an insider’s personal perspective of those races and other events at the beginning of the period of progressive change being documented “In the Crucible of Change,” as well as his personal insights into the larger political/policy picture of Montana. Gordon Bennett, a major and formative player “In the Crucible of Change,” was born in the far northeast town of Scobey, MT in 1922. He attended school in Scobey through the eighth grade and graduated from Helena High School. After attending Carroll College for two years, he received his BA in economics from Carleton College in Northfield, MN. During a brief stint on the east coast, his daily reading of the New York Times (“best newspaper in the world at that time … and now”) inspired him to pursue a career in journalism. He received his MA in Journalism from the University of Missouri and entered the field. As a reporter for the Great Falls Tribune under the ownership and management of the Warden Family, he observed and competed with the rigid control of Montana’s press by the Anaconda Company (the Great Falls Tribune was the only large newspaper in Montana NOT owned by ACM). Following his intellectual curiosity and his philosophical bend, he attended a number of Farm-Labor Institutes which he credits with motivating him to pursue solutions to economic and social woes through the law. In 1956, at the age of 34, he received his Juris Doctorate degree from the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Bennett’s varied career included eighteen years as a farmer, four years in the US Army during WWII (1942-46), two years as Assistant MT Attorney General (1957-59) with Forrest Anderson, three years in private practice in Glasgow (1959-61), two years as Associate Solicitor in the Department of Interior in Washington, DC (1961-62), and private law practice in Helena from 1962 to 1969. While in Helena he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Montana Supreme Court (1962) and cemented his previous relationships with Attorney General Forrest Anderson and US Senator Lee Metcalf. Bennett modestly refuses to accept the title of Campaign Manager for either Lee Metcalf (1966 re-election over the challenger, MT Republican Governor Tim Babcock) or Forrest Anderson (his 1968 election as Governor), saying that “they ran their campaigns … we were only there to help.” But he has been generally recognized as having filled that critical role in both of those critical elections. After Governor Anderson’s election in 1968, Bennett was appointed Director of the MT Unemployment Compensation Commission, a position from where he could be a close advisor and confidant of the new Governor. In 1971, Governor Anderson appointed him Judge in the most important jurisdiction in Montana, the 1st Judicial District in Helena, a position he held for seventeen years (1971-88). Upon stepping down from his judgeship, for twenty years (1988-2008) he was a law instructor, mediator and arbitrator. He currently resides in Helena with his wife, Norma Tirrell, former newspaper reporter and researcher/writer. Bennett has two adult children and four grandchildren.

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The dramatic period of progressive change in Montana that is documented "In the Crucible of Change" series really exploded with the election of Governors Forrest Anderson and Tom Judge. Anderson's single term saw the dispatching of the sales tax as an issue for a long period, the reorganization of the executive branch of state government and the revision of Montana's Constitution. As a former legislator, county attorney, Supreme Court justice, and Attorney General, Anderson brought unmatched experience to the governorship when elected. Tom Judge, although much younger (elected MT’s youngest governor at age 38 immediately following Anderson), also brought serious experience to the governorship: six years as a MT State Representative, two years as a MT State Senator, four years is Lieutenant Governor and significant business experience. The campaign and election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 spurred other young Americans to service, including Tom Judge. First elected in 1960, he rose rapidly through MT’s political-governmental hierarchy until he took over the governorship in time to implement many of the changes started in Governor Anderson’s term. But as a strong progressive leader in his own right, Governor Judge sponsored and implemented significant advancements of his own for Montana. Those accomplishments, however, are the subject of other films in this series. This film deals with Tom Judge’s early years – his rise to the governorship from when he returned home after college at Notre Dame and newspaper experience in Kentucky to his actual election in November 1972. That story is discussed in this episode by three major players in the effort, all directly involved in Tom Judge’s early years and path to the governorship: Sidney Armstrong, Larry Pettit and Kent Kleinkopf. Their recollections of the early Tom Judge and the period of his advancement to the governorship provide an insider’s perspective of the growth of this significant leader of the important period of progressive change documented “In the Crucible of Change.” Sidney Armstrong, President of Sidney Armstrong Consulting, serves on the board and as the Executive Director of the Greater Montana Foundation. Formerly Executive Director of the Montana Community Foundation (MCF), she has served on national committees and participated in national foundation initiatives. While at MCF, she worked extensively with MT Governors Racicot and Martz on the state charitable endowment tax credit and other endowed philanthropy issues. A member of MT Governor Thomas L. Judge’s staff in the 1970s, she was also part of Governor Brian Schweitzer’s 2004 Transition Team, continuing to serve as a volunteer advisor during his term. In the 1980s, Sidney also worked for the MT State AFL-CIO and the MT Democratic Party as well as working two sessions with the MT Senate as Assistant Secretary of the Senate and aide to the President. A Helena native, and great granddaughter of pioneer Montanans, Sidney has served on numerous nonprofit boards, and is currently a board member for the Montana History Foundation. Recently she served on the board of the Holter Museum of Art and was a Governor’s appointee to the Humanities Montana board. She is a graduate of the International School of Geneva, Switzerland and the University of Montana. Armstrong's Irish maternal immigrant great-grandparents, Thomas and Maria Cahill Cooney, came to Virginia City, MT in a covered wagon in 1865, looking for gold. Eventually, they settled on the banks of the Missouri River outside Helena as ranchers. She also has roots in Butte, MT, where her journalist father's family, both of whom were newspaper people, lived. Her father, Richard K. O’Malley, is also the author of a well-known book about Butte, Mile High, Mile Deep, recently re-published by Russell Chatham. She is the mother of four and the grandmother of eight. Dr. Lawrence K. Pettit (Larry Pettit) (b. 5/2/1937) has had a dual career in politics and higher education. In addition to being Montana’s first Commissioner of Higher Education (the subject of another film in this series); Pettit, of Lewistown, served as legislative assistant to U.S. Senators James E. Murray and Lee Metcalf, campaign manager, head of transition team and assistant to Montana Governor Thomas L. Judge; taught political science at The Pennsylvania State University (main campus), was chair of political science at Montana State University, Deputy Commissioner for Academic Programs at the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, Chancellor of the University System of South Texas (since merged with Texas A&M University), President of Southern Illinois University, and President of Indiana University of Pennsylvania from where he retired in 2003. He has served as chair of the Commission on Leadership for the American Council on Education, president of the National Association of (University) System Heads, and on many national and state boards and commissions in higher education. Pettit is author of “If You Live by the Sword: Politics in the Making and Unmaking of a University President.” More about Pettit is found at http://www.lawrencekpettit.com… Kent Kleinkopf of Missoula is co-founder of a firm with a national scope of business that specializes in litigation consultation, expert vocational testimony, and employee assistance programs. His partner (and wife of 45 years) Kathy, is an expert witness in the 27 year old business. Kent received a BA in History/Education from the University of Idaho and an MA in Economics from the University of Utah. The Kleinkopfs moved to Helena, MT in 1971 where he was Assistant to the Commissioner of State Lands (later Governor) Ted Schwinden. In early 1972 Kent volunteered full time in Lt. Governor Tom Judge’s campaign for Governor, driving the Lt. Governor extensively throughout Montana. After Judge was elected governor, Kent briefly joined the staff of Governor Forrest Anderson, then in 1973 transitioned to Judge’s Governor’s Office staff, where he became Montana’s first “Citizens’ Advocate.” In that capacity he fielded requests for assistance from citizens with concerns and information regarding State Agencies. While on the Governor’s staff, Kent continued as a travel aide with the governor both in Montana and nationally. In 1977 Kent was appointed Director of the MT Department of Business Regulation. That role included responsibility as Superintendent of Banking and Chairman of the State Banking Board, where Kent presided over the chartering of many banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. In 1981 the Kleinkopfs moved to Missoula and went into the business they run today. Kent was appointed by Governor Brian Schweitzer to the Board of the Montana Historical Society in 2006, was reappointed and continues to serve. Kathy and Kent have a daughter and son-in-law in Missoula.

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BACKGROUND: Microarray genome analysis is realising its promise for improving detection of genetic abnormalities in individuals with mental retardation and congenital abnormality. Copy number variations (CNVs) are now readily detectable using a variety of platforms and a major challenge is the distinction of pathogenic from ubiquitous, benign polymorphic CNVs. The aim of this study was to investigate replacement of time consuming, locus specific testing for specific microdeletion and microduplication syndromes with microarray analysis, which theoretically should detect all known syndromes with CNV aetiologies as well as new ones. METHODS: Genome wide copy number analysis was performed on 117 patients using Affymetrix 250K microarrays. RESULTS: 434 CNVs (195 losses and 239 gains) were found, including 18 pathogenic CNVs and 9 identified as "potentially pathogenic". Almost all pathogenic CNVs were larger than 500 kb, significantly larger than the median size of all CNVs detected. Segmental regions of loss of heterozygosity larger than 5 Mb were found in 5 patients. CONCLUSIONS: Genome microarray analysis has improved diagnostic success in this group of patients. Several examples of recently discovered "new syndromes" were found suggesting they are more common than previously suspected and collectively are likely to be a major cause of mental retardation. The findings have several implications for clinical practice. The study revealed the potential to make genetic diagnoses that were not evident in the clinical presentation, with implications for pretest counselling and the consent process. The importance of contributing novel CNVs to high quality databases for genotype-phenotype analysis and review of guidelines for selection of individuals for microarray analysis is emphasised.

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Taking the South African experience as an example, this article considers the interpretive benefits to be reaped from having access to bi- and multilingual versions of a statutory text. The discussion takes place against the backdrop of a history of statutory bi- and multilingualism in the said jurisdiction as well as, at present, constitutional guarantees of language rights and the “parity of esteem” of eleven official languages. It is argued that, if invoked with due discretion and in a non-rigid way, statutory multilingualism can be a boon to statutory and constitutional interpretation. The South African courts – whose traditional approach to statutory inter-pretation has tended to be literalist, formalistic and formulaic – are, generally speaking, to be commended for their supple use of bilingualism as an aid to interpretation over the years. The advent of constitutional multilingualism and the (potential) availability of statutory texts (and the Constitution) in more than two languages, have moreover created conditions conducive to the further development and refinement of reliance on multilingualism in statutory and constitutional interpretation – certain challenges notwithstanding.

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This article seeks to bring some clarity to the publicly held debate on the Swiss federal popular initiative to limit immigration as it was adopted on 9 February 2014 by the Swiss people. It considers the crux of the matter, which is the implementation of the new Swiss constitutional article in the context of public international law. The initiative is stuck in between Swiss constitutional sovereignty and Swiss treaty obligations flowing from the agreement on free movement of persons between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation. Specific attention is paid to the democratic element anchored in the Swiss Constitution which, in contrast to other systems where the judicial element prevails, is of high importance for whole the process of a bilateral contractual relationship between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation.