An essay on the history of the English government and constitution : from the reign of Henry VII. to the present time /

Half title: An essay on the English government and constitution.

Self-government in Canada, and how it was achieved: the story of Lord Durham's report.

"Select bibliography on Canadian history, 1763-1840": pages 361-374.

Transfer of Glover-Archbold Parkway right-of-way to National Capital Park system : hearings before the Fiscal Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, second session on S. 2436, to transfer certain land in the District of Columbia to the Secretary of Interior for administration as a part of the National capital parks system, and for other purposes. Apr. 2-3, 1962.

Mode of access: Internet.

Application kit : federal surplus property transfer program.

"March 1985."

Singapore 'shared values' and law: Non east versus west constitutional hermeneutic

This article examines the apparent contradictions in Singaporean interpretation and application of its Westminster modeled Constitution in which the Constitution is treated as any other piece of legislation and Western style individual rights are easily overrun. It also examines the Government's particularist claim to Asian values as an explanation for its handling of the Constitution and seeks an alternative approach to understand the Constitution with reference to the Government publication, the Shared Values. The author suggests that this Document serves as a quasi-Constitution, and finds that interpreting two leading cases with this hermeneutic leads to a more satisfactory understanding of the court's decisions. The article concludes that the Government's approach toward the law to create the society it envisioned and published in the Document is a different and pragmatic issue, rather than a result of any fundamental East versus West cultural difference.

Risk management in build-operate-transfer projects

Construction projects are risky. A build-operate-transfer (BOT) project is recognised as one of the most risky project schemes. This scheme has been employed rather frequently in the past few decades, in both developed and developing countries. However, because of its risky nature, there have been failures as well as successes. Risk analysis in an appropriate way is desirable in implementing BOT projects. There are various tools and techniques applicable to risk analysis. The application of these risk analysis tools and techniques (RATTs) to BOT projects depends on an understanding of the contents and contexts of BOT projects, together with a thorough understanding of RATTs. This paper studies key points in their applications through reviews of relevant literatures and discusses the application of RATTs to BOT projects. The application to BOT projects is considered from the viewpoints of the major project participants, i.e. government, lenders and project companies. Discussion is also made with regard to political risks, which are very important in BOT projects. A flow chart has been introduced to select an appropriate tool for risk management in BOT projects. This study contributes to the establishment of a framework for systematic risk management in BOT projects.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

Technology transfer to China:a study of strategy in 20 EU industrial companies

Foreign direct investment has been important in China's economic development since the early 1980s. In recent years, the volume of inward FDI into China, according to some estimates, has been second only to that into the USA. The Chinese government has emphasised the need for FDI to be coupled with the transfer of more advanced technologies to China. For foreign companies, technology transfer raises the risk of losing their technology based competitive advantage to potential competitor firms. This risk may be exacerbated by insufficient legal protection of intellectual property rights in China. After briefly reviewing the development of Chinese official policy on technology transfer, this paper considers the strategy adopted by EU companies regarding the transfer of technology; in particular in advanced technology sectors. The research on which the paper is based included an analysis of information gathered from 20 leading EU companies with investments in China and operating in high-technology sectors. Information was gathered from senior company managers based in both China and Europe during the second half of 1998. The main findings include a measure of reluctance on the part of EU companies to transfer their core technologies to China and to base R&D capability there. At the same time, the companies appear aware that this policy may be unsustainable in the longer-term in the face of Chinese official policy and a desire to expand their operations in China. While they attempt to protect their existing technological knowledge, most of them accept that there will be technology "leakage" and therefore the most effective strategy is to maintain their technological lead through R&D.

The role of choice in the development of an M-government strategy in Turkey

Enhanced data services through mobile phones are expected to be soon fully transactional, interactive and embedded with other mobile consumption practices. While private services will continue to take the lead in the mobile data revolution, others such as government and NGOs are becoming more prominent m-players. This paper adopts a qualitative case study approach interpreting micro-level municipality officers’ mobility concept, ICT histories and choice practices for m-government services in Turkey. The findings highlight that in-situs ICT choice strategies are non-homogenous, sometimes conflicting with each other, and that current strategies have not yet justified the necessity for municipality officers to engage and fully commit to m-government efforts. Furthermore, beyond m-government initiatives’ success or failure, the mechanisms related to public administration mobile technical capacity building and knowledge transfer are identified to be directly related to m-government engagement likelihood.

Labour's modernization of local government

The modernization of local government is central to the government’s plans to revitalize the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Implicitly managerialist, the modernizing local government project also contains centralist and localist themes. Translated into policy, these themes are articulated as leadership, community, democracy and regulation. However, these elements are potentially contradictory and may produce tensions in the project that may be difficult to resolve. By reviewing the government’s aims to promote leadership, community and democracy in local government, it is also argued that the planned modernization of local government will extend further and into new areas the regulation of local authorities.

International technology transfer and development of capabilities in Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises:lessons from 20 years of case research

Technological capabilities in Chinese manufacturing have been transformed in the last three decades. However, the extent to which domestic market oriented state owned enterprises (SOEs) have developed their capabilities is not clear. Six SOEs in the automotive, steel and machine tools sectors in Beijing and Tianjin have been studied since the mid-1990s to assess the capability levels attained and the role of external sources and internal efforts in developing them. Aided by government policies, acquisition of technology and their own efforts, the case study companies appear to be broadly following the East Asian late industrialisation model. All six enterprises demonstrate competences in operating established technology, managing investment and making product and process improvements. The evidence suggests that companies without foreign joint venture (JV) collaborations have made more progress in this respect.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

The Office of the Auditor General of Canada : Government in Exile? (Working Paper 31)

How can a "servant of Parliament" be held in check if it disregards the constitutional conventions of responsible government and takes a place in its own right in the representative institutions? the paper presents a history of the modernization of the legislative audit in the federal Parliament. It considers the evolution of the powers and practices of the Office of the Auditor General, how its role has become intertwined with that of Treasury Board Secretariat, and the eclipse of the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Public Accounts. The paper is an abridged version of a paper prepared for a conference in Saskatoon in November, 2001. It is to be published in a UBC Press volume edited by David Smith, John Courtney and Duff Spafford of the Department of Political Science at the University of Saskatchewan. The Press will hold copyright. See also "Biggest Scandal in Canadian History," School of Policy Studies Working Paper Number 23.