Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Supply chain management as a competitive advantage in the Spanish grocery sector

Adversarial relationships have long dominated business relationships,but Supply Chain Management (SCM) entails a new perspective. SCM requiresa movement away from arms-length relationships toward partnership stylerelations. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper analyses the relationship between internal andexternal integration processes, their effect on firms performance andtheir contribution to the achievement of a competitive advantage.Performance improvements are analysed through costs, stock out and leadtime reductions. And, the achievement of a better competitive positionis measured by comparing the firm s performance with its competitors performance. To analyse this, an empirical study has been conducted inthe Spanish grocery sector.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum CaptureProblem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lowertraveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time willaffect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques.Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

Historical contingency affects signaling strategies and competitive abilities in evolving populations of simulated robots.

One of the key innovations during the evolution of life on earth has been the emergence of efficient communication systems, yet little is known about the causes and consequences of the great diversity within and between species. By conducting experimental evolution in 20 independently evolving populations of cooperatively foraging simulated robots, we found that historical contingency in the occurrence order of novel phenotypic traits resulted in the emergence of two distinct communication strategies. The more complex foraging strategy was less efficient than the simpler strategy. However, when the 20 populations were placed in competition with each other, the populations with the more complex strategy outperformed the populations with the less complex strategy. These results demonstrate a tradeoff between communication efficiency and robustness and suggest that stochastic events have important effects on signal evolution and the outcome of competition between distinct populations.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.

Surviving in a competitive spatial market: The threshold capture model

Most facility location decision models ignore the fact that for a facility to survive it needs a minimum demand level to cover costs. In this paper we present a decision model for a firm thatwishes to enter a spatial market where there are several competitors already located. This market is such that for each outlet there is a demand threshold level that has to be achievedin order to survive. The firm wishes to know where to locate itsoutlets so as to maximize its market share taking into account the threshold level. It may happen that due to this new entrance, some competitors will not be able to meet the threshold and therefore will disappear. A formulation is presented together with a heuristic solution method and computational experience.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Possibilities of Competition Indices to Describe Competitive Differences between Scots Pine Families

Summary

Competitive evaporation in arrays of droplets

We consider the evaporation of periodic arrays of initially equal droplets in two-dimensional systems with open (absorbing) boundaries. Our study is based on the numerical solution of the Cahn-Hilliard equation. We show that due to cooperative effects the droplets which are further from the boundary may evaporate earlier than those in the boundary¿s vicinity. The time evolution of the overall amount of matter in the system is also studied.

Antitumor activities of ATP-competitive inhibitors of mTOR in colon cancer cells

Le cancer colorectal est la 3ème cause de décès liée au cancer dans l'Europe de l'Ouest et nécessite une prise en charge pluridisciplinaire. Les thérapies anticancéreuses récentes développées visent à inhiber les voies de signalisation cellulaires responsables de la prolifération des cellules tumorales. L'inhibition de la voie de signalisation cellulaire mTOR, est une stratégie prometteuse. En effet, mTOR est souvent suractivé dans les cellules du cancer colorectal et régule la croissance, la prolifération et la survie cellulaire. De nombreuses études récentes ont démontrés l'importance de l'activité de mTOR dans le développement du cancer colorectal et l'efficacité anti-tumorale des inhibiteurs allostériques de mTOR, telle que la rapamycine. Récemment, une nouvelle classe d'inhibiteur de mTOR, notamment PP242 et NVP-BEZ235, agissant comme inhibiteur ATP- compétitif a été développée. L'efficacité de ces inhibiteurs n'a pas été démontrée dans le contexte du cancer colorectal. Dans cette étude, nous avons comparé l'effet de PP242, un inhibiteur ATP-compétitif de mTOR et NVP-BEZ235, un inhibiteur dual de PI3K/mTOR par rapport à la rapamycine. Nous avons étudié, in vitro, leur effet sur la croissance, la prolifération et la survie cellulaire sur des lignées cellulaires du cancer du colon (LS174, SW480 et DLD-1) et, in vivo, sur la croissance de xénogreffes dans un modèle murin. Nous avons émis l'hypothèse que l'effet des ces nouveaux inhibiteurs seraient plus importants qu'avec la rapamycine. Nous avons observé que le PP242 et le NVP-BEZ235 réduisent significativement et de façon plus marquée que la rapamycine la croissance, la prolifération et la survie cellulaire des cellules LS174T et DLD-1. Ces inhibiteurs réduisent également la prolifération et la survie cellulaire des cellules SW480 alors que celles-ci étaient résistantes à la rapamycine. Nous avons également observé que les inhibiteurs PP242 et NVP-BEZ235 réduisaient la croissance des xénogreffes avec les lignées cellulaires LS174 et SW480. Finalement, nous avons remarqué que l'effet anti-tumoral des inhibiteurs ATP-compétitifs de mTOR était potentialisé par l'U0126, un inhibiteur de MEK/MAPK, souvent activé dans les voies de signalisation cellulaire du cancer colorectal. En conclusion, nous avons observé que les inhibiteurs ATP-compétitifs de mTOR bloquent la croissance de cellules tumorales du cancer colorectal in vitro et in vivo. Ces résultats démontrent que ces inhibiteurs représentent une option thérapeutique prometteuse dans le traitement du cancer colorectal et méritent d'être évalués dans des études cliniques.