The Irish High Court Issues its First Order on a Commitment Agreement between the NCA and an Undertaking (Fitflop)

The Irish Competition (Amendment) Act 2012 introduced court-endorsed commitment agreements to Irish competition law. The new section 14B of the principal Competition Act 2002 provides for making commitment agreements between the Irish Competition and undertakings an order of the Irish High Court. This piece, first, investigates the prior Irish practice regarding commitment or settlement agreements and its legal basis. It looks then into the newly introduced rules on court-endorsed commitment agreements. Finally, before concluding, it points to the first instance of their application — to an order issued by the High Court in the FitFlop case in December 2012, which came into effect in February 2013.

A Probe-Goal Approach to Agreement and Incorporation Restrictions in Southern Tiwa

Southern Tiwa (Tanoan) exhibits agreement with up to three arguments (ergative, absolutive, dative). This agreement is subject to certain restrictions resembling the Person-Case Constraint paradigm (Bonet 1991). Moreover, there is a correlation between agreement restrictions and conditions on (the obviation of) noun-incorporation in Southern Tiwa, as explicitly and elegantly captured by Rosen (1990) in terms of a heterogeneous feature hierarchy and rules of association. We attempt to recast Rosen’s central insights in terms of Anagnostopoulou’s probe-sharing model of Person-Case Constraint effects (Anagnostopoulou 2003, 2006), to show that the full range of Southern Tiwa agreement and (non-)incorporation restrictions can be given a single, unified analysis within the probe-goal-Agree framework of Chomsky (2001). In particular, we argue that Southern Tiwa’s triple-agreement system is characterized by (a) an independent class probe located on the heads T and v, and (b) a rule that allows this class probe to be deleted in the context of local-person T-agreement. The various restrictions on agreement and non-incorporation then reduce to a single source: failure of class-valuation with DP (as opposed to NP) arguments.

Load Balanced Scalable Byzantine Agreement through Quorum Building, with Full Information

We address the problem of designing distributed algorithms for large scale networks that are robust to Byzantine faults. We consider a message passing, full information model: the adversary is malicious, controls a constant fraction of processors, and can view all messages in a round before sending out its own messages for that round. Furthermore, each bad processor may send an unlimited number of messages. The only constraint on the adversary is that it must choose its corrupt processors at the start, without knowledge of the processors’ private random bits.

A good quorum is a set of O(logn) processors, which contains a majority of good processors. In this paper, we give a synchronous algorithm which uses polylogarithmic time and Õ(vn) bits of communication per processor to bring all processors to agreement on a collection of n good quorums, solving Byzantine agreement as well. The collection is balanced in that no processor is in more than O(logn) quorums. This yields the first solution to Byzantine agreement which is both scalable and load-balanced in the full information model.

The technique which involves going from situation where slightly more than 1/2 fraction of processors are good and and agree on a short string with a constant fraction of random bits to a situation where all good processors agree on n good quorums can be done in a fully asynchronous model as well, providing an approach for extending the Byzantine agreement result to this model.

The first major step in the peace process’? Exploring the impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on Irish Republican thinking

This article supports interpretations of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as a significant factor contributing to the development of the Northern Ireland peace process. However, it also emphasises a certain serendipity in the Agreement's effect on northern nationalist, and more specifically republican, politics in the region. In particular, it stresses that a specific interpretation of the Agreement promoted by the Social Democratic and Labour Party inspired a dialogue with republicanism, encouraging an ongoing reappraisal within the latter about the nature of Britain's role in Northern Ireland. This, the article argues, reinforced the movement towards a more political approach that republicans had begun in the 1980s, and encouraged their eventual embrace of a constitutional strategy in the 1990s. However, in advancing this argument, the article notes that such an outcome was far from the minds of the British and Irish officials who negotiated the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Agreement was intended to marginalise rather than accommodate republicans. Despite this, it provided an inadvertent incentive to draw militant republicanism into the democratic process in Northern Ireland.

The first major step in the peace process’? Exploring the impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on Irish republican thinking

This article supports interpretations of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as a significant factor contributing towards the development of the Northern Ireland peace process. However, it also emphasises a certain serendipity in the Agreement’s effect on northern nationalist, and more specifically republican, politics in the region. In particular, it stresses that a specific interpretation of the Agreement promoted by the SDLP inspired a dialogue with republicanism, encouraging an ongoing re-appraisal within the latter about the nature of Britain’s role in Northern Ireland. This, the article argues, reinforced the movement towards a more political approach that republicans had begun in the 1980s, and encouraged their eventual embrace of a constitutional strategy in the 1990s. However, in advancing this argument, the article notes that such an outcome was far from the minds of the British and Irish officials who negotiated the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The Agreement was intended to marginalise rather than accommodate republicans. Despite this, it provided an inadvertent incentive to draw militant republicanism into the democratic process in Northern Ireland.