249 resultados para Carols, Ukrainian
Resumo:
The active initiative taken by Russian President Vladamir Putin by bombarding the antigovernment forces in Syria at the end of September 2015 startled the world by its precalculated boldness. Russian intervention has radically changed the dynamic of the war by empowering the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, and has resulted in a ceasefire agreement which starts on 27th February 2016, led by Russia and the US. No one can predict at present the next stage of conflicts in Syria or whether it will result in a positive solution to the tragic wars there. However, there is no denying the fact that Russia has played an important role in the development of the game. This paper analyzes the motivations of Putin in intervening in the Syrian crisis and the factors which have enabled Russia to play an enlarged role in the Middle East, seemingly beyond its objective capabilities. Legacies of international networks built during the Soviet period; shrewd tactics in making use of the inconsistency and vacillation of US policies, particularly towards the Middle East; its historical experience of interaction with the Muslim cultures, including domestic ones; its geopolitical perception of world politics, and the export of energy resources and military weapons as tools of diplomacy are some of the factors which explain Russian behavior. At the same time, the personal leadership and accumulated experience of President Putin in formulating Russian diplomacy and in manipulating different issues in a combined policy should be taken into account. His initiative in Syria succeeded to some extent in turning world attention away from the Ukrainian issue, aimed at changing the present sanctions imposed by the West. Another phenomenon to be noted in the international arena is the newly developed mutual interaction between Russia and the Arab countries in the Gulf. Frequent visits to Russia by autocratic leaders, including kings, emirsand princes do not always reflect a shared common interest between Russia and the Arab leaders. On the contrary, in spite of sharp and fundamental differences in their attitude toward the issues related to Syria, Iran and Yemen, the Arab leaders find it necessary to communicate with Russia and to know Russia’s expected strategies and intentions towards the Middle East, apart from its oil and gas policies. The Iran deal on the nuclear issue in July 2015 may have been a factor behind the phenomena.
Resumo:
Historians have yet to realize the depth of artist Janet Sobel’s artistic aptitude and ingenuity. This paper focuses on understanding how unique Sobel and her art were due to her distinctive world experiences and her ability to express her feelings about these experiences through her art. It also demonstrates the importance of her Jewish and Ukrainian heritage, showing how this influenced her artistic development. Sobel immigrated to the United States at a young age and struggled with her identity. Her art was a way for her to define and accept her personal identity as an immigrant Eastern European Jew in America. In addition to this heritage, Sobel experienced many traumatic events in her early life. Her art therefore served as a way for Sobel to work through this past trauma and come to terms with it.
Resumo:
As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.
Resumo:
Surveying the political and economic problems that plague Ukraine today, Michael Emerson warns in this commentary that unless strong and sound fresh governance structures are immediately put into place, the political dynamics will lead to catastrophic radicalisation, chaos and conflict. He calls upon the EU, elected by the Ukrainian street as honorary sponsor of the EuroMaidan, to prepare for this contingency now, observing that emergency situations require emergency measures.
Resumo:
With Ukraine disintegrating before our eyes, Michael Emerson calls for the EU to convene again the Geneva Quad with the utmost urgency, and proposes a peacekeeping operation by a jointly flagged tripartite brigade of Ukrainian, EU and Russian troops and police to clean up the Maidan in Kyiv, moving on into Donetsk and Lugansk. This short-term action should also have long-term consequences for the European order, if it initiated a switch by the EU and Russia into a cooperative mode over their common neighbourhood.
Resumo:
Apart from threats to its national security and territorial integrity, Ukraine faces serious economic challenges. These result from the slow pace of economic and institutional reform in the previous two decades, the populist policies of the Yanukovych era and the consequences of the conflict with Russia. The new Ukrainian authorities have made pro-reform declarations, but these do not seem to be supported sufficiently by concrete policy measures, especially in the critical areas of fiscal, balance-of-payment and structural adjustment. Also, the international financial aid package granted to Ukraine has not been accompanied by sufficiently strong policy conditionality. Ukraine urgently needs a complex programme of far-reaching economic and institutional reform, which will include both short-term fiscal and macroeconomic adjustment measures and medium- to long-term structural and institutional changes. Energy subsidies and the low retirement age are the two critical policy areas that require adjustment to avoid sovereign default and a balance-of-payments crisis.
Resumo:
It is paradoxical and symbolic that it has taken Ukraine two waves of mass protests to conclude a new agreement with the EU. As a result, the political and geopolitical implications of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine are very high. This means that it cannot be regarded merely as one of many trade agreements signed by the EU with its numerous trading partners. More attention needs to be paid to the role and impact of the Association Agreement on Ukraine. This requires screening, prioritising and sequencing of the approximation process at the national, sectoral and regional levels. Implementing the Agreement in a cost-effective way will allow Ukraine to derive benefits in the short-to-medium term, at the very time when Russia is sparing no efforts to inflict harm on the Ukrainian economy to punish the country for its European orientation.
Resumo:
Some two months since Ukrainians took to the streets, a political solution to the standoff between the EuroMaidan protestors and the Ukrainian authorities remains out of reach, with the situation on the ground remaining volatile. As the clock ticks there is fear that further violence and instability could be on the horizon. Further turmoil risks Ukraine’s territorial integrity, with talk of division and calls for Moscow to intervene coming from a number of Party of Regions speakers. It also increases the likelihood of new security threats going beyond Ukraine’s border including refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, as the political crisis deepens, Ukraine’s economic situation becomes more perilous with the chances of default on its debts rising.
Resumo:
On 25 May Ukrainian businessman Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine’s fifth President, winning in the first round with some 54% of the vote, far ahead of Yulia Tymoshenko. While Poroshenko has been involved in Ukrainian politics for several years, including a short stint in the government of disposed President Viktor Yanukovych, his support and involvement in the EuroMaiden anti-government protests, along with the decision of Vitali Klitschko to drop out of the presidential race and support Poroshenko’s candidacy, were key to his success.
Resumo:
The political crisis in Ukraine, particularly the bloodshed seen on 18–20 February and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea, has sparked fears of another possible wave of immigrants heading to the EU. However, the country was partially politically stabilised (at least in its central and western parts), and this has made the scenario of a mass migration of people from Ukraine rather unlikely. If there is no civil war in Ukraine, any further development of the political situation in Ukraine may have only an indirect impact on the actual migration. Should the political instability continue, the Ukrainian economy remain in recession while jobs are available for Ukrainian immigrants in the EU, then an increase in the migration of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, including Poland, would be possible. In the short term there may be two characteristic groups of immigrants: (1) young people who will attempt to leave Ukraine for good due to the lack of job opportunities; (2) circulating migrants, mainly from western Ukraine, who will be looking for temporary jobs. Only if the economic downturn trend and political turmoil in Ukraine continues for a longer time, will settlement migration increase.
Resumo:
The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.
Resumo:
The protests on Kyiv’s Maidan which commenced in November 2013, followed by the conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions, have redefined the political and social relations between Russia and Ukraine, and have added complexity to the dependences between the Orthodox Churches operating in the two countries. The Kremlin’s policy has put the Russian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (ROC) in an awkward position. The ROC is Russia’s largest religious organisation, which also exercises symbolic sovereignty over Ukraine’s most numerous Orthodox community, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), which since 13 August has had a new leader, Metropolitan Onufry. The head of the ROC, the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia, Kirill, has been facing a dilemma as to how he should respond to the Russian government’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine. His firm support of the Kremlin’s moves in Ukraine, may lose the Russian Church its social influence in this country. This might also catalyse a process within which Ukraine’s largest Orthodox Church would gradually become independent of Moscow. On the other hand, if he condemns the Kremlin’s policy, this would adversely affect the co-operation between ‘the altar and the throne’ which has been rapidly developing over the past few years in Russia, and which has offered multiple benefits to the Russian Church. As a result, Patriarch Kirill has distanced the ROC from the recent developments in Ukraine and has adopted a neutral stance. However, Kirill’s choice has aggravated the negative perception of the ROC among the Orthodox community in Ukraine. Given its close relations with the Kremlin, the ROC is increasingly viewed there as an instrument of political struggle and an exponent of the Russian government’s interests. The ROC’s stance has cast the UOC–MP, which has links with the Russian Church, in an unfavourable light, and has fostered its efforts to become more independent from the Moscow Patriarchate. Regardless of how the situation evolves, the recent developments in Ukraine have made it clear that the interests of the Russian Church and the Kremlin, which have coincided for years, now come into conflict, mainly due to the disagreement over the methods used. Despite this, the Russian Church is not withdrawing from the cooperation of ‘the altar and the throne’, and submits itself to the Kremlin’s decisions.
Resumo:
Azerbaijan’s cooperation with the West, launched two decades ago, has helped it become a relatively strong and ambitious actor on the international stage. It has become a key country in the region from the Western (USA and the EU) and Turkish points of view, as well as an important partner in the energy sector. The strategic EU concept of the Southern Gas Corridor, also supported by the United States, is among the initiatives based on cooperation with Azerbaijan. Surprisingly, however, Azerbaijan’s increased ambition and importance have caused its policy to diverge ever farther from the expectations and plans formulated by the West. The changes in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, occurring in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, have forced Azerbaijan to revise its assessment of its position in the region. The main impetus for Azerbaijan’s actions is fear of Russia, as well as the weakness of the West which has become particularly apparent in the recent stages of the Ukrainian crisis. Azerbaijan’s actions so far have displayed its tendency to deepen its self-isolation in foreign affairs and consolidate its authoritarian system. This comes as a challenge to the West, whose ability to shape its relations with Azerbaijan has weakened considerably. This state of affairs poses the threat that in the current situation, the Southern Gas Corridor concept, which Azerbaijan amended in 2012 in its own favour, might become totally blocked.
Resumo:
The parliamentary elections to be held in Ukraine on 26 October will bring about deep changes in the political composition of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. It is very probable that after the elections only one or two of the five parties which are represented in the parliament today will remain, and the leading positions will be taken by groupings who were still considered marginal a year ago. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, a party which according to polls can count on victory, did not exist a year ago and today still remains in the construction phase. It is likely that around two-thirds of the newly elected deputies will be people with no parliamentary or even no political experience. On the one hand, this may be a strong impetus to revival; but on the other the lack of experience of most of the parliamentarians may be a problem. Another source of potential problems may be the process of consolidating the internally unstable political parties which have emerged during the electoral campaign. All of the parties which will count in the upcoming elections have a pro-European programme. It is probable that the numerous supporters of an anti-Western orientation (although not necessarily a pro-Russian orientation, as recent events have shown) will be represented by very few deputies elected in single-mandate constituencies. On the one hand, this homogeneity within the Rada will facilitate the country’s reforms, including work on the new constitution, while on the other it might be a subject of permanent criticism by Moscow and its Ukrainian representatives. The elections will take place in the conditions of a growing wave of social disappointment and ongoing military actions in the eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the vote will be held without any major disturbances, and its course will be transparent and fair.