Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.

Bertrand, Cournot and monopolistically competitive equilibria

Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. These equilibria can be shown to exist and be uni que if we impose a sim pie and natural restriction on the elasticities of the demand functions for the differentiated products. Our characterizations of these equilibria make it possible to compare them and to determine how they are affected by the size of the market and the number of firms. We are also able to prove the existence of Cournot free-entry equilibria in which the number of firms is determined endogenously. In addition, we are able to prove that, in a large market, the Cournot free-entry equilibria approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive equilibria. The free-entry equilibrium concept we study is an analog of the one studied by Novshek for the case of firms selling products that are perfect substitutes. Our results are extensions of Novshek's. While we were unable to establish a general existence result for Bertrand free-entry equilibria, we were able to prove that, when these equilibria exist, they are unique and that in large markets they also approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibria.

Fitting the frequency-dependent parameters in the Bergeron line model

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

epresentação de linhas de transmissão por meio do modelo de bergeron: inclusão do efeito da frequência nos parâmetros longitudinais

Pós-graduação em Engenharia Elétrica - FEIS

Sonho e poesia em Gaspard de la Nuit, de Aloysius Bertrand

Considerado o criador do poema em prosa na literatura francesa, Aloysius Bertrand incorporou em seus textos diversos elementos da cultura popular da Idade Média, entre eles, o sonho e o pesadelo. Neste artigo pretende-se mostrar que, em certos poemas do Gaspard de la Nuit, o sonho funciona não só como um motivo literário, mas também como componente da construção textual.

A Comparison of Two-Market Bertrand Duopoly and Two-Market Cournot Duopoly

In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that market. All four choices are made simultaneously. In a two-market Cournot duopoly, the firms choose quantities rather than prices.It is well known that in the one-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits will be lower and quantities higher than Cournot equilibrium prices, profits and quantities.We find a quite different consequence of price undercutting in two-market duopoly. In the two-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibria are in continuous mixed strategies, while every Cournot duopoly has an equilibrium in pure strategies, or in strategies that are pure in each market.

Max Schwarz, Maximilian Fleisch, Gotthold Künkel, Bertrand Roth, Gruppenbildnis, Ganzfigurbildnis, bei der Gründung des Raff-Konservatoriums in Frankfurt a. M., 1882

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F11794

Aline Bertrand, Brustbild, Profil

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G00455

Bertrand Roth, Brustbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G02083

La concepción pragmática de la verdad. Diálogo entre William James y Bertrand Russell

Fil: Di Berardino, María Aurelia. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación; Argentina.