Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

How far do the borders of the west extend? Russian/Polish strategic conflicts in the period 1990-2010. OSW Report, 2010-03-18

From a historical perspective, the last two decades can almost be regarded as a 'golden age' of Polish-Russian relations. This is the first time in several centuries that a sovereign Poland and Russia have been able to develop mutual relations without resorting to force; moreover, they have established a bilateral legal basis and put into practice its provisions on "the inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference with internal affairs and the nations' right to self-determination. This does not change the fact that since 1990 the atmosphere between the two countries has much more often been chilly and tense. Contrary to the widely-held belief, Polish-Russian conflicts do not stem from genetic Russophobia on the part of Poland, or irrational prejudice on the part of Russia. Their substance is real and concerns strategic issues. At the deepest level, though, this is a dispute about how far the borders of the Western world extend, and about the Russian Federation's sphere of influence. However, it is not a clash between two states; moreover, Poland is certainly not the most important actor in this regard, although due to the historical context and its geographic location, it is one of the countries that lies closest to the 'line of contact', and is therefore particularly entangled in the disagreement.

Russian gas industry - current condition and prospects; New regional 'in-security' system in Central Asia; Caspian oil and gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. OSW Study 1/2001

Russian gas industry: The current condition of the gas industry is one of the most crucial factors influencing the Russian state·s functioning, internal situation and international position. Not only is gas the principal energy resource in Russia, it also subsidises other sectors of the economy. Status of the main European gas exporter strengthens also Russia's importance in the international arena. New regional in-security: Ten years have passed since the Central Asian states declared their independence, but their relationship with Russia still remains close, and the latter treats them as its exclusive zone of influence. A crucial reason for keeping Central Asia within the orbit of Moscow·s influence is the fact that Russia exercises control over the most important transport routes out of the region of raw materials for the power industry, on which the economic development of Asia depends on. But this is the only manifestation of Central Asia·s economic dependence on Russia. Moscow lacks solid economic instruments (i.e. investment input or power industry dependence) to shape the situation in the region. Caspian oil and gas: Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most probably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale. Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil, and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the existence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by extension the political influences of Russia in the region.

Demographic situation in Russia. OSW Study 24/2006

Throughout the history of Russia, periods of deep chaos have been accompanied by demographic crises. This was the case during the Time of Troubles, or Smutnoye Vremya, in the seventeenth century, and during the period of wars and revolutions in the early twentieth century, which brought the Bolsheviks to power. Similarly, the break-up of the USSR also coincided with a demographic crisis. However, while the previous crises had been caused by factors such as war, famine, epidemics or repressive policies, and were followed by periods of rapid population growth once these factors had ceased to operate, the current crisis is systemic and structural. To a large extent, it has been occasioned by cultural factors such as changing family models and the roles of women in today's society. In Russia, the effect of these factors on population increase is exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, an culture of inadequate working conditions which leads to many accidents at work, and healthcare deficiencies (only c. 3% of the GDP is spent on healthcare annually).

The 'tribal areas' of the Caucasus: The North Caucasus - an enclave of 'alien civilisation' within the Russian Federation. OSW Study 34/2010

Militant Islam is currently the greatest threat to security and stability in the Russian part of the Caucasus. However, even though the armed Islamic underground is capable of organising terrorist attacks and carrying out actions of sabotage, it seems too weak to bring about any change in the Caucasus’s political status quo. Besides, militant Islam is merely a symptom (albeit the most radical and spectacular) of a much wider process, namely the widening civilisational gap between Russia and the North Caucasus, initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key elements of this process are as follows: the spontaneous re-Islamisation of social life and the dynamic growth of Islam's political influence; the de-Russification of the region; and the ongoing marginalisation of secular intellectuals. As a result, the North Caucasus, and principally Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, are turning into an enclave separated from the rest of the Russian Federation by a growing civilisational gap, and becoming increasingly different from the rest of Russia. This situation may recall the tribal areas of Pakistan inhabited by Pashtuns (FATA) along the Afghan border.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia? OSW COMMENTARY Number 169, 29.04.2015 2015-04-29

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa. From hitherto unpublished documents. 1740-1742.

Mode of access: Internet.

[Review of] Ivo Mijnssen, The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity and Patriotism According to Nashi, 2005–2012. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2012, 202pp., e 34.90 p/b

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT NASHI (OURS) WAS FOUNDED IN THE SPRING of 2005 against the backdrop of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’. Its aim was to stabilise Russia’s political system and take back the streets from opposition demonstrators. Personally loyal to Putin and taking its ideological orientation from Surkov’s concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, Nashi has sought to turn the tide on ‘defeatism’ and develop Russian youth into a patriotic new elite that ‘believes in the future of Russia’ (p. 15). Combining a wealth of empirical detail and the application of insights from discourse theory, Ivo Mijnssen analyses the organisation’s development between 2005 and 2012. His analysis focuses on three key moments—the organisation’s foundation, the apogee of its mobilisation around the Bronze Soldier dispute with Estonia, and the 2010 Seliger youth camp—to help understand Nashi’s organisation, purpose and ideational outlook as well as the limitations and challenges it faces. As such,the book is insightful both for those with an interest in post-Soviet Russian youth culture, and for scholars seeking a rounded understanding of the Kremlin’s initiatives to return a sense of identity and purpose to Russian national life.The first chapter, ‘Background and Context’, outlines the conceptual toolkit provided by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe to help make sense of developments on the terrain of identity politics. In their terms, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced acute dislocation of its identity. With the tangible loss of great power status, Russian realities have become unfixed from a discourse enabling national life to be constructed, albeit inherently contingently, as meaningful. The lack of a Gramscian hegemonic discourse to provide a unifying national idea was securitised as an existential threat demanding special measures. Accordingly, the identification of those who are ‘notUs’ has been a recurrent theme of Nashi’s discourse and activity. With the victory in World War II held up as a foundational moment, a constitutive other is found in the notion of ‘unusual fascists’. This notion includes not just neo-Nazis, but reflects a chain of equivalence that expands to include a range of perceived enemies of Putin’s consolidation project such as oligarchs and pro-Western liberals.The empirical background is provided by the second chapter, ‘Russia’s Youth, the Orange Revolution, and Nashi’, which traces the emergence of Nashi amid the climate of political instability of 2004 and 2005. A particularly note-worthy aspect of Mijnssen’s work is the inclusion of citations from his interviews with Nashicommissars; the youth movement’s cadres. Although relatively few in number, such insider conversations provide insight into the ethos of Nashi’s organisation and the outlook of those who have pledged their involvement. Besides the discussion of Nashi’s manifesto, the reader thus gains insight into the motivations of some participants and behind-the-scenes details of Nashi’s activities in response to the perceived threat of anti-government protests. The third chapter, ‘Nashi’s Bronze Soldier’, charts Nashi’s role in elevating the removal of a World War II monument from downtown Tallinn into an international dispute over the interpretation of history. The events subsequent to this securitisation of memory are charted in detail, concluding that Nashi’s activities were ultimately unsuccessful as their demands received little official support.The fourth chapter, ‘Seliger: The Foundry of Modernisation’, presents a distinctive feature of Mijnssen’s study, namely his ethnographic account as a participant observer in the Youth International Forum at Seliger. In the early years of the camp (2005–2007), Russian participants received extensive training, including master classes in ‘methods of forestalling mass unrest’ (p. 131), and the camp served to foster a sense of group identity and purpose among activists. After 2009 the event was no longer officially run as a Nashi camp, and its role became that of a forum for the exchange of ideas about innovation, although camp spirit remained a central feature. In 2010 the camp welcomed international attendees for the first time. As one of about 700 international participants in that year the author provides a fascinating account based on fieldwork diaries.Despite the polemical nature of the topic, Mijnssen’s analysis remains even-handed, exemplified in his balanced assessment of the Seliger experience. While he details the frustrations and disappointments of the international participants with regard to the unaccustomed strict camp discipline, organisational and communication failures, and the controlled format of many discussions,he does not neglect to note the camp’s successes in generating a gratifying collective dynamic between the participants, even among the international attendees who spent only a week there.In addition to the useful bibliography, the book is back-ended by two appendices, which provide the reader with important Russian-language primary source materials. The first is Nashi’s ‘Unusual Fascism’ (Neobyknovennyi fashizm) brochure, and the second is the booklet entitled ‘Some Uncomfortable Questions to the Russian Authorities’ (Neskol’ko neudobnykh voprosov rossiiskoivlasti) which was provided to the Seliger 2010 instructors to guide them in responding to probing questions from foreign participants. Given that these are not readily publicly available even now, they constitute a useful resource from the historical perspective.

Discovery and settlement of Alaska coaster

Tsar Peter the Great ruled Russia between 1689 and 1725. Its domains, stretching from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east. From north to south, its empire stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the borders with China and India. Tsar Peter I tried to extend the geographical knowledge of his government and the rest of the world. He was also interested in the expansion of trade in Russia and in the control of trade routes. Feodor Luzhin and Ivan Yeverinov explored the eastern border of the Russian Empire, the trip between 1719 and 1721 and reported to the Tsar. They had crossed the peninsula of Kamchatka, from west to east and had traveled from the west coast of Kamchatka to the Kuril Islands. The information collected led to the first map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands. Tsar Peter ordered Bering surf the Russian Pacific coast, build ships and sail the seas north along the coast to regions of America. The second expedition found equal to those of the previous explorers difficulties. Two ships were eventually thrown away in Okhotsk in 1740. The explorers spent the winter of 1740-1741 stockpiling supplies and then navigate to Petropavlovsk. The two ships sailed eastward and did together until June 20, then separated by fog. After searching Chirikov and his boat for several days, Bering ordered the San Pedro continue to the northeast. There the Russian sailors first sighted Alaska. According to the log, "At 12:30 (pm July 17) in sight of snow-capped mountains and between them a high volcano." This finding came the day of St. Elijah and so named the mountain.

Experimental studies of di-jet survival and surface emission bias in Au plus Au collisions via angular correlations with respect to back-to-back leading hadrons

We report first results from an analysis based on a new multi-hadron correlation technique, exploring jet-medium interactions and di-jet surface emission bias at the BNL Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC). Pairs of back-to-back high-transverse-momentum hadrons are used for triggers to study associated hadron distributions. In contrast with two-and three-particle correlations with a single trigger with similar kinematic selections, the associated hadron distribution of both trigger sides reveals no modification in either relative pseudorapidity Delta eta or relative azimuthal angle Delta phi from d + Au to central Au + Au collisions. We determine associated hadron yields and spectra as well as production rates for such correlated back-to-back triggers to gain additional insights on medium properties.

Measurement of the Parity-Violating Longitudinal Single-Spin Asymmetry for W(+/-) Boson Production in Polarized Proton-Proton Collisions at root s=500 GeV

We report the first measurement of the parity-violating single-spin asymmetries for midrapidity decay positrons and electrons from W(+) and W(-) boson production in longitudinally polarized proton-proton collisions at root s = 500 GeV by the STAR experiment at RHIC. The measured asymmetries, A(L)(W+) = -0.27 +/- 0.10(stat.) +/- 0.02(syst.) +/- 0.03(norm.) and A(L)(W-) = 0.14 +/- 0.19(stat.) +/- 0.02(syst.) +/- 0.01(norm.), are consistent with theory predictions, which are large and of opposite sign. These predictions are based on polarized quark and antiquark distribution functions constrained by polarized deep-inelastic scattering measurements.

Measurement of the Bottom Quark Contribution to Nonphotonic Electron Production in p plus p Collisions at root s=200 GeV

The contribution of B meson decays to nonphotonic electrons, which are mainly produced by the semileptonic decays of heavy-flavor mesons, in p + p collisions at root s = 200 GeV has been measured using azimuthal correlations between nonphotonic electrons and hadrons. The extracted B decay contribution is approximately 50% at a transverse momentum of p(T) >= 5 GeV/c. These measurements constrain the nuclear modification factor for electrons from B and D meson decays. The result indicates that B meson production in heavy ion collisions is also suppressed at high p(T).

Spectra of identified high-p(T) pi(+/-) and p((p)over-bar ) in Cu + Cu collisions at root s(NN)=200 GeV

We report new results on identified (anti) proton and charged pion spectra at large transverse momenta (3 < p(T) < 10 GeV/c) from Cu + Cu collisions at root s(NN) = 200 GeV using the STAR detector at the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC). This study explores the system size dependence of two novel features observed at RHIC with heavy ions: the hadron suppression at high-p(T) and the anomalous baryon to meson enhancement at intermediate transverse momenta. Both phenomena could be attributed to the creation of a new form of QCD matter. The results presented here bridge the system size gap between the available pp and Au + Au data, and allow for a detailed exploration of the onset of the novel features. Comparative analysis of all available 200 GeV data indicates that the system size is a major factor determining both the magnitude of the hadron spectra suppression at large transverse momenta and the relative baryon to meson enhancement.