2.6 Judge William F. Frank, Chief Justice, Missouri State Supreme Court

In February, 1937, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice William F. Frank, issued their verdict that supported the Missouri statute that allowed for out-of-state tuition for Missouri blacks to continue their education if the desired program was not offered at Lincoln University Once again, the legal team of Lloyd Gaines was not undaunted.

3.4 United States Supreme Court 1938

Gaines’ legal team, led by Houston, had faith in the justice system of the United States and anticipated getting a fair trial at the federal level. So far, all decisions had occurred in Missouri, a state with a segregated system.The fact that Gaines v Canada had reached the Supreme Court was promising indeed. It was rare that any case involving African-Americans would be considered by the highest court in the land. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been appointing Justices that were more willing to consider cases concerned with civil rights. On November 9, 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments in the Gaines v Canada case. The defense was unmoved by the rude treatment and made their presentation with professionalism and aplomb. Houston’s argument remained steadfast; not only was the state of Missouri’s statute concerning out-of-state tuition for blacks in violation of the 14th Amendment, but the very idea of segregation itself violated the Constitution. William Hogsett, the attorney for the University of Missouri, countered that the school was merely following state laws. The MU legal team was flustered as questions from the bench forced them to correct overstatements regarding Missouri’s “generosity to Negro students”. With crossed fingers and high hopes, the Gaines legal team rested their case and awaited the verdict. Meanwhile, Lloyd Gaines was still in Michigan. Lloyd held a W.P.A. job as a Civil Service Clerk and was in constant contact with his family and attorneys. His mood in his correspondence was hopeful and positive.

Analysis of the adjudication of alcohol related traffic arrests. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Driver and Pedestrian Programs, Washington, D.C.

New Orleans Alcohol Safety Action Project. Section III. Analytical study 4 - judicial. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

R v Dr Priya Ramnath

The recent conviction at Birmingham Crown Court of Dr Priya Ramnath for the manslaughter of a patient under her care at Stafford District General Hospital, occurs no less than a decade after the original inquest into the victim’s death recorded a verdict of death by natural causes. This verdict was later overturned following a second inquest in 2004 and substituted for a verdict of unlawful killing...

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

Predicting jurors' decisions: The effects of repeated expression and forewarning in civil voir dire

To help lawyers uncover jurors' attitudes and predict verdict, litigation experts recommend that attorneys encourage jurors to repeatedly express their attitudes during voir dire. While social cognitive literature has established that repeated expression of attitudes increases accessibility and behavior predictability, the persuasive twist on the method exercised in trials deserves empirical investigation. Only one study has examined the use of repeated expression within a legal context with the results finding that the tactic increased accessibility, but did not influence the attitude verdict relationship. This dissertation reexamines the ability of civil attitudes to predict verdict in a civil trial and investigates the use of repeated expression as a persuasive tactic utilized by both parties (Plaintiff and Defense) within a civil voir dire in an attempt to increase attitudinal strength, via accessibility, and change attitudes to better predict verdict. This project also explores potential moderators, repetition by the opposing party and the use of a forewarning, to determine their ability to counter the effects of repeated expression on attitudes and verdict.^ This dissertation project asked subjects to take on the role of jurors in a civil case. During the voir dire questioning session, the number of times the participants were solicited to express their attitudes towards litigation crisis by both parties was manipulated (one vs. five). Also manipulated was the inclusion of a forewarning statement from the plaintiff, within which mock jurors were cautioned about the repeated tactics that the defense may use to influence their attitudes. Subsequently, participants engaged in a response latency task which measured the accessibility of their attitudes towards various case-related issues. After reading a vignette of a fictitious personal injury case, participants rendered verdict decisions and responded to an attitude evaluation scale. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data. Results indicated that the act of repeated expression influenced both the accessibility and value of litigation crisis attitudes thus increasing the attitude-verdict relationship, but only when only one party engaged in it. Furthermore, the forewarning manipulation did moderate the effect of repeated expression on attitude change and verdict, supporting our hypothesis.^

Jury decision making and the Story Model: How do deliberation style and evidence order influence the story that juries create?

This study investigated the utility of the Story Model for decision making at the jury level by examining the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on story consistency and guilt. Participants were shown a video-taped trial stimulus and then provided case perceptions including a guilt judgment and a narrative about what occurred during the incident. Participants then deliberated for approximately thirty minutes using either an evidence-driven or verdict-driven deliberation style before again providing case perceptions, including a guilt determination, a narrative about what happened during the incident, and an evidence recognition test. Multi-level regression analyses revealed that evidence order, deliberation style and sample interacted to influence both story consistency measures and guilt. Among students, participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution presented their case in story-order, while participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order. Findings were the opposite among community members, with participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order, and participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution's case was presented in story-order. Additionally several story consistency measures influenced guilt decisions. Thus there is some support for the hypothesis that story consistency mediates the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on guilt decisions.

Age differences and conformity in juror decision -making

The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether older adults conform more than young and middle-aged adults on a juror decision making task. Degree of group pressure, personality characteristics, gender, and social influence processes were also examined.^ Registered voters (208 participants) completed a personality questionnaire. Several weeks later, groups of six participants listened to a robbery case that portrayed the defendant as guilty. Afterwards, participants completed the first of two ballots. On the first, participants rated the defendant's degree of guilt and scored their degree of certainty in this verdict rating. They also indicated in writing which piece of information (a statement of evidence) from the robbery case supported their verdict ratings. Next, participants reviewed photocopies of five contrived first ballots. Then participants completed second ballots, in which they again rated the defendant's degree of guilt and scored their degree of certainty in this verdict rating. Finally, participants rated the importance of the five contrived first ballot verdict ratings (normative social influence) and statements of evidence (informational social influence) in reaching their second ballot verdict ratings.^ The results demonstrated that not only did older adults conform as expected, but all age groups conformed; that is, all age groups changed their verdict ratings. After reviewing the other jurors' contrived first ballots (group pressure), participants rated the defendant as less guilty on their second ballot than on their first. However, only older adults significantly changed their level of certainty in their verdict ratings from first to second ballot compared to young and middle-aged adults. With regard to personality characteristics, only rigidity predicted conformity in young and middle-aged adults but not in older adults. It was also found that females conformed more than males. Finally, all three age groups reported that different social influence processes (normative vs. informational) were important in reaching their second ballot verdict ratings. The results of this research indicate that various factors can influence young, middle-aged, and older adults as they reach verdicts. Knowledge of these factors may help alter stereotypes of older adults in terms of conformity, rigidity, and desirability as jurors. ^

The differential effects of *American and British trial proceedings on juror decision-making

Seven basic elements differentiate British from American trial procedures: confining attorneys to their tables; dealing with objections outside the presence of the jury; resolving disagreements between attorneys prior to objections being made; presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case; the judge directly questions witnesses and has a wider latitude in controlling the evidence; and the judge gives a summation of all the evidence presented to the jury (Fulero & Turner, 1997). The present experiment examined the influence of these different courtroom procedures, judges' non-verbal behavior, and evidence strength on juror decision-making. Using models of persuasion to understand how the varying elements may effect juror decision-making, it was predicted that trials following American courtroom procedures would be more distracting for jurors and as such, they would be more likely to rely on the peripheral cue of the judge's expectations for trial outcome as expressed in his nonverbal behavior. In trials following British procedures jurors should be less distracted and better able to scrutinize the strength of the evidence that in turn should minimize the influence of the judge's nonverbal behavior. Two hundred forty-five participants viewed a mock civil trial in which courtroom procedure, judge's nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength were varied. Analyses suggest that courtroom procedure and evidence strength influenced the direction of participants' verdicts, but that judge's nonverbal behavior did not have a direct impact on verdict preference. Judge's nonverbal behavior appeared to influence other measures related to verdict. Participants were more confident in their verdicts when they agreed with judge's nonverbal behavior and when they viewed British courtroom procedures. Participants were more likely to return estimates of the defendant's liability that reflected judge's nonverbal behavior and a congruency with evidence strength. Participants also recalled more facts in the British conditions than in the American conditions. These findings are interpreted as indicating the importance of the impact of trial procedures and of nonverbal influence. ^

Perceptions of alibi evidence as a function of the strength of incriminating *evidence

The current study investigated the exculpatory value of alibi evidence when presented together with various types of incriminating evidence. Previous research has reported that alibi evidence could weaken the effects of DNA evidence and eyewitness identification. The present study assessed the effectiveness of alibi evidence in counteracting defendant's confession (experiment 1) and eyewitness evidence (experiment 2). In experiment 1, three levels of alibi evidence (none, weak, strong) were combined with three levels of confession evidence (voluntary, elicited under low pressure, elicited under high pressure). Results indicated significant main effects of confession and alibi and an alibi by confession interaction. Of participants exposed to high-pressure confession, those in the strong alibi condition rendered lower guilt estimates than those in the no alibi condition. In experiment 2, three levels of alibi were combined with two levels of eyewitness evidence (bad view, good view). A main effect of alibi was obtained, but no interaction between alibi and eyewitness evidence. ^ An explanation of this pattern is based in part on the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) and a novel “culpability threshold” model of juror decision-making. The Story Model suggests that jurors generate verdict stories (interpretations of events consistent with a guilty or not guilty verdict) based on trial evidence. If the evidence in favor of guilt exceeds jurors' threshold for perceiving culpability, jurors will fail to properly consider exonerating evidence. However, when the strength of incriminating evidence does not exceed the jurors' threshold, they are likely to give appropriate consideration to exculpatory evidence in their decisions. ^ Presentation of a reliable confession in Experiment 1 exceeded jurors' culpability threshold and rendered alibi largely irrelevant. In contrast, presentation of a high-pressure confession failed to exceed jurors' culpability threshold, so jurors turned to alibi evidence in their decisions. Similarly, in the second experiment, eyewitness evidence (in general) was not strong enough to surpass the culpability threshold, and thus jurors incorporated alibi evidence in their decisions. A third study is planned to further test this “culpability threshold” model, further explore various types of alibi evidence, and clarify when exculpatory evidence will sufficiently weaken the prosecution's “story.” ^

Attitudinal predictors in a Negligence Case

This study addresses the use of attitude and personality variables as predictors of compensation and award in a personal injury suit. Safety seeking behavior and attitudes toward tort reform are introduced as case-specific factors that may predict this verdict decision. Two hundred registered voters were surveyed on scales measuring attitudes toward safety, tort reform, and psychiatrists. Subjects also indicated their demographic characteristics and the degree of compensation and amount of award they would render the plaintiff in a civil suit. Results indicated attitudinal variables were more predictive of compensation and award than were demographic variables. The implications of these findings are discussed.

L'évaluation des allégations d’agression sexuelle chez les enfants

Rapport de stage présenté à la Faculté des sciences de criminologie en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître ès sciences (M.Sc.) en sciences en criminologie option cheminement avec stage en intervention

Vivre avec un statut « dangereux » : l’expérience pénale d’hommes déclarés « délinquants dangereux » ou « délinquants à contrôler »

Cette recherche qualitative a comme objectif de comprendre et d’analyser l’expérience pénale d’individus ayant été déclarés « délinquants dangereux » ou « délinquants à contrôler », en vertu des dispositions légales prévues à la Partie XXIV (articles 752 et suivantes) du Code criminel canadien. Plus spécifiquement, nous avons voulu mettre en lumière comment se vit l’apposition de ce statut « dangereux » au plan personnel et social au moment des procédures judiciaires, lors de l’exécution de leur peine d’incarcération et dans le cadre de leur liberté surveillée, le cas échéant. Pour ce faire, nous avons rencontré dix-neuf hommes visés par ces dispositions légales afin de restituer en profondeur leur expérience pénale par rapport à ce « statut » légalement imposé, et ce, à partir de leur point de vue. Il en ressort que les individus faisant l’objet d’une déclaration spéciale traversent un grand bouleversement émotif, d’une part, en lien avec les délits qu’ils ont commis et d’autre part, relativement à la peine leur ayant été imposée. Ces sentiments complexes semblent se positionner en paradoxe entre un sentiment de culpabilité pour les gestes commis et l’impression d’avoir été traités injustement. Les hommes rencontrés partagent également un parcours pénal difficile marqué par de l’exclusion, du rejet ainsi que des mauvais traitements physiques ou psychologiques. Ils rapportent beaucoup d’impuissance à pouvoir faire évoluer leur situation, soit de se défaire de leur statut « dangereux ». Enfin, l’analyse des propos rapportés montre que l’imposition d’une déclaration spéciale ne constitue pas une « simple » peine puisqu’elle induit un processus de stigmatisation immédiat, discréditant et permanent qui a des implications importantes au niveau social et personnel. Ces implications ont de fait, engendré une transformation à l’égard de la perception qu’ils ont d’eux-mêmes ainsi que dans leurs façons de se comporter socialement.