Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Failure to collude in the presence of asymmetric information

In this paper, we design the optimal contract when two agents can collude under asymmetric information. They have correlated types, produce complementary inputs and are protected by limited liability. Therefore, a joint manipulation of reports allows them to internalize informational and productive externalities. We show that by taking advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information, even though they collude, the principal can achieve the outcome without collusion regardless of the sign and the degree of correlation. In particular, the principal can implement a non-monotonic quantity schedule in a collusion-proof way while this is impossible if collusion occurs under complete information.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

The Value of Private Information within Evolving Groups

This note offers an analytical framework aimed at explaining how individual agents purposefully act with the goal of managing the value of their information sets. Agents undertake a process of private accumulation of information, which takes into account the non-rival nature of this peculiar entity. Non rivalry introduces an externality that might trigger long-term endogenous fluctuations. The dynamics of interaction, namely the possibility of entering or exiting the group to which the individuals belong, wil l determine time trajectories for the information flows that are unique for the specific conditions of interaction that are being considered at a given momentEste artigo apresenta uma estrutura analítica que tem por objetivo explicar como é que os agentes individuais atuam, de modo intencional, com o propósito de gerir o valor da informação que detêm. Os agentes prosseguem um processo de acumulação privada de informação, o qual toma em consideração a natureza não rival desta entidade que detém características específicas. A não rivalidade introduz uma externalidade que pode despoletar flutuações endógenas de longo prazo. A dinâmica de interação, nomeadamente a possibilidade de entrar ou sair do grupo a que os indivíduos pertencem, vai determinar a formação de trajetórias no tempo para os fluxos de informação, as quais são únicas para as condições particulares de interação que estão a ser consideradas num determinado momento.

Discovery of the faithfulness gene: a model of transmission and transformation of scientific information.

The purpose of this paper is to study the diffusion and transformation of scientific information in everyday discussions. Based on rumour models and social representations theory, the impact of interpersonal communication and pre-existing beliefs on transmission of the content of a scientific discovery was analysed. In three experiments, a communication chain was simulated to investigate how laypeople make sense of a genetic discovery first published in a scientific outlet, then reported in a mainstream newspaper and finally discussed in groups. Study 1 (N=40) demonstrated a transformation of information when the scientific discovery moved along the communication chain. During successive narratives, scientific expert terminology disappeared while scientific information associated with lay terminology persisted. Moreover, the idea of a discovery of a faithfulness gene emerged. Study 2 (N=70) revealed that transmission of the scientific message varied as a function of attitudes towards genetic explanations of behaviour (pro-genetics vs. anti-genetics). Pro-genetics employed more scientific terminology than anti-genetics. Study 3 (N=75) showed that endorsement of genetic explanations was related to descriptive accounts of the scientific information, whereas rejection of genetic explanations was related to evaluative accounts of the information.

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Willigness to pay for long-term care coverage: the role of private information and self-insurance

Both public and private insurance for long-term care is undeveloped in some European countries such as in Spain and empirical evidence is still limited. This paper aims at exmining the determinants of the demand for Long Term Care (LTC) coverage in Spain using contingent valuation techniques. Our findings indicate that only one-fifth of the population is willing to pay to assure coverage decisions are significantly affected by private information asymmetry and housing tenure in giving rise to self-insurance reduces the probability of insurance being hypothetically purchased.

Estimating vadose zone hydraulic properties using ground penetrating radar: The impact of prior information

A number of geophysical methods, such as ground-penetrating radar (GPR), have the potential to provide valuable information on hydrological properties in the unsaturated zone. In particular, the stochastic inversion of such data within a coupled geophysical-hydrological framework may allow for the effective estimation of vadose zone hydraulic parameters and their corresponding uncertainties. A critical issue in stochastic inversion is choosing prior parameter probability distributions from which potential model configurations are drawn and tested against observed data. A well chosen prior should reflect as honestly as possible the initial state of knowledge regarding the parameters and be neither overly specific nor too conservative. In a Bayesian context, combining the prior with available data yields a posterior state of knowledge about the parameters, which can then be used statistically for predictions and risk assessment. Here we investigate the influence of prior information regarding the van Genuchten-Mualem (VGM) parameters, which describe vadose zone hydraulic properties, on the stochastic inversion of crosshole GPR data collected under steady state, natural-loading conditions. We do this using a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) inversion approach, considering first noninformative uniform prior distributions and then more informative priors derived from soil property databases. For the informative priors, we further explore the effect of including information regarding parameter correlation. Analysis of both synthetic and field data indicates that the geophysical data alone contain valuable information regarding the VGM parameters. However, significantly better results are obtained when we combine these data with a realistic, informative prior.