Comparison of HIV-infected patients' characteristics, healthcare resources use and cost between native and migrant patients

OBJECTIVES: To assess whether patients' characteristics and healthcare resources consumption and costs were different between native and migrant populations in Switzerland. METHODS: All adult patients followed-up in the Swiss HIV-cohort study in our institution during 2000-2003 were considered. Patients' characteristics were retrieved from the cohort database. Hospital and outpatient resource use were extracted from individual charts and valued with 2002 tariffs. RESULTS: The 66 migrants were younger (29 +/- 8 years versus 37 +/- 11, p < 0.001), less often of male gender (38 % versus 70 %, p < 0.001), predominantly infected via heterosexual contact (87 % versus 52 %, p < 0.01), with lower mean CD4 level at enrollment (326 +/- 235 versus 437 +/- 305, p = 0.002) than their 200 native counterparts. Migrants had fewer hospitalizations, more frequent outpatient visits, laboratory tests, and lower total cost of care per year of follow-up (<euro> 2'215 +/- 4'206 versus 4'155 +/- 12'304, p = 0.037). Resource use and costs were significantly higher in people with < 200 CD4 cell counts in both groups. CONCLUSIONS: Migrant population had more advanced disease, more outpatient visits but less hospitalizations, resulting in lower costs of care when compared with native population.

Tariff Escalation and Invasive Species Risk, October 2005

We investigate the interface between trade and invasive species (IS) risk, focusing on the existing tariff escalation in agro-forestry product markets and its implication for IS risk. Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the risk of IS by biasing trade flows toward increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that reducing tariff escalation by lowering the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. We also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods, leading to winwin situations.

Rules of origin : from analysis to reform

General Introduction This thesis can be divided into two main parts :the first one, corresponding to the first three chapters, studies Rules of Origin (RoOs) in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs); the second part -the fourth chapter- is concerned with Anti-Dumping (AD) measures. Despite wide-ranging preferential access granted to developing countries by industrial ones under North-South Trade Agreements -whether reciprocal, like the Europe Agreements (EAs) or NAFTA, or not, such as the GSP, AGOA, or EBA-, it has been claimed that the benefits from improved market access keep falling short of the full potential benefits. RoOs are largely regarded as a primary cause of the under-utilization of improved market access of PTAs. RoOs are the rules that determine the eligibility of goods to preferential treatment. Their economic justification is to prevent trade deflection, i.e. to prevent non-preferred exporters from using the tariff preferences. However, they are complex, cost raising and cumbersome, and can be manipulated by organised special interest groups. As a result, RoOs can restrain trade beyond what it is needed to prevent trade deflection and hence restrict market access in a statistically significant and quantitatively large proportion. Part l In order to further our understanding of the effects of RoOs in PTAs, the first chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot, Celine Carrère and Pr. Jaime de Melo, describes and evaluates the RoOs governing EU and US PTAs. It draws on utilization-rate data for Mexican exports to the US in 2001 and on similar data for ACP exports to the EU in 2002. The paper makes two contributions. First, we construct an R-index of restrictiveness of RoOs along the lines first proposed by Estevadeordal (2000) for NAFTA, modifying it and extending it for the EU's single-list (SL). This synthetic R-index is then used to compare Roos under NAFTA and PANEURO. The two main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, it shows, in the case of PANEURO, that the R-index is useful to summarize how countries are differently affected by the same set of RoOs because of their different export baskets to the EU. Second, it is shown that the Rindex is a relatively reliable statistic in the sense that, subject to caveats, after controlling for the extent of tariff preference at the tariff-line level, it accounts for differences in utilization rates at the tariff line level. Finally, together with utilization rates, the index can be used to estimate total compliance costs of RoOs. The second chapter proposes a reform of preferential Roos with the aim of making them more transparent and less discriminatory. Such a reform would make preferential blocs more "cross-compatible" and would therefore facilitate cumulation. It would also contribute to move regionalism toward more openness and hence to make it more compatible with the multilateral trading system. It focuses on NAFTA, one of the most restrictive FTAs (see Estevadeordal and Suominen 2006), and proposes a way forward that is close in spirit to what the EU Commission is considering for the PANEURO system. In a nutshell, the idea is to replace the current array of RoOs by a single instrument- Maximum Foreign Content (MFC). An MFC is a conceptually clear and transparent instrument, like a tariff. Therefore changing all instruments into an MFC would bring improved transparency pretty much like the "tariffication" of NTBs. The methodology for this exercise is as follows: In step 1, I estimate the relationship between utilization rates, tariff preferences and RoOs. In step 2, I retrieve the estimates and invert the relationship to get a simulated MFC that gives, line by line, the same utilization rate as the old array of Roos. In step 3, I calculate the trade-weighted average of the simulated MFC across all lines to get an overall equivalent of the current system and explore the possibility of setting this unique instrument at a uniform rate across lines. This would have two advantages. First, like a uniform tariff, a uniform MFC would make it difficult for lobbies to manipulate the instrument at the margin. This argument is standard in the political-economy literature and has been used time and again in support of reductions in the variance of tariffs (together with standard welfare considerations). Second, uniformity across lines is the only way to eliminate the indirect source of discrimination alluded to earlier. Only if two countries face uniform RoOs and tariff preference will they face uniform incentives irrespective of their initial export structure. The result of this exercise is striking: the average simulated MFC is 25% of good value, a very low (i.e. restrictive) level, confirming Estevadeordal and Suominen's critical assessment of NAFTA's RoOs. Adopting a uniform MFC would imply a relaxation from the benchmark level for sectors like chemicals or textiles & apparel, and a stiffening for wood products, papers and base metals. Overall, however, the changes are not drastic, suggesting perhaps only moderate resistance to change from special interests. The third chapter of the thesis considers whether Europe Agreements of the EU, with the current sets of RoOs, could be the potential model for future EU-centered PTAs. First, I have studied and coded at the six-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) .both the old RoOs -used before 1997- and the "Single list" Roos -used since 1997. Second, using a Constant Elasticity Transformation function where CEEC exporters smoothly mix sales between the EU and the rest of the world by comparing producer prices on each market, I have estimated the trade effects of the EU RoOs. The estimates suggest that much of the market access conferred by the EAs -outside sensitive sectors- was undone by the cost-raising effects of RoOs. The chapter also contains an analysis of the evolution of the CEECs' trade with the EU from post-communism to accession. Part II The last chapter of the thesis is concerned with anti-dumping, another trade-policy instrument having the effect of reducing market access. In 1995, the Uruguay Round introduced in the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA) a mandatory "sunset-review" clause (Article 11.3 ADA) under which anti-dumping measures should be reviewed no later than five years from their imposition and terminated unless there was a serious risk of resumption of injurious dumping. The last chapter, written with Pr. Olivier Cadot and Pr. Jaime de Melo, uses a new database on Anti-Dumping (AD) measures worldwide to assess whether the sunset-review agreement had any effect. The question we address is whether the WTO Agreement succeeded in imposing the discipline of a five-year cycle on AD measures and, ultimately, in curbing their length. Two methods are used; count data analysis and survival analysis. First, using Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions, the count of AD measures' revocations is regressed on (inter alia) the count of "initiations" lagged five years. The analysis yields a coefficient on measures' initiations lagged five years that is larger and more precisely estimated after the agreement than before, suggesting some effect. However the coefficient estimate is nowhere near the value that would give a one-for-one relationship between initiations and revocations after five years. We also find that (i) if the agreement affected EU AD practices, the effect went the wrong way, the five-year cycle being quantitatively weaker after the agreement than before; (ii) the agreement had no visible effect on the United States except for aone-time peak in 2000, suggesting a mopping-up of old cases. Second, the survival analysis of AD measures around the world suggests a shortening of their expected lifetime after the agreement, and this shortening effect (a downward shift in the survival function postagreement) was larger and more significant for measures targeted at WTO members than for those targeted at non-members (for which WTO disciplines do not bind), suggesting that compliance was de jure. A difference-in-differences Cox regression confirms this diagnosis: controlling for the countries imposing the measures, for the investigated countries and for the products' sector, we find a larger increase in the hazard rate of AD measures covered by the Agreement than for other measures.

Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

The impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading. Evidence from Argentina

In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.

Globalization and the provision of incentives inside the firm: The effect of foreign competition

This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

Trade liberalization, exports and technology upgrading: Evidence on the impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinean firms

This paper studies the impact of a regional free trade agreement, MERCOSUR, on technologyupgrading by Argentinean firms. To guide empirical work, I introduce technology choice inMelitz s (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms. The joint treatment of the technologyadoption and exporting choices shows that the increase in revenues produced by trade integrationcan induce exporters to upgrade technology. An empirical test of the model reveals that firms inindustries facing higher reductions in Brazil s tariffs increase their investment in technologyfaster. The effect of tariffs on entry in the export market and technology adoption is highest inthe upper-middle range of the firm size distribution, as predicted by the model.

Lobbying, innovation and protectionist cycles

This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries,and why they are often reversed. It does so by focusing on the use oflobbying for protection by import competing firms as a means to postponecostly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Giventhe availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firmswill lobby for a sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic profits from awidening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be postponed. But asthe contributions required by the government grow with the size of thequality gap, it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease thelobbying effort at some time, leading to liberalization and technologicalcatch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and "cheap",and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment.Therefore, cycles in protection will occur as a result of the use oflobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus sheds new light onthe impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbyingeffort over time, and on their implications for the timing and the timehorizon of trade reforms in developing countries.

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two-way access pricing

We study a retail benchmarking approach to determine access prices for interconnected networks. Instead of considering fixed access charges as in the existing literature, we study access pricing rules that determine the access price that network i pays to network j as a linear function of the marginal costs and the retail prices set by both networks. In the case of competition in linear prices, we show that there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of the underlying demand conditions. In the case of competition in two-part tariffs, we consider a class of access pricing rules, similar to the optimal one under linear prices but based on average retail prices. We show that firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost under this class of rules. Therefore, the regulator (or the competition authority) can choose one among the rules to pursue additional objectives such as consumer surplus, network coverage or investment: for instance, we show that both static and dynamic e±ciency can be achieved at the same time.

Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy:n sähkön siirto- ja myyntituotteiden kehittämissuunnitelma

Diplomityössä selvitetään Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy:n myynti- ja siirtotuotteiden kehitystarpeita. Työssä tarkastellaan käytössä olevien siirtotuotteiden kustannusvastaavuutta, lakkautustuotteiden tulevaisuutta ja tarvetta uusille tuotteille. Lopuksi lasketaan uusi siirtohinnoittelumalli ja sitä tukevat myyntituotteet. Työn alussa perehdytään tariffisuunnittelun periaatteisiinja tehdään kulutusanalyysi Imatran Seudun Sähkö Oy:ssä 1999 tehdyn tehoennusteen ja edellisten vuosien kulutustietojen pohjalta. Seuraavaksi selvitetään sähkönsiirrosta aiheutuvat kustannukset kustannusanalyysissä rajakustannus- ja keskikustannuslaskentaa soveltaen ja kohdistetaan kustannukset käyttäjille. Kun sähkönsiirron aiheuttamat kustannukset on selvitetty, voidaan käytössä olevien ja kehitettävien siirtotuotteiden kustannusvastaavuus ja sopivuus käyttäjille määrittää. Lopuksi tuotteet muotoillaan järkeväksi kokonaisuudeksi muuttamalla energiamaksun ja perus- tai tehomaksun painoja. Tariffien suunnittelussa mitoitetaan tulot niin, että ne kattavat kaikki kulut ja tuottovaatimuksen.

Regulation of Electricity Transmission and Distribution in Russia

The regulation of electricity transmission and distribution business is an essential issue for any electricity market; it is widely introduced in developed electricity markets of Great Britain, Scandinavian countries and United States of America and other. Those markets which were liberalized recently also need well planned regulation model to be chosen and implemented. In open electricity markets the sectors of electricity distribution and transmission remain monopolies, so called "natural monopolies", as introducing the competition into these sectors in most cases appears to be inefficient. Thatis why regulation becomes very important as its main tasks are: to set reasonable tariffs for customers, to ensure non-discriminating process of electricity transmission and distribution, at the same time to provide distribution companies with incentives to operate efficiently and the owners of the companies with reasonable profits as well; the problem of power quality should be solved at the same time. It should be mentioned also, that there is no incentive scheme which will be suitable for any conditions, that is why it is essential to study differentregulation models in order to form the best one for concrete situation. The aim of this Master's Thesis is to give an overview over theregulation of electricity transmission and distribution in Russia. First, the general information about theory of regulation of natural monopolies will be described; the situation in Russian network business and the importance of regulation process for it will be discussed next. Then there is a detailed description ofexisting regulatory system and the process of tariff calculation with an example. And finally, in the work there is a brief analysis of problems of present scheme of regulation, an attempt to predict the following development of regulationin Russia and the perspectives and risks connected to regulation which could face the companies that try to enter Russian electricity market (such as FORTUM OY).

Cost-effectiveness of a new combined immunosuppressive and anti-infectious regimen in kidney transplantation.

OBJECTIVES: The aims of this study were to assess the 1-year cost-effectiveness of a new combined immunosuppressive and anti-infectious regimen in kidney transplantation to prevent both rejection and infectious complications. METHODS: Patients (pts) transplanted from January 2000 to March 2003 (Group A) and treated with a conventional protocol were compared with pts submitted to a combined regimen including universal cytomegalovirus (CMV) prophylaxis between April 2003 and July 2005 (Group B). Costs were computed from the hospital accounting system for hospital stays, and official tariffs for outpatient visits. Patients with incomplete costs data were excluded from analysis. RESULTS: Fifty-three patients were analyzed in Group A, and 60 in Group B. Baseline characteristics including CMV serostatus were not significantly different between the two groups. Over 12 months after transplantation, acute rejections decreased from 41.5 percent in Group A to 6.7 percent in Group B (p &lt; .001), and CMV infections from 47 percent to 15 percent (p &lt; .001). Overall, readmissions decreased from 68 percent to 55 percent (p = .160), and average hospital days from 28 +/- 19 to 20 +/- 11 days (p &lt; .007). The average number of outpatient visits decreased from 49 +/- 10 to 39 +/- 8 (p &lt; .001). Average 1-year immunosuppressive and CMV prophylaxis costs (per patient) increased from CHF20,402 +/- 7,273 to 27,375 +/- 6,063 (p &lt; .001), graft rejection costs decreased from CHF4,595 +/- 10,182 to 650 +/- 3,167 (p = .005), CMV treatment costs from CHF2,270 +/- 6,161 to 101 +/- 326 (p = .008), and outpatient visits costs from CHF8,466 +/- 1'721 to 6,749 +/- 1,159 (p &lt; .001). Altogether, 1-year treatment costs decreased from CHF39'957 +/- 16,573 to 36,204 +/- 6,901 (p = .115). CONCLUSIONS: The new combined regimen administered in Group B was significantly more effective, and its additional costs were more than offset by savings associated with complications avoidance.

Determinants of Broadband Access: Is Platform Competition always the Key Variable to Success?

Previous studies have identified the rivalry among technological platforms as one of the main driving forces of broadband services penetration. This paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011 to estimate the main determinants of broadband prices. Controlling for broadband tariffs features and network variables, we examine the impact of the different modes of competition on prices. We find that inter-platform competition has no significant effects over prices, while intra-platform competition is a key driver of the prices charged in the broadband market. Our analysis suggests that the impact of different types of competition on prices is critically affected by the levels of development of the broadband market achieved by the considered country

Nationalekonomi

Samlingen med signum ESF Nat.ek. finns vid Institutionen för samhällsekonomi och statistik i anslutning till ämnet Nationalekonomi. Vid huvudbiblioteket finns också en samling nationalekonomiskt litteratur. Ekonomisk historia och doktrinhistoria samt nationalekonomiska klassiker är väl representerade i samlingen. Under professor Carl Erik Knoellingers era 1942-1968 utvecklades institutions¬biblioteket till ett av ÅA:s största och mest mångsidiga med god täckning beträffande skandinavisk och engelskspråkig litteratur inom nationalekonomi. Nationalekonomiskt litteratur har ingått i bokdonationer såväl från hemlandet som från Skandinavien och Förenta staterna. Några större donationer kan nämnas, främst en efterkrigstida donation kallad ”amerikagåvan” samt professor Knoellingers samling med arbetsmarknads¬frågor som specialintresse. Från 1950-talet till 2003 anlände material från the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) och the World Trade Organization (WTO) som deposition. Den nationalekonomiska litteraturen söks i Alma med sökfunktionen Signum och söktermen ESF Nat.ek. En del litteratur tryckt före 1980 skall sökas manuellt i institutionens kortkatalog, men retroaktiv inmatning i Alma av litteratur tryckt mellan 1830 och 1979 pågår.