How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Detection of nandrolone metabolites in urine after a football game in professional and amateur players: a Bayesian comparison.

Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is a widely used anabolic steroid in sports where strength plays an essential role. Once nandrolone has been metabolised, two major metabolites are excreted in urine, 19-norandrosterone (NA) and 19-noretiocholanolone (NE). In 1997, in France, quite a few sportsmen had concentrations of 19-norandrosterone very close to the IOC cut off limit (2ng/ml). At that time, a debate took place about the capability of the human male body to produce by itself these metabolites without any intake of nandrolone or related compounds. The International Football Federation (FIFA) was very concerned with this problematic, especially because the World Cup was about to start in France. In this respect, a statistical study was held with all football players from the first and second divisions of the Swiss Football National League. All players gave a urine sample after effort and around 6% of them showed traces of 19-norandrosterone. These results were compared with amateur football players (control group) and around 6% of them had very small amounts of 19-norandrosterone and/or 19-noretiocholanolone in urine after effort, whereas none of them had detectable traces of one or the other metabolite before effort. The origin of these compounds in urine after a strenuous physical activity is still unknown, but three hypotheses can be put forward. First, an endogenous production of nandrolone metabolites takes place. Second, nandrolone metabolites are released from the fatty tissues after an intake of nandrolone, some related compounds or some contaminated nutritive supplements. Finally, the sportsmen may have taken something during or just before the football game.

Acute hypersensitivity pneumonitis in a paint quality controller : a case report

Introduction: Isocyanates are sensitizing chemicals used in various industries such as polyurethane foam production or paint-related purposes. Acting as haptens recognized by T-lymphocytes, they can cause allergic asthma and rarely hypersensitivity pneumonitis (HP). We aim to present a case report of acute HP due to hexamethylene diisocyanate (HDI) in a paint quality controller, a profession not generally considered at a high risk for work-related Isocyanates exposure. Case report: A 30-yr-old otherwise healthy female, light smoker working as a paint quality controller developed shortness of breath, malaise, sweating and chills at workplace six hours after handling a HDI-based hardener. Upon admission to emergency department, symptoms had progressed to severe respiratory failure. HR computer tomography (HRCT) showed bilateral ground-glass attenuation without pleural effusion. Rapid clinical and radiological improvement occurred under facial oxygen supply and systemic steroid therapy. Occupational medicine investigations revealed regular handling of HDI using latex gloves without respiratory protection. Assessment at workplace showed insufficient air renewal (1.5 times per hour), inadequate local aspiration and HDI exposure at levels of 1-4.25 ppb/m3 (Swiss Occupation Exposure Limit 5 ppb/m3). Biological monitoring after identical work procedure executed by a co-worker showed HDI exposure (5.1 micrograms hexamethylene diamine/g creatinine). Resumption of work was disadvised because of the life-threatening event. Discussion: The diagnosis of occupational HP is highly supported by classical findings on imagery and typical symptoms occurring within approved latency interval, associated with rapid clinical improvement. Although neither broncho-alveolar lavage nor specific IgG diagnosis (en route) were performed during the acute episode, various blood tests managed to rule out evidence of an infection or autoimmune disease. Other causes of HP seem unlikely as the patient did not have any recurrence of symptoms since absence from work. Workplace evaluation provided significant information on HDI exposure and allowed substantial recommendations to diminish Isocyanate exposure for the 20 still healthy laboratory co-workers. Although the entryways (air or skin) and precise mechanism of toxicity remain unclear, the present case clearly shows that Isocyanates may trigger acute HP in susceptible workers in a profession not generally considered at a high risk.

Aplicación de la ingeniería del software sobre la herramienta MATE : application controller

Este proyecto tiene como objetivo crear y aplicar una metodología a una aplicación llamada MATE que fue creada en en el año 2003 por Anna Sikora para su tesis doctoral. Se trata de dotar el proyecto MATE de las herramientas necesarias para garantizar su evolución. La metodología creada consta de la especificación de un entorno de trabajo y una serie de documentos que detallan los procesos relativos al desarrollo de MATE. Además se han creado algunas nuevas características que hacen de MATE una herramienta más completa y cómoda.

"Michael's Game," a card game for the treatment of psychotic symptoms.

Objective: "Michael's Game" is a card game which aims at familiarizing healthcare professionals and patients with cognitive therapy of psychotic symptoms. The present study tests the feasibility and the impact of the intervention in naturalistic settings.Methods: 135 patients were recruited in 11 centres. They were assessed pre- and post-tests with the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and the Peters Delusion Inventory-21 items (PDI-21).Results: Data about 107 patients were included in the entire analyses. Significant improvements were observed on BCIS subscales as well as a reduction of severity of conviction and preoccupation scores on the PDI-21. The intervention has a moderate effect on the PDI-21 preoccupation and conviction as well as the BCIS subscales. Patients who benefit the most from the program are patients who have a low degree of self-reflectiveness and patients who are concomitantly preoccupied by their symptoms.Conclusion: The present study supports the feasibility and effectiveness of "Michael's Game" in naturalistic settings.Practical implications: The game seems to be a useful tool for patients with psychotic disorders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.

Une nouvelle situation pour évaluer le fonctionnement familial: le jeu du pique-nique = A new situation to evaluate a family system's fuctioning: the picnic game.

Cet article présente une nouvelle situation, le Jeu du Pique-Nique, qui permet l'évaluation du fonctionnement familial, pris dans son ensemble, quel que soit le nombre d'enfants, âgés de quelques semaines à une douzaine d'années. L'évaluation est macroscopique, selon différentes dimensions comme le coparentage, la chaleur familiale, la dimension ludique, l'autonomie des enfants, etc. Pour illustrer la richesse des observations qu'offre cette situation, les jeux de trois familles contrastées sont présentés ainsi que leur codage. L'utilité en recherche ainsi qu'en clinique, et en particulier l'apport de la vision du film avec la famille, est discutée.