Drivers of populism - A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections

The aim of this paper is to analyze what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. While households with large holdings of securities from stressed Euro area countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) de-crease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Euro area crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Euro area countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. Only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration. Our results are robust to falsification tests, and instrumental variables estimation.

Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks, and asset allocation:evidence from household and firm portfolios

We use a unique dataset with bank clients’ security holdings for all German banks to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect asset allocation preferences of households and non-financial firms. Our analysis focuses on two alternative mechanisms which can influence portfolio choice: wealth shocks, which are represented by the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, and credit-supply shocks which arise from reductions in borrowing abilities during bank distress. We document het- erogeneous responses to these two types of shocks. While households with large holdings of secu- rities from stressed Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) decrease the degree of concentration in their security portfolio as a result of the Eurozone crisis, non-financial firms with similar levels of holdings from stressed Eurozone countries do not. Credit-supply shocks at the bank level (caused by bank distress) result in lower concentration, for both households and non-financial corporations. We also show that only shocks to corporate credit bear ramifications on bank clients’ portfolio concentration, while shocks in retail credit are inconsequential. Our results are robust to falsification tests, propensity score matching techniques, and instrumental variables estimation.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Rules-based economic governance in the European Union: A reappraisal of national fiscal rules.

The economic and financial crisis of 2007/2009 has posed unexpected challenges on both the global and the regional level. Besides the US, the EU has been the most severely hit by the current economic crisis. The financial and banking crisis on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the other hand have clearly shown that without a bold, constructive and systematic change of the economic governance structure of the Union, not just the sustainability of the monetary zone but also the viability of the whole European integration process can be seriously undermined. The current crisis is, however, only a symptom, which made all those contradictions overt that were already heavily embedded in the system. Right from the very beginning, the deficit and the debt rules of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact have proved to be controversial cornerstones in the fiscal governance framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet, member states of the EU (both within and outside of the EMU) have shown an immense interest in adopting numerical constraints on the domestic level without hesitation. The main argument for the introduction of national fiscal rules was mostly to strengthen the accountability and credibility of national fiscal policy-making. The paper, however, claims that a relatively large portion of national rules were adopted only after the start of deceleration of the debt-to-GDP ratios. Accordingly, national rules were hardly the sole triggering factors of maintaining fiscal discipline; rather, they served as the key elements of a comprehensive reform package of public budgeting. It can be safely argued, therefore, that countries decide to adopt fiscal rules because they want to explicitly signal their strong commitment to fiscal discipline. In other words, it is not fiscal rules per se what matter in delivering fiscal stability but a strong political commitment.

The Argentine Dilemma: “Vulture Funds” and the Risks Posed to Developing Economies

Post-crisis Argentina is a case study of crisis management through debt restructuring. This article examines how Argentina negotiated the external debt in the wake of the sovereign default in December 2001 and now confronts challenges posed by holdout creditors—the so called “vulture funds”. It argues that debt restructuring has put a straitjacket on the national economy, making it virtually impossible for healthy growth short of a break with the international economic order. While Argentina has successfully restructured a $95 billion debt with an unprecedented “hair cut” (around 70% reduction in “net value of debt”), a sustainable growth appears out of reach as long as reliance on the government debt market prevails. In this cycle, the transmission belt of financial crisis to developing countries is characterized by the entry of highly speculative players such as hedge funds, conflicts of interests embedded in “sovereign debt restructuring” (SDR) and vulnerabilities associated with “emerging market debt”.

Eurobonos: evolución y soluciones de la deuda en Europa

En este trabajo se analizan los principales problemas derivados de la gestión de la deuda pública, discutiendo si es un problema latente o puntual. A continuación, se propone un mecanismo solución a la crisis de deuda soberana que sufren los países de la Eurozona en el marco de la crisis financiera internacional. Dicho mecanismo consiste en la combinación de un proceso de reestructuración unido a la creación de un sistema común de emisión de deuda soberana en la Eurozona, denominado habitualmente como Eurobonos. Por tanto, el objetivo de esta investigación es ofrecer los elementos analíticos necesarios para comprender las posibles soluciones a los problemas de la deuda pública.

Bond Fund Performance During Recessions and Expansions: Empirical Evidence from a Small Market

This paper provides the first investigation about bond mutual fund performance during recession and expansion periods separately. Based on multi-factor performance evaluation models, results show that bond funds significantly underperform the market during both phases of the business cycle. Nevertheless, unlike equity funds, bond funds exhibit considerably higher alphas during good economic states than during market downturns. These results, however, seem entirely driven by the global financial crisis subperiod. In contrast, during the recession associated to the Euro sovereign debt crisis, bond funds are able to accomplish neutral performance. This improved performance throughout the debt crisis seems to be related to more conservative investment strategies, which reflect an increase in managers’ risk aversion.

Capital 2.0 capital formation and legal risk in a new global economic order from fiat to exit: including case studies of the proposed transatlantic trade and investment partnership between the United States and the European Union and the financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China

Following the intrinsically linked balance sheets in his Capital Formation Life Cycle, Lukas M. Stahl explains with his Triple A Model of Accounting, Allocation and Accountability the stages of the Capital Formation process from FIAT to EXIT. Based on the theoretical foundations of legal risk laid by the International Bar Association with the help of Roger McCormick and legal scholars such as Joanna Benjamin, Matthew Whalley and Tobias Mahler, and founded on the basis of Wesley Hohfeld’s category theory of jural relations, Stahl develops his mutually exclusive Four Determinants of Legal Risk of Law, Lack of Right, Liability and Limitation. Those Four Determinants of Legal Risk allow us to apply, assess, and precisely describe the respective legal risk at all stages of the Capital Formation Life Cycle as demonstrated in case studies of nine industry verticals of the proposed and currently negotiated Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States of America and the European Union, TTIP, as well as in the case of the often cited financing relation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Having established the Four Determinants of Legal Risk and its application to the Capital Formation Life Cycle, Stahl then explores the theoretical foundations of capital formation, their historical basis in classical and neo-classical economics and its forefathers such as The Austrians around Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek and most notably and controversial, Karl Marx, and their impact on today’s exponential expansion of capital formation. Starting off with the first pillar of his Triple A Model, Accounting, Stahl then moves on to explain the Three Factors of Capital Formation, Man, Machines and Money and shows how “value-added” is created with respect to the non-monetary capital factors of human resources and industrial production. Followed by a detailed analysis discussing the roles of the Three Actors of Monetary Capital Formation, Central Banks, Commercial Banks and Citizens Stahl readily dismisses a number of myths regarding the creation of money providing in-depth insight into the workings of monetary policy makers, their institutions and ultimate beneficiaries, the corporate and consumer citizens. In his second pillar, Allocation, Stahl continues his analysis of the balance sheets of the Capital Formation Life Cycle by discussing the role of The Five Key Accounts of Monetary Capital Formation, the Sovereign, Financial, Corporate, Private and International account of Monetary Capital Formation and the associated legal risks in the allocation of capital pursuant to his Four Determinants of Legal Risk. In his third pillar, Accountability, Stahl discusses the ever recurring Crisis-Reaction-Acceleration-Sequence-History, in short: CRASH, since the beginning of the millennium starting with the dot-com crash at the turn of the millennium, followed seven years later by the financial crisis of 2008 and the dislocations in the global economy we are facing another seven years later today in 2015 with several sordid debt restructurings under way and hundred thousands of refugees on the way caused by war and increasing inequality. Together with the regulatory reactions they have caused in the form of so-called landmark legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the JOBS Act of 2012 or the introduction of the Basel Accords, Basel II in 2004 and III in 2010, the European Financial Stability Facility of 2010, the European Stability Mechanism of 2012 and the European Banking Union of 2013, Stahl analyses the acceleration in size and scope of crises that appears to find often seemingly helpless bureaucratic responses, the inherent legal risks and the complete lack of accountability on part of those responsible. Stahl argues that the order of the day requires to address the root cause of the problems in the form of two fundamental design defects of our Global Economic Order, namely our monetary and judicial order. Inspired by a 1933 plan of nine University of Chicago economists abolishing the fractional reserve system, he proposes the introduction of Sovereign Money as a prerequisite to void misallocations by way of judicial order in the course of domestic and transnational insolvency proceedings including the restructuring of sovereign debt throughout the entire monetary system back to its origin without causing domino effects of banking collapses and failed financial institutions. In recognizing Austrian-American economist Schumpeter’s Concept of Creative Destruction, as a process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one, Stahl responds to Schumpeter’s economic chemotherapy with his Concept of Equitable Default mimicking an immunotherapy that strengthens the corpus economicus own immune system by providing for the judicial authority to terminate precisely those misallocations that have proven malignant causing default perusing the century old common law concept of equity that allows for the equitable reformation, rescission or restitution of contract by way of judicial order. Following a review of the proposed mechanisms of transnational dispute resolution and current court systems with transnational jurisdiction, Stahl advocates as a first step in order to complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle from FIAT, the creation of money by way of credit, to EXIT, the termination of money by way of judicial order, the institution of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court constituted by a panel of judges from the U.S. Court of International Trade and the European Court of Justice by following the model of the EFTA Court of the European Free Trade Association. Since the first time his proposal has been made public in June of 2014 after being discussed in academic circles since 2011, his or similar proposals have found numerous public supporters. Most notably, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, David Martin, has tabled an amendment in June 2015 in the course of the negotiations on TTIP calling for an independent judicial body and the Member of the European Commission, Cecilia Malmström, has presented her proposal of an International Investment Court on September 16, 2015. Stahl concludes, that for the first time in the history of our generation it appears that there is a real opportunity for reform of our Global Economic Order by curing the two fundamental design defects of our monetary order and judicial order with the abolition of the fractional reserve system and the introduction of Sovereign Money and the institution of a democratically elected Transatlantic Trade and Investment Court that commensurate with its jurisdiction extending to cases concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership may complete the Capital Formation Life Cycle resolving cases of default with the transnational judicial authority for terminal resolution of misallocations in a New Global Economic Order without the ensuing dangers of systemic collapse from FIAT to EXIT.

Sobre o contágio nos mercados bolsistas internacionais: evidência de nove países

Mestrado em Contabilidade e Análise Financeira

Volatility Spillover and Multivariate Volatility Impulse Response Analysis of GFC News Events

This paper applies two measures to assess spillovers across markets: the Diebold Yilmaz (2012) Spillover Index and the Hafner and Herwartz (2006) analysis of multivariate GARCH models using volatility impulse response analysis. We use two sets of data, daily realized volatility estimates taken from the Oxford Man RV library, running from the beginning of 2000 to October 2016, for the S&P500 and the FTSE, plus ten years of daily returns series for the New York Stock Exchange Index and the FTSE 100 index, from 3 January 2005 to 31 January 2015. Both data sets capture both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). The spillover index captures the transmission of volatility to and from markets, plus net spillovers. The key difference between the measures is that the spillover index captures an average of spillovers over a period, whilst volatility impulse responses (VIRF) have to be calibrated to conditional volatility estimated at a particular point in time. The VIRF provide information about the impact of independent shocks on volatility. In the latter analysis, we explore the impact of three different shocks, the onset of the GFC, which we date as 9 August 2007 (GFC1). It took a year for the financial crisis to come to a head, but it did so on 15 September 2008, (GFC2). The third shock is 9 May 2010. Our modelling includes leverage and asymmetric effects undertaken in the context of a multivariate GARCH model, which are then analysed using both BEKK and diagonal BEKK (DBEKK) models. A key result is that the impact of negative shocks is larger, in terms of the effects on variances and covariances, but shorter in duration, in this case a difference between three and six months.

Banca Digital

Em plena quarta revolução industrial, todas as industrias se estão a transformar para se ajustar aos novos paradigmas de relação com os clientes, altamente influenciados pelos pioneiros digitais como a Uber, Netflix ou Amazon, porém no setor financeiro há desafios acrescidos, pois os clientes esperam juntar essas expectativas digitais com a manutenção da iteração humana, enquanto, do lados bancos, em simultâneo, necessitam de recuperar da crise da dívida soberana que impôs necessidades de ajustamento dos balanços. O momento de desenvolvimento tecnológico potenciado pelo forte crescimento do acesso à internet em mobilidade traz novos hábitos e expectativas na relação com as entidades, com dispositivos cada vez mais potentes a cada vez menor custo, o que criou a oportunidade perfeita para o surgimento de startups tecnológicas dispostas a transformar os modelos de negócio de intermediação clássica, dando origem, no setor financeiro, às fintechs – empresas de base tecnológica dedicadas à prestação de serviços financeiros - impondo uma disrupção na industria financeira, com destaque para mercados como os EUA e Reino Unido. Olhando aos últimos cinco anos do setor financeiro, será muito difícil antecipar como estará o setor financeiro dentro de cinco anos, mas sabemos que estará seguramente muito diferente do que conhecemos hoje, por esse fato este trabalho é assente essencialmente em referências bibliográficas dos últimos 5 anos, tendo sido feito utilizados estudos de investigação de empresas e documentos académicos para a caracterização do setor neste contexto de inovação permanente e em que medida este processo de “digitalização” do setor financeiro influencia a propensão dos clientes na contratação de mais produtos e serviços, sendo esse um fator central para os bancos em Portugal recuperarem economicamente. É também analisada a dimensão seguida pelas instituições de regulação e supervisão do setor financeiro com vista a potenciar a concorrência e inovação do setor financeiro, enquanto mantém a garantia de segurança, confiança e controlo de risco sistémico. É bastante escassa a literatura disponível para caracterizar a banca em Portugal numa ótica de inovação e transformação, porém este trabalho procura caracterizar o sistema financeiro português face à forma como está a responder aos desafios de transformação tecnológica e digital. Procurou-se estabelecer uma metodologia de investigação que permita caracterizar a perceção de valor acrescentado para os clientes da utilização de serviços digitais e em que medida estes se podem substituir aos balcões e à intervenção humana dos profissionais dos bancos, tendo-se concluído que estes dois elementos são ainda fatores centrais para os clientes.

Self-defeating austerity? Assessing the impact of fiscal consolidations on unemployment

The great recession of 2008/2009 has had a huge impact on unemployment and public finances in most advanced countries, and these impacts were magnified in the southern Euro area countries by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2011. The fiscal consolidation imposed by the European Union on highly indebted countries was based on the assumptions of the so-called expansionary austerity. However, the reality so far shows proof to the contrary, and the results of this paper support the opposing view of a self- defeating austerity. Based on the input-output relations of the productive system, an unemployment rate/budget balance trade-off equation is derived, as well as the impact of a strong fiscal consolidation based on social transfers and the notion of neutral budget balance. An application to the Portuguese case confirms the huge costs of a strong fiscal consolidation, both in terms of unemployment and social policy regress, and it allows one to conclude that too much consolidation in one year makes consolidation more difficult in the following year.

Risk premiumin the global creditMarkets: 2006-2012

¿What have we learnt from the 2006-2012 crisis, including events such as the subprime crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers or the European sovereign debt crisis, among others? It is usually assumed that in firms that have a CDS quotation, this CDS is the key factor in establishing the credit premiumrisk for a new financial asset. Thus, the CDS is a key element for any investor in taking relative value opportunities across a firm’s capital structure. In the first chapter we study the most relevant aspects of the microstructure of the CDS market in terms of pricing, to have a clear idea of how this market works. We consider that such an analysis is a necessary point for establishing a solid base for the rest of the chapters in order to carry out the different empirical studies we perform. In its document “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”, Basel sets the requirement of a capital charge for credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk in the trading book and its methodology for the computation for the capital requirement. This regulatory requirement has added extra pressure for in-depth knowledge of the CDS market and this motivates the analysis performed in this thesis. The problem arises in estimating of the credit risk premium for those counterparties without a directly quoted CDS in the market. How can we estimate the credit spread for an issuer without CDS? In addition to this, given the high volatility period in the credit market in the last few years and, in particular, after the default of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, we observe the presence of big outliers in the distribution of credit spread in the different combinations of rating, industry and region. After an exhaustive analysis of the results from the different models studied, we have reached the following conclusions. It is clear that hierarchical regression models fit the data much better than those of non-hierarchical regression. Furthermore,we generally prefer the median model (50%-quantile regression) to the mean model (standard OLS regression) due to its robustness when assigning the price to a new credit asset without spread,minimizing the “inversion problem”. Finally, an additional fundamental reason to prefer the median model is the typical "right skewness" distribution of CDS spreads...

A Historical Materialist Approach to the Eurozone Crisis: Fictitious Capital, States, and Capital Accumulation

This dissertation examines the ongoing European sovereign debt crises that began with Greece in 2009, in the wake of the US subprime mortgage crisis. Through the application of a historical materialist approach, I attempt to understand the on-going crisis in the European Monetary Union (EMU) by investigating root causes of sovereign debt crises, relations of power, and main beneficiaries of the policy responses. My theoretical framework hinges on three contradictions in capitalism: the tendency towards overaccumulation, the tension between fictitious capital and the productive base, and the contradiction inherent in capitalist states between their role as a national state and as a class state. In contrast to the dominant positions that locate the cause of the crisis within either: debtor states; creditor states; or the framework at the EMU, I argue that these sovereign debt crises are actually a broader crisis of crisis of capitalism within the EMU itself. In order to do so, I trace the evolution of the political economy of the Eurozone in the post-Bretton woods era, with a particularly focus on the credit system. More specifically, I argue that these crises are the result of an interaction between three meso-level contradictions that have developed within the EMU region: 1) Germany’s postwar accumulation regime, which has produced a deep crisis of overaccumulation; 2) the contradictory processes associated with the neoliberal logic of the EMU, by which I mean the rush to lower barriers to credit and finance at the expense of all else; and 3) credit-fueled, consumption-based EMU integration in the periphery; and. These three contradictions came together in the wake of the 2007-2008 US subprime crisis to form an overall crisis of capitalism in the Eurozone, expressed, as I suggest, as a crisis of fictitious capital. This dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing project among critical political economists to de-naturalize and re-politicize money, while challenging the hegemony of monetarism within neoliberalism. Second, there has yet to be a comprehensive study that examines the EMU, Germany, and the crises in the periphery from a holistic, historical materialist analysis.