Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.

The 4Cs of Disaster Partnering: Communication, Coordination, Cooperation and Collaboration

Public, nonprofit and private organisations respond to large-scale disasters domestically and overseas. Critics of these assistance efforts, as well as those involved, often cite poor interorganisational partnering as an obstacle to successful disaster response. Observers frequently call for ‘more’ and ‘better’ partnering. We found important qualitative distinctions existed within partnering behaviours. We identified four different types of interorganisational partnering activities often referred to interchangeably: communication, cooperation, coordination and collaboration—the Four Cs. We derived definitions of the Four Cs from the partnering literature. We then tested them in a case study of the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. We suggest that the Four Cs are distinct activities, that organisations are typically strong or weak in one or more for various reasons, and that the four terms represent a continuum of increased interorganisational embeddedness in partnering activities.

EU Cross-Border Cooperation and Conflict Transformation in the Basque and Irish Border Regions

Comparative research on violent conflict in the Basque Country and Ireland has yielded a sizable body of published academic work. Less well explored is the relationship between conflict transformation and cross-border cooperation in that specific comparative context. This paper provides a comparative examination of Third (not for profit) sector cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation in the Basque (France/Spain) and Irish (UK/Ireland) border regions. To what extent does cross-border cooperation contribute to peacebuilding in the two last violent ethnonationalist conflicts in Western Europe? The comparison is based on the premise that the EU played a different role in both cases. In the Irish case, the EU contributed to the institutionalization of a peace process that included cross-border cooperation between third sector organizations among the policy instruments contributing to conflict transformation. In the Basque case, the unilateral renunciation of violence by ETA (Euskadi eta Askatasuna) in 2010 did not generate the consistent involvement of the EU in a comparable institutional peace process. However, some third sector organizations used EU instruments for cross-border economic, social and cultural cooperation between France and Spain in order to reinforce their cross-border networks, which indirectly impacted on conflict transformation. The effectiveness of this cross-border cooperation for conflict transformation is assessed comparatively. To what extent does this increase in cross-border cooperation “from below” connect to wider institutional and social processes of conflict transformation in Ireland and the Basque Country? Crucially, does the strengthening of cross-border relations on shared issues mollify or sharpen existing identity cleavages? Also considered is the sustainability of such cooperation in these regions in light of the less favourable post-2004 EU funding environment, and the post-2008 economic and political turmoil affecting the relevant EU member states, especially Ireland and Spain.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation as Conflict Transformation:Potential and Limits

Cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation provides a potential strategy for the European Union (EU) to help realise its founding peacebuilding objective. A wealth of cross-border cooperation activity sponsored by the EU spans a quarter of a century. Although the conflict transformation capacity of that cooperation is questionable in some border regions there is evidence to suggest that it has delivered peacebuilding dividends in other border regions. However, EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation faces a number of significant twenty-first century challenges including: ghost borders of the communal imagination; EU external border securitization; perceptions of EU and Russian empire-building; and the Mediterranean transmigrant/refugee crisis. It is argued that these challenges pose significant obstacles to EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation and undermine the peacebuilding objective of European integration.

Russia and the EU: The Global Cooperation Agenda

Two factors are important for effective cooperation with Russia in the wider world. First, the EU needs to develop a downgraded, ‘values-light’ agenda focused on solving concrete challenges. Second, to achieve the first point, a common minimum set of shared principles needs to be agreed upon. The need for such change is underscored by structural barriers for construct

The Evolution of Extreme Cooperation via Shared Dysphoric Experiences

Willingness to lay down one’s life for a group of non-kin, well documented in the
historical and ethnographic records, represents an evolutionary puzzle. Here we
present a novel explanation for the willingness to fight and die for a group, combining evolutionary theorizing with empirical evidence from real-world human groups. Building on research in social psychology, we develop a mathematical model showing how conditioning cooperation on previous shared experience can allow extreme (i.e., life-threatening) pro-social behavior to evolve. The model generates a series of predictions that we then test empirically in a range of special sample populations (including military veterans, college fraternity/sorority members, football fans, martial arts practitioners, and twins). Our results show that sharing painful experiences produces “identity fusion” – a visceral sense of oneness – more so even than bonds of kinship, in turn motivating extreme pro-group behavior, including willingness to fight and die for the group. These findings have theoretical and practical relevance. Theoretically, our results speak to the origins of human cooperation, as we offer an explanation of extremely costly actions left unexplained by existing models.
Practically, our account of how shared dysphoric experiences produce identity fusion, which produces a willingness to fight and die for a non-kin group, helps us better understand such pressing social issues as suicide terrorism, holy wars, sectarian violence, gang-related violence, and other forms of intergroup conflict.

International cooperation for development in tourism destinations

The main goal of this thesis is to propose a conceptual theoretical model of critical success factors of International Development Cooperation programmes that are based in knowledge transfer approaches in the context of tourism development. The research was structured around three main theoretical pillars: international development cooperation (IDC), tourism as a tool for development, and knowledge transfer (KT). By exploring these pillars´ main interrelations, it was possible to gather the necessary background to develop the theoretical model and apply it to a real context. It was adopted a qualitative research approach using as a case study an IDC programme in tourism - the UNWTO.Volunteers programme. The key contribution of this thesis in the theoretical realm is the bridging of fields of study that are insufficiently covered in the scientific literature. The resulting model proposal applied to a real context of an IDC programme implementation permitted to test it partially providing useful insights for future research. It is postulated that IDC programmes in these contexts constitute a process rather than an end in itself. Therefore, they should be seen as a way of changing the state of the art of the tourism system in a sustainable manner so that it potentially generates positive development changes. This study suggested that it is not possible to achieve positive results if, instead of encouraging a KT and learning environment, it is simply disseminated knowledge in a linear, static, north-south approach. The characteristics of these interventions should be reviewed in that it was found that it is very difficult to guarantee the maintenance of the development changes induced by them if it is not safeguarded the necessary conditions and accountability to implement the recommended actions. While it was perceived a great potential for development changes to be induced by some IDC programmes in tourism destinations, it was concluded that these processes are too much dependent on the local political systems and existing power relations, as well as on the level of tourism development of the destination. However, more research is needed to examine the ability to generalise the findings to other IDC programmes and different destinations of developing countries.

Neuroendocrinology of cooperation: the role of neuropeptides on the modulation of mutualistic behaviour of the Indo-Pacific Cleaner Wrasse (Labroides dimidiatus)

Tese de doutoramento, Ciências do Mar, da Terra e do Ambiente, Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia, Universidade do Algarve, 2015

Lessons from Flanders: drivers & pitfalls of cooperation on a business park

For almost ten years several companies located in De Zaubeek Business Park in Flanders have been collaborating with the goal of creating a more sustainable industrial zone. Many initiatives have been developed in this business park, many successful, but some clearly pointed to constraints that require action beyond the reach of the companies or the business association. The former chairman of the association has been involved in several of these initiatives and we asked him to tell his story.

Cooperation mechanism for team-work based multi-agent system in dynamic scheduling through meta-heuristics

This paper describes a Multi-agent Scheduling System that assumes the existence of several Machines Agents (which are decision-making entities) distributed inside the Manufacturing System that interact and cooperate with other agents in order to obtain optimal or near-optimal global performances. Agents have to manage their internal behaviors and their relationships with other agents via cooperative negotiation in accordance with business policies defined by the user manager. Some Multi Agent Systems (MAS) organizational aspects are considered. An original Cooperation Mechanism for a Team-work based Architecture is proposed to address dynamic scheduling using Meta-Heuristics.

Cooperation among selfish individuals in insect societies

Kin selection is the key to understanding the evolution of cooperation in insect societies. However, kin selection also predicts potential kin conflict, and understanding how these conflicts are resolved is a major goal of current research on social insects

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.