Is price dispersion always an indication of price discrimination?

It has been established for a long time that there is significant dispersion in prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods. This may happen in competitive markets because the world is not frictionless, and certainly in other markets where price discrimination is carried out by firms with oligopolistic power. This paper is the first survey of the economic literature on price dispersion that addresses the following three key issues: i) its characteristics as a result of optimizing search behavior; ii) its relevance as a reflection of price discrimination and its consequences for social welfare and policy intervention; and iii) the empirical evidence of price dispersion. By contributing to a better understanding of price dispersion, this survey may help in the design and implementation of competition and anti-trust policies

Essays on Wage and Price Formation in Sweden

Study IReal Wage Determination in the Swedish Engineering Industry This study uses the monopoly union model to examine the determination of real wages and in particular the effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on real wages in the engineering industry. Quarterly data for the period 1970:1 to 1996:4 are used in a cointegration framework, utilising the Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure. On a basis of the Johansen (trace) test results, vector error correction (VEC) models are created in order to model the determination of real wages in the engineering industry. The estimation results support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect to rises in the labour productivity, in the tax wedge, in the alternative real consumer wage and in real UI benefits. The estimation results also support the presence of a long-run wage-raising effect due to positive changes in the participation rates regarding ALMPs, relief jobs and labour market training. This could be interpreted as meaning that the possibility of being a participant in an ALMP increases the utility for workers of not being employed in the industry, which in turn could increase real wages in the industry in the long run. Finally, the estimation results show evidence of a long-run wage-reducing effect due to positive changes in the unemployment rate. Study IIIntersectoral Wage Linkages in Sweden The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the wage-setting in certain sectors of the Swedish economy affects the wage-setting in other sectors. The theoretical background is the Scandinavian model of inflation, which states that the wage-setting in the sectors exposed to international competition affects the wage-setting in the sheltered sectors of the economy. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly data on Swedish sector wages for the period 1980:1–2002:2. Different vector error correction (VEC) models are created, based on assumptions as to which sectors are exposed to international competition and which are not. The adaptability of wages between sectors is then tested by imposing restrictions on the estimated VEC models. Finally, Granger causality tests are performed in the different restricted/unrestricted VEC models to test for sector wage leadership. The empirical results indicate considerable adaptability in wages as between manufacturing, construction, the wholesale and retail trade, the central government sector and the municipalities and county councils sector. This is consistent with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model. Further, the empirical results indicate a low level of adaptability in wages as between the financial sector and manufacturing, and between the financial sector and the two public sectors. The Granger causality tests provide strong evidence for the presence of intersectoral wage causality, but no evidence of a wage-leading role in line with the assumptions of the Scandinavian model for any of the sectors. Study IIIWage and Price Determination in the Private Sector in Sweden The purpose of this study is to analyse wage and price determination in the private sector in Sweden during the period 1980–2003. The theoretical background is a variant of the “Imperfect competition model of inflation”, which assumes imperfect competition in the labour and product markets. According to the model wages and prices are determined as a result of a “battle of mark-ups” between trade unions and firms. The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration approach is applied to quarterly Swedish data on consumer prices, import prices, private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity and the total unemployment rate for the period 1980:1–2003:3. The chosen cointegration rank of the estimated vector error correction (VEC) model is two. Thus, two cointegration relations are assumed: one for private-sector nominal wage determination and one for consumer price determination. The estimation results indicate that an increase of consumer prices by one per cent lifts private-sector nominal wages by 0.8 per cent. Furthermore, an increase of private-sector nominal wages by one per cent increases consumer prices by one per cent. An increase of one percentage point in the total unemployment rate reduces private-sector nominal wages by about 4.5 per cent. The long-run effects of private-sector labour productivity and import prices on consumer prices are about –1.2 and 0.3 per cent, respectively. The Rehnberg agreement during 1991–92 and the monetary policy shift in 1993 affected the determination of private-sector nominal wages, private-sector labour productivity, import prices and the total unemployment rate. The “offensive” devaluation of the Swedish krona by 16 per cent in 1982:4, and the start of a floating Swedish krona and the substantial depreciation of the krona at this time affected the determination of import prices.

Land deals intensify competition for scarce resources

Since the worldwide food price crisis of 2008, foreign investors have rushed to acquire large amounts of agricultural land in poorer countries. Some observers welcome this, claiming that outside investment in ostensibly underused land will jump-start local development. Others regard such investments as land grabs, stressing that the areas are rarely empty and that local people have little say. This brief identifies the types of land targeted by investors and reveals key socio-ecological patterns of such deals. The evidence indicates that foreign investments are intensifying competition for the best land. Ensuring that such deals instead contribute to sustainable, inclusive use of land requires strong public guidance and oversight.

Competition of the mechanisms : how Chinese home appliance firms coped with default risk of trade credit?

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms coped with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis claim that spot and integration are inferior to contracts, a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with the rebate on volume an against exclusive agent and its price level is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.

Approaches Regarding the Competition in Romanian Sugar Market

This paper proposes an economic instrument designed to assess the competitive nature of the sugar industry in Romania. In the first part of the paper is presented the theoretical background underlying index (HHI) and its calculation methodology. Then comes the results of a first application of this index for a total of 10 plants in the sugar industry, the robustness of these results is discussed. We believe HHI is a proactive tool that may prove useful competition authority, in its pursuit of continuous monitoring of various industries in the economy and in the internal decision-making on resource allocation institution (Peacock, and Prisecaru, 2013).The starting point of our research is to free competition in the European market with competitors much stronger than Romanian plants, plants that produce at a price lower than the domestic ones. In our study we will see if it is a concentration of production in factories around the strongest in Romania, concentration accompanied by the collapse of those who could not resist the market.The market concentration, competition policy, we will follow using the HHI index, for evaluation of impact analysis on existing trade, the number and size of competitors, protecting existing sales structures, avoiding disruptions in the competitive environment, etc.

Do European Union fines deter price-fixing? Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/04, May 2013

The issue: Anti-cartel enforcement is the least controversial of competition policy themes. Agreements to restrict competition such as price fixing or market sharing have obvious negative effects on welfare. Within the European Union, however, industry representatives have increasingly voiced concern that the European Commission applies a too-strict fining policy to enforce anti-cartel law, particularly since the introduction of new guidelines on fines in 2006. Fines are said to be too high, disproportionate and liable to introduce distortions into the market, ultimately leading to higher prices for consumers. It is often argued that more lenient approaches should be followed in crisis times. Policy challenge: High fines for cartel activity could entail costs for society and might be difficult to implement. Nevertheless, there is no case for reducing current levels of EU anti-cartel fines. Fine levels already take the economic crisis into account, and the net present value of fines might prove to be too low to discourage collusion. We estimate that fines might even be not high enough to offset the additional profits yielded by collusion. Fines should be complemented with other measures to increase deterrence, in particular personal sanctions targeting company officers who are responsible for leading the company to commit infringements. In the short term, pressure on decision makers could be increased by reducing the expected duration of investigations.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Resale price maintenance : economic theories and empirical evidence /

Mode of access: Internet.

Competition and collusion in electrical equipment markets : an economic assessment /

"July 1982."

Business under the new price laws; a study of the economic and legal problems arising out of the Robinson-Patman Act and the various fair trade and unfair practices laws,

"Table of cases": p. [441]-447.

Trade practice and price law, federal,

Includes index.

An evaluation of the impact upon productivity of ending resale price maintenance on books

Report prepared for the OFT by the Centre for Competition Policy at University of East Anglia. An examination of the ending of RPM aims to improve understanding of how competition interventions affect productivity, provide a methodological framework that could inform future evaluations and provide inputs to the ongoing debate about the effects of RPM.

Benefits from competition:some illustrative UK cases

This study provides a powerful demonstration of the real world impact of increasedcompetition. By presenting six market case studies drawn from a variety of sectors itgives evidence of the type and magnitude of the benefits following marketinterventions to develop competition and free up the operation of these sectors. In discussing the types and form such interventions take, whether competition policy,deregulation or liberalisation, this report explores market conditions before and afterintervention, paying careful attention to both the envisaged benefits and the potentialfor negative side effects. Overall, the evidence suggests these benefits materialised,and in a number of instances proved more sizeable than anticipated. Concerns aboutharmful side effects have proved unfounded, with market stimuli impacting not only onthe price and range of goods available but also acting as a motivating force to productand process innovation. As Professor Davies points out, although active competition policy proves an importantcomponent in the competitive process, it is not sufficient in its own right. In order todeliver greater productivity, of which competition is a key driver, the UK needs a pool of resourceful entrepreneurs able to exploit changing market conditions. In order togive these people the best chance of success the framework conditions need to becorrect with strength in the complementary capabilities of innovation, investment, skillsand enterprise. Ensuring the competition framework is world class is central to the DTI’s strategy. The most recent peer review of the UK competition regime demonstrates that the UK isa strong performer, ranked third in the 2004 study, with the US first and Germanysecond. This study provides further evidence of the important role played by thatframework in delivering tangible benefits to consumers.

Competition, agency and productivity

This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.