On the stability of the optimal value and the optimal set in optimization problems

The paper develops a stability theory for the optimal value and the optimal set mapping of optimization problems posed in a Banach space. The problems considered in this paper have an arbitrary number of inequality constraints involving lower semicontinuous (not necessarily convex) functions and one closed abstract constraint set. The considered perturbations lead to problems of the same type as the nominal one (with the same space of variables and the same number of constraints), where the abstract constraint set can also be perturbed. The spaces of functions involved in the problems (objective and constraints) are equipped with the metric of the uniform convergence on the bounded sets, meanwhile in the space of closed sets we consider, coherently, the Attouch-Wets topology. The paper examines, in a unified way, the lower and upper semicontinuity of the optimal value function, and the closedness, lower and upper semicontinuity (in the sense of Berge) of the optimal set mapping. This paper can be seen as a second part of the stability theory presented in [17], where we studied the stability of the feasible set mapping (completed here with the analysis of the Lipschitz-like property).

Vintage capital growth theory: three breakthroughs

Vintage capital growth models have been at the heart of growth theory in the 60s. This research line collapsed in the late 60s with the so-called embodiment controversy and the technical sophisitication of the vintage models. This paper analyzes the astonishing revival of this literature in the 90s. In particular, it outlines three methodological breakthroughs explaining this resurgence: a growth accounting revolution, taking advantage of the availability of new time series, an optimal control revolution allowing to safely study vintage capital optimal growth models, and a vintage human capital revolution, along with the rise of economic demography, accounting for the vintage structure of human capital similarly to physical capital age structuring. The related literature is surveyed.

Effects of brood manipulation costs on optimal sex allocation in social hymenoptera.

In eusocial Hymenoptera, queens and workers are in conflict over optimal sex allocation. Sex ratio theory, while generating predictions on the extent of this conflict under a wide range of conditions, has largely neglected the fact that worker control of investment almost certainly requires the manipulation of brood sex ratio. This manipulation is likely to incur costs, for example, if workers eliminate male larvae or rear more females as sexuals rather than workers. In this article, we present a model of sex ratio evolution under worker control that incorporates costs of brood manipulation. We assume cost to be a continuous, increasing function of the magnitude of sex ratio manipulation. We demonstrate that costs counterselect sex ratio biasing, which leads to less female-biased population sex ratios than expected on the basis of relatedness asymmetry. Furthermore, differently shaped cost functions lead to different equilibria of manipulation at the colony level. While linear and accelerating cost functions generate monomorphic equilibria, decelerating costs lead to a process of evolutionary branching and hence split sex ratios.

On optimal computation of MPLS label binding for multipoint-to-point connections

Most network operators have considered reducing Label Switched Routers (LSR) label spaces (i.e. the number of labels that can be used) as a means of simplifying management of underlaying Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and, hence, reducing operational expenditure (OPEX). This letter discusses the problem of reducing the label spaces in Multiprotocol Label Switched (MPLS) networks using label merging - better known as MultiPoint-to-Point (MP2P) connections. Because of its origins in IP, MP2P connections have been considered to have tree- shapes with Label Switched Paths (LSP) as branches. Due to this fact, previous works by many authors affirm that the problem of minimizing the label space using MP2P in MPLS - the Merging Problem - cannot be solved optimally with a polynomial algorithm (NP-complete), since it involves a hard- decision problem. However, in this letter, the Merging Problem is analyzed, from the perspective of MPLS, and it is deduced that tree-shapes in MP2P connections are irrelevant. By overriding this tree-shape consideration, it is possible to perform label merging in polynomial time. Based on how MPLS signaling works, this letter proposes an algorithm to compute the minimum number of labels using label merging: the Full Label Merging algorithm. As conclusion, we reclassify the Merging Problem as Polynomial-solvable, instead of NP-complete. In addition, simulation experiments confirm that without the tree-branch selection problem, more labels can be reduced

Advances in Sequence Analysis: Theory, Methods, Applications

This book gives a general view of sequence analysis, the statistical study of successions of states or events. It includes innovative contributions on life course studies, transitions into and out of employment, contemporaneous and historical careers, and political trajectories. The approach presented in this book is now central to the life-course perspective and the study of social processes more generally. This volume promotes the dialogue between approaches to sequence analysis that developed separately, within traditions contrasted in space and disciplines. It includes the latest developments in sequential concepts, coding, atypical datasets and time patterns, optimal matching and alternative algorithms, survey optimization, and visualization. Field studies include original sequential material related to parenting in 19th-century Belgium, higher education and work in Finland and Italy, family formation before and after German reunification, French Jews persecuted in occupied France, long-term trends in electoral participation, and regime democratization. Overall the book reassesses the classical uses of sequences and it promotes new ways of collecting, formatting, representing and processing them. The introduction provides basic sequential concepts and tools, as well as a history of the method. Chapters are presented in a way that is both accessible to the beginner and informative to the expert.

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Population density and optimal body size.

The population density of an organism is one of the main aspects of its environment, and shoud therefore strongly influence its adaptive strategy. The r/K theory, based on the logistic model, was developed to formalize this influence. K-selectioon is classically thought to favour large body sizes. This prediction, however, cannot be directly derived from the logistic model: some auxiliary hypotheses are therefor implicit. These are to be made explicit if the theory is to be tested. An alternative approach, based on the Euler-Lotka equation, shows that density itself is irrelevant, but that the relative effect of density on adult and juvenile features is crucial. For instance, increasing population will select for a smaller body size if the density affects mainly juvenile growth and/or survival. In this case, density shoud indeed favour large body sizes. The theory appears nevertheless inconsistent, since a probable consequence of increasing body size will be a decrease in the carrying capacity

Optimal estimation of two-qubit pure-state entanglement

We present optimal measuring strategies for an estimation of the entanglement of unknown two-qubit pure states and of the degree of mixing of unknown single-qubit mixed states, of which N identical copies are available. The most general measuring strategies are considered in both situations, to conclude in the first case that a local, although collective, measurement suffices to estimate entanglement, a nonlocal property, optimally.