Increasing Realism and Supporting Content Planning for Dynamic Scenes in a Mixed Reality System incorporating a Time-of-Flight Camera

For broadcasting purposes MIXED REALITY, the combination of real and virtual scene content, has become ubiquitous nowadays. Mixed Reality recording still requires expensive studio setups and is often limited to simple color keying. We present a system for Mixed Reality applications which uses depth keying and provides threedimensional mixing of real and artificial content. It features enhanced realism through automatic shadow computation which we consider a core issue to obtain realism and a convincing visual perception, besides the correct alignment of the two modalities and correct occlusion handling. Furthermore we present a possibility to support placement of virtual content in the scene. Core feature of our system is the incorporation of a TIME-OF-FLIGHT (TOF)-camera device. This device delivers real-time depth images of the environment at a reasonable resolution and quality. This camera is used to build a static environment model and it also allows correct handling of mutual occlusions between real and virtual content, shadow computation and enhanced content planning. The presented system is inexpensive, compact, mobile, flexible and provides convenient calibration procedures. Chroma-keying is replaced by depth-keying which is efficiently performed on the GRAPHICS PROCESSING UNIT (GPU) by the usage of an environment model and the current ToF-camera image. Automatic extraction and tracking of dynamic scene content is herewith performed and this information is used for planning and alignment of virtual content. An additional sustainable feature is that depth maps of the mixed content are available in real-time, which makes the approach suitable for future 3DTV productions. The presented paper gives an overview of the whole system approach including camera calibration, environment model generation, real-time keying and mixing of virtual and real content, shadowing for virtual content and dynamic object tracking for content planning.

The Usual Suspects: Jewish Magical Realism, Trauma and the Holocaust

Jewish magical realism is often associated immediately with the historical trauma of the Holocaust. This article sets out to point to some of the problems and limitations such an interpretive approach may bring. After a reconsideration of the allegedly inherent subversive qualities of the mode and a discussion of its frequent association with trauma narratives, especially in the case of Jewish texts engaging with the Holocaust, the discussion will focus on two examples, Michael Chabon’s The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier & Clay (2000) and Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything Is Illuminated (2002). The aim throughout is to caution against rashly reproducing familiar interpretive maneuvers, which may be in need of reassessment in face of recent fictions like the ones under discussion in this article.

Ontology and Realism about Modality

A philosopher who thinks substantive necessities obtain in re, this paper argues, need not believe in non-actual worlds, or maximal consistent sets of propositions, but merely in properties. For most properties, on even the sparsest property realism, are flanked by contraries with which they cannot be co-instantiated. True, Armstrong has shown that the impossibility that a property bearer should bear each of two contraries is sometimes just the impossibility that the bearer should be identical with its own proper part-hence is no substantive impossibility. But for many genuine contraries Armstrong's analysis fails; their incompatibility cannot be reduced to facts of identity. The main examples are dispositional properties, so the paper also argues that being dispositional is no bar to a property's being real in its own right.

Wright’s Version of Critical Realism

N. T. Wright’s research project “Christian Origins and the Question of God” is characterized by its use of the method of critical realism. Now, “critical realism” is a term that has been used in connection with different epistemo-logical positions because the term has been “constantly reinvented.” It is very easy to make up a term when one wants to distinguish oneself from an assumed naïve approach to reality. As has been observed earlier, the use of a distinct term does not necessarily mean the same if used by another author; the context is important. One has to track literal dependencies to evaluate whether continuity with former uses of a term is intended. That is to say, the term “critical realism” has proven to be equivocal, although this has rarely been noticed . This does not mean that taking such a critical realist stance cannot present a decisive advantage over rather unreflective approaches to whatever sort of reality. Nevertheless, philosophically it can probably only be a start. The purpose of this contribution to this compendium will be to analyze the content claims and the status of N. T. Wright’s critical realism in these regards, with a special emphasis on Paul and the Faithfulness of God, of course.

El concepto de persona en el comentario de las sentencias de Guillermo de Ockham

En un primer examen de las auctoritates Ockham formula un claro acercamiento al esquema aristotélico-boeciano y a la definición de persona como sustancia en cuanto suppositum intellectualis, definición que encuentra conveniente aplicar tanto a lo creado como a Dios. Comienza luego una discusión más próxima y contemporánea con los moderni, que está centrada, por un lado en Escoto para quien la persona se ha de definir a partir de la relación; y por otro, con santo Tomás de Aquino. “Persona", para el Aquinate, no significa una naturaleza común quidditas, ousía o sustancia segunda, por el contrario, indica al individuo: “esta carne y estos huesos" pero lo significa de un modo vago e indeterminado. Precisamente, éste es el punto que Ockham discute: qué denota esta significación indeterminada; le dedica a la cuestión un amplio análisis que lo conduce a equiparar los conceptos de naturaleza y de persona. En un paso subsiguiente Ockham propone examinar las personas in divinis: no es posible establecer in divinis ninguna diferencia o distinción; si se afirma en Dios la presencia de tres personas y de una sola naturaleza la adhesión se presta por la fe sin que medie un acercamiento racional al tema. El aparato conceptual y metafísico para abordar el problema de la persona en sede divina, ha pasado por la criba de un examen que concluye, para Ockham, en la verdadera imposibilidad de elaborar una teología trinitaria.

Building the View Graph of a Category by Exploiting Image Realism

We propose a weakly supervised method to arrange images of a given category based on the relative pose between the camera and the object in the scene. Relative poses are points on a sphere centered at the object in a given canonical pose, which we call object viewpoints. Our method builds a graph on this sphere by assigning images with similar viewpoint to the same node and by connecting nodes if they are related by a small rotation. The key idea is to exploit a large unlabeled dataset to validate the likelihood of dominant 3D planes of the object geometry. A number of 3D plane hypotheses are evaluated by applying small 3D rotations to each hypothesis and by measuring how well the deformed images match other images in the dataset. Correct hypotheses will result in deformed images that correspond to plausible views of the object, and thus will likely match well other images in the same category. The identified 3D planes are then used to compute affinities between images related by a change of viewpoint. We then use the affinities to build a view graph via a greedy method and the maximum spanning tree.

Reality bites: Documentary photography and architectural realism = Fragmentos de realidad: Fotografía documental y realismo en arquitectura

En el día de hoy nos enfrentamos a una serie de desafíos económicos, geopolíticos y ambientales que apuntan hacia una transformación profunda del mundo tal y como lo conocemos. La arquitectura esta – siempre lo ha estado – imbricada en todos estos problemas. En nuestra actual condición de recursos limitados e injusticia global surge la necesidad de superar la dicotomía entre progreso y tradición, entre innovación y preservación – la urgencia de redefinir incluso cada uno de estos términos. Los tipos de crisis que encaramos ahora no se resolverán con mas tecnología y más crecimiento – se necesita también una profunda reevaluación de nuestros sistemas de valores e incluso de nuestra sensibilidad. En este contexto, la humilde contribución de esta tesis consiste en proponer la idea de un realismo en arquitectura, entendido como una actitud progresista y atenta a lo que ya existe, dispuesta a abrir los ojos al presente, a las condiciones y los problemas reales que nos rodean. Pensando en esta idea, resulta evidente que si bien el realismo carece de una definición clara en el campo de la arquitectura hoy, cuenta sin embargo con numerosos precedentes parciales, entre ellos algunos de los más notorios episodios de la historia de la arquitectura reciente. Al intentar confeccionar una lista provisional de arquitectos realistas en el último siglo, otro hecho se nos presenta: muchos, por no decir todos estos arquitectos, comparten una fijación por la fotografía, bien apropiándose del trabajo de fotógrafos contemporáneos, bien tomando sus propias imágenes como una forma de mirar fuera de sus estudios e incorporar la realidad del medio construido a sus proyectos. Parece entonces lógico pensar que la arquitectura, como disciplina visual, ha acudido a otra disciplina visual en búsqueda de su propia respuesta al problema del realismo – dentro de este campo la fotografía reverbera con la arquitectura especialmente, ya que ambas son consideradas simultáneamente como practicas utilitarias y como parte de las bellas artes. Parece entonces lógico el organizar la investigación como una serie de casos, con la esperanza de que la acumulación de diversas instancias en las que la arquitectura ha acudido a la fotografía en su búsqueda de un realismo arrojara luz sobre las ideas más generales a debate. Por tanto, cada uno de los episodios en este texto se examina en sus propios términos, si bien una serie de interconexiones emergen a medida que el estudio procede con un suave orden cronológico. Hacia el final del texto cuestiones más grandes recobran protagonismo, a medida que las repercusiones políticas de nuestro estudio se hacen más patentes y comenzamos a interrogar las implicaciones contemporáneas y el potencial futuro de nuestra discusión sobre el realismo. ABSTRACT Today we are faced with a series of economic, geopolitical and environmental challenges that outline a deep transformation of the world as we know it. Architecture is – it has always been – ingrained in all of these problems. In our current condition of limited resources and global inequalities there is a necessity to overcome the dichotomy between progress and tradition, between innovation and preservation – an urgency to even redefine these terms altogether. The types of crises that we are facing will not be solved with more technology and more growth – a deep reevaluation of our systems of values and our sensibilities are also needed. In this context, the humble contribution of this text is to put forward the idea of an architectural realism, understood as an attitude that is both progressive and attentive to what is already in place, willing to open its eyes to the present and accept the real conditions and problems around us. In thinking about this prospect, it immediately becomes apparent that even if realism lacks a clear definition in the field of architecture today, there are numerous partial precedents for it, among them some of the most notorious episodes in the recent history of architecture. In crafting a tentative list of realist architects in the last century, another realization takes place: many, not to say all of these architects, have had a fixation with photography, either appropriating the work of contemporary photographers or taking photographs themselves as a way to look out their windows and bring the reality of the built environment into their practices. It seems then logical to think that architecture, as a visual discipline, has looked to other visual disciplines in search for its own take on the problem of realism – within this field, photography specially resonates with architecture, since both are regarded simultaneously as utilitarian practices and belonging to the fine arts. The idea then becomes to organize the research as a series of cases, with the hope that the accumulation of diverse instances in which architecture has approached photography in its realist drive will shed some light on the larger ideas at stake. Therefore, each of the episodes in this text is examined on its own terms, with a series of interconnections slowly emerging as our survey proceeds with a soft chronologic order. Towards the end of the study, larger issues regain relevance as the political repercussions of our inquiry become more pressing and we start to question the contemporary implications and future potentials of our discussion on realism.

Linguistic Knowledge of Reality: A Metaphysical Impossibility?

Reality contains information (significant) that becomes significances in the mind of the observer. Language is the human instrument to understand reality. But is it possible to attain this reality? Is there an absolute reality, as certain philosophical schools tell us? The reality that we perceive, is it just a fragmented reality of which we are part? The work that the authors present is an attempt to address this question from an epistemological, linguistic and logical-mathematical point of view.

Modernist Ecology: Modernism and the Reimagination of Nature

Countering the trend in contemporary ecocriticism to advance realism as an environmentally responsible mode of representation, this essay argues that the anti-realist aesthetics of literary modernism were implicitly “ecological.” In order to make this argument I distinguish between contemporary and modernist ecological culture (both of which I differentiate in turn from ecological science); while the former is concerned primarily with the practical reform characteristic of what we now call “environmentalism,” the latter demanded an all-encompassing reimagination of the relationship between humanity and nature. “Modernist ecology,” as I call it, attempted to envision this change, which would be ontological or metaphysical rather than simply social, through thematically and formally experimental works of art. Its radical vision, suggestive in some ways of today’s “deep” ecology, repudiated modern accounts of nature as a congeries of inert objects to be manipulated by a sovereign subject, and instead foregrounded the chiasmic intertexture of the subject/object relationship. In aesthetic modernism we encounter not “objective” nature, but “nature-being” – a blank substratum beneath the solid contours of what philosopher Kate Soper calls “lay nature” – the revelation of which shatters historical constructions of nature and alone allows for radical alternatives. This essay looks specifically at modernist ecology as it appears in the works of W. B. Yeats, D. H. Lawrence, and Samuel Beckett, detailing their attempts to envision revolutionary new ecologies, but also their struggles with the limited capacity of esoteric modernist art to effect significant ecological change on a collective level.

Aristotelian predicables, universality and realism: the logic of comparison in topics as denying the view that Aristotle was a realist

Aristotle is reportedly held to have been a Moderate Realist in that he would maintain that a concept derives from an act of grasping a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow inside of the many different things which the concept is predicated of. As far as a universal is independent of mind, it would stand for the proper object of a concept that subsumes a given number of things as its own instantiations. But we claim that Aristotle rejected such a view and instead did perceive and comprehend universality as a feature of thought rather than as a feature of reality in its own right. As showed in the chapters of Topics regarding the so-called logic of comparison (with the support of Albert the Great’s commentary), each predicate can be more or less consistent with the attribute of the subject of which it may be predicated. Both essential and accidental attributes assume a definite degree of being related to the degree of belonging to substance. Unlike particular things, the universality of a concept is to be understood always in comparison with another concept according to a hierarchy of predicates in terms of universality degree arranged by comparative terms such as ‘more’, ‘less’, and ‘likewise’. What is really mind-independent are the truth conditions which make a universal true when exclusively referring to a set of things identically meant by the same predicate whose universality is given by the place occupied in the hierarchy of predicates.