In a state of necessity. How has Orban changed Hungary. OSW Point of View Number 41, April 2014

Viktor Orban’s sweeping victory in the 2010 election ensured his party, Fidesz, a constitutional two-thirds majority in parliament. The party took over the rule of the country from the discredited political left when Hungary was plunged in political and economic crisis. Claiming that the circumstances were unusual and that it had a strong electoral mandate, Fidesz introduced radical changes in the country and thus challenged the previous economic and political order. These changes have led to an unprecedented concentration of power and provoked a discussion on the limits of democracy and the rule of law in the European Union. The state’s economic role has strengthened. The Orban government has been unable to overcome economic stagnation but it has managed to stabilise Hungary’s budget situation, which needs to deal with the high debt. Hungary’s relations with most partners in the EU and NATO have cooled due to controversial moves made by its government. As regards foreign policy and economic co-operation, Orban has granted high priority to the ‘Eastern opening’, where Russia has assumed the leading role.

The ENP in practice - the European Union's policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova one year after the publication of the Strategy Paper. OSW Point of View, June 2005

Clear qualitative changes have taken place in relations between the European Union and its Eastern neighbours over the past year. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been playing a significant part in the context of these changes. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, which are the countries interested in enhancing co-operation with the EU, the ENP has provided a formula that allows taking steps to implement this objective. The ENP has also contributed to "outlining an alternative" to Belarus' current self-isolation. However, the ENP has first of all given a clear message to Russia by specifying the EU's interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe. The ENP has clearly stated that the EU wants to build democracy and a free market in those countries, and has signalled that the European Union intends to discuss the issues concerning the countries directly with them, and not through Moscow's offices.

It's not (only) about Erika Steinbach. Three myths in the German discourse on the resettlements. OSW Point of View, August 2010

The activity of the Federation of Expellees and its chairperson Erika Steinbach, including efforts aimed at establishing the Centre Against Expulsions have been and will continue to be a source of controversy in Germany’s domestic policy, as well as in Polish–German and Czech–German relations. Steinbach has become a central figure in German inter-party conflicts and in disputes with the country’s immediate neighbours. In her efforts to gain more publicity for injustice and suffering in the German past she has resorted to controversial methods and has thus latched onto another stage in the historical debate on the consequences of World War II. This time it is related to and interpreted from the point of view of the German victims. The consequences of the present debate on how Germany suffered during the war do matter and will continue to matter both for Germany itself and for Germany’s relations with its near neighbours. Contrary to popular belief, the debate, still underway and in the shape imposed by Erika Steinbach, is likely to bring some benefit to Poland.

A new Visegrad Group in the new European Union - possibilities and opportunities for development. OSW Point of View, June 2003

The Visegrad Group has fulfilled the tasks it was set when established. It seems unjustified, therefore, to ponder the need for it to function further. However, it is advisable to lay out new tasks, suitable for the group's operation in the new European reality - following EU accession of Visegrad countries in May 2004.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Counter-reforms in times of prosperity. OSW Point of View, September 2006

In 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power after nearly a decade of the rule of the first Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. As prime minister, and later as a candidate for president, Putin announced that he would reform the state. The main assumptions of this reform were presented during a congress of the pro-Kremlin Unity movement, in Putin's address entitled 'Russia at the turn of the millennium' which was delivered on 29 December 1999, and later in a open letter to voters published on 25 February 2000. Both declarations were rather general, but they gave a clear picture of the principal directions of and priority areas for the future president's efforts: they outlined Russia's development path as pro-market and democratic. Nearly seven years have passed since Vladimir Putin came to power, a time for a summary of his achievements. In a way, Vladimir Putin has partially delivered on his initial declarations; indeed, Russia has undergone a deep transformation. However, when seen in the light of the president’s initial promises, the changes appear to be no more than 'counter-reforms', because instead of putting into practice the policy he outlined seven years ago, they have largely followed a different, if not entirely opposite direction.

Reintegration or Reconquest? Georgia's policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context of the internal and international situation. OSW Point of View, May 2008

The conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been Georgia's main security problem since the beginning of the 1990s, and, along with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have made up the main security problems in the South Caucasus.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

In Putin’s Shadow: Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. OSW Point of View, November 2011

Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency was an experiment carried out by the Russian ruling elite. Even though the new president has been a loyal member of the ruling camp, this decision involved certain risk that the extensive constitutional powers could eventually encourage the new president to seek emancipation, which could provoke internal conflicts and splits in the elite. This paper analyses Medvedev’s presidency and tries to answer the question why this scenario did not take place and why Medvedev failed to overcome the restrictions imposed on him at the start of his presidential term. The paper also presents the activation of certain social groups during Medvedev’s presidency and their calls for a new social contract with the government.

Jihad vs The New Great Game: Paradoxes of militant Islamic threats in Central Asia. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), January 2010

Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations. The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Turkey and the Kurdish problem; new approaches in the face of the Middle East crises. Point of View No. 30, February 2013

From the Introduction. For almost a hundred years (since World War I and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire) stability – or rather, the permanent threat to stability – has been a key challenge for the Middle East. One of the central elements of this threat has been the so-called Kurdish problem, that is, the issues that continually arise between the states of the region and the Kurdish minority living in the area, as well as the tensions among the individual states caused by a range of issues related to local Kurds. The country most affected by the Kurdish problem is Turkey.

A weak link? Germany in the Euro-Atlantic security system. OSW Point of View Number 47, January 2015

The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.