Fixing the Student Loan Mess

A Montana Public Radio Commentary by Evan Barrett. Published newspaper columns written by Evan Barrett on this topic, which vary somewhat in content from this commentary, appeared in the following publications: Havre Daily News, June, 11, 2014 Montana Standard, June 12, 2014 Missoulian, June 13, 2014

Economic Loan Loss Provision and Expected Loss

The intention of a loan loss provision is the anticipation of the loan's expected losses by adjusting the book value of the loan. Furthermore, this loan loss provision has to be compared to the expected loss according to Basel II and, in the case of a difference, liable equity has to be adjusted. This however assumes that the loan loss provision and the expected loss are based on a similar economic rationale, which is only valid conditionally in current loan loss provisioning methods according to IFRS. Therefore, differences between loan loss provisions and expected losses should only result from different approaches regarding the parameter estimation within each model and not due to different assumptions regarding the outcome of the model. The provisioning and accounting model developed in this paper overcomes the before-mentioned shortcomings and is consistent with an economic rationale of expected losses. Additionally, this model is based on a close-to-market valuation of the loan that is in favor of the basic idea of IFRS. Suggestions for changes in current accounting and capital requirement rules are provided.

Democratization and Financial Reform in Taiwan: The Political Economy of Bad-Loan Creation

This study shows that many bad loans now burdening Taiwan's financial institutions are interrelated with the society's democratization which started in the late 1980s. Democratization made the local factions and business groups more independent from the Kuomintang government. They acquired more political influence than under the authoritarian regime. These changes induced them to manage their owned financial institutions more arbitrarily and to intervene more frequently in the state-affiliated financial institutions. Moreover they interfered in financial reform and compelled the government to allow many more new banks than it had originally planned. As a result the financial system became more competitive and the qualities of loans deteriorated. Some local factions and business groups exacerbated the situation by establishing banks in order to funnel funds to themselves, sometimes illegally. Thus many bad loans were created as the side effect of democratization.

Nonlinear dynamics in discretionary accruals: An analysis of bank loan-loss provisions

Several studies have analyzed discretionary accruals to address earnings-smoothing behaviors in the banking industry. We argue that the characteristic link between accruals and earnings may be nonlinear, since both the incentives to manipulate income and the practical way to do so depend partially on the relative size of earnings. Given a sample of 15,268 US banks over the period 1996–2011, the main results in this paper suggest that, depending on the size of earnings, bank managers tend to engage in earnings-decreasing strategies when earnings are negative (“big-bath”), use earnings-increasing strategies when earnings are positive, and use provisions as a smoothing device when earnings are positive and substantial (“cookie-jar” accounting). This evidence, which cannot be explained by the earnings-smoothing hypothesis, is consistent with the compensation theory. Neglecting nonlinear patterns in the econometric modeling of these accruals may lead to misleading conclusions regarding the characteristic strategies used in earnings management.