Histoire physique, naturelle, et politique de Madagascar / par Alfred Grandidier.

v.27:pt.1 [Myriapodes] (1902) Text

Histoire physique, naturelle, et politique de Madagascar / par Alfred Grandidier.

v.27:pt.2 [Myriapodes] (1902) Text

New land mollusks from Madagascar and Mexico.

v.44:no.3(1961)

A floral and faunal inventory of the Réserve spéciale d'Anjanaharibe-Sud, Madagascar : with reference to elevational variation / Steven M. Goodman, editor.

n.s. no.90(1998)

Histoire physique, naturelle, et politique de Madagascar / par Alfred Grandidier.

v. 23

A floral and faunal inventory of the Parc national de Marojejy, Madagascar : with reference to elevational variation / Steven M. Goodman, editor.

n.s. no.97(2000)

The birds of southeastern Madagascar / Steven M. Goodman ... [et al.].

n.s. no.87(1997)

A floral and faunal inventory of the Réserve Naturelle Intégrale d'Andohahela, Madagascar : with reference to elevational variation / Steven M. Goodman, editor.

n.s. no.94(1999)

A Floral and faunal inventory of the eastern slopes of the Réserve naturelle intégrale d'Andringitra, Madagascar : with reference to elevational variation / Steven M. Goodman, editor.

n.s. no.85(1996)

Nuclear Weapons as Symbols. The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making

Throughout history, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons. This understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country’s identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Main purpose of this paper is to explore on the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. Many studies on the normative understanding of nuclear weapons consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as ‘nuclear taboo’, as a major factor in preventing their acquisition and use. Other studies acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as the ‘nuclear myth’, when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, such as a state’s identity, self-image, and its desired position in the international system. With 180 odd countries in the world abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 8 countries in possession of them (with two further countries assumed to have pursued their acquisition), one might consider the dominance of the nuclear taboo over the nuclear myth to be the rule. The core question is thus why and how this relationship reversed in the case of defectors.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Raising the Level of Moral Thinking among Managers Will Not Help. Kohlberg's Conventionality and Systemic Ethical Flaws in Business

Business ethicists often assume that unethical behavior arises when individuals deviate from the norms and responsibilities that are institutionalized to frame economic activities. People's greed motivates them to violate the rules of the game. In Kohlberg's terms, it is assumed that such actors make decisions in a preconventional way and act opportunistically. In this article, we propose an alternative interpretation of deviant behavior, arguing that such behavior does not result from a lack of conventional moral guidance but rather from the fact that characteristics attributed to preconventional morality by Kohlberg - the purely incentive and punishment driven opportunistic morality - have become the conventionalized morality. The prevailing norms that economic actors have internalized as their yardstick are those of the preconventional Homo economicus. Not the deviation from, but the compliance with the rules of the game explains many forms of harmful and illegal decisions made in corporations.

Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals

In many moral hazard problems, the principal evaluates the agent's performance based on signals which the agent may suppress and replace with counterfeits. This form of fraud may affect the design of optimal contracts drastically, leading to complete market failure in extreme cases. I show that in optimal contracts, the principal deters all fraud, and does so by two complementary mechanisms. First, the principal punishes signals that are suspicious, i.e. appear counterfeit. Second, the principal is lenient on bad signals that the agent could suppress, but does not.