Effect of the acoustic impedance in ultrasonic emitter transducers using digital modulations

In an underwater environment it is difficult to implement solutions for wireless communications. The existing technologies using electromagnetic waves or lasers are not very efficient due to the large attenuation in the aquatic environment. Ultrasound reveals a lower attenuation, and thus has been used in underwater long-distance communications. The much slower speed of acoustic propagation in water (about 1500 m/s) compared with that of electromagnetic and optical waves, is another limiting factor for efficient communication and networking. For high data-rates and real-time applications it is necessary to use frequencies in the MHz range, allowing communication distances of hundreds of meters with a delay of milliseconds. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to develop ultrasound transducers able to work at high frequencies and wideband, with suitable responses to digital modulations. This work shows how the acoustic impedance influences the performance of an ultrasonic emitter transducer when digital modulations are used and operating at frequencies between 100 kHz and 1 MHz. The study includes a Finite Element Method (FEM) and a MATLAB/Simulink simulation with an experimental validation to evaluate two types of piezoelectric materials: one based on ceramics (high acoustic impedance) with a resonance design and the other based in polymer (low acoustic impedance) designed to optimize the performance when digital modulations are used. The transducers performance for Binary Amplitude Shift Keying (BASK), On-Off Keying (OOK), Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) and Binary Frequency Shift Keying (BFSK) modulations with a 1 MHz carrier at 125 kbps baud rate are compared.

stochastic method for automated matching of horizons across a fault in 3D seismic data

Seismic analysis, horizon matching, fault tracking, marked point process,stochastic annealing

Wideband impedance spectrum analyzer with arbitry fine frequency resolution for in situ sensor applications

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2009

Management of XML data by means of schema matching

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2010

Disposable, micro-fluidic biosensor array for online analysis of adherent cells activity combining quartz crystal resonators and impedance measurement techniques

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2011

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

NAVA enhances tidal volume and diaphragmatic electro-myographic activity matching: a Range90 analysis of supply and demand.

Neurally adjusted ventilatory assist (NAVA) is a ventilation assist mode that delivers pressure in proportionality to electrical activity of the diaphragm (Eadi). Compared to pressure support ventilation (PS), it improves patient-ventilator synchrony and should allow a better expression of patient's intrinsic respiratory variability. We hypothesize that NAVA provides better matching in ventilator tidal volume (Vt) to patients inspiratory demand. 22 patients with acute respiratory failure, ventilated with PS were included in the study. A comparative study was carried out between PS and NAVA, with NAVA gain ensuring the same peak airway pressure as PS. Robust coefficients of variation (CVR) for Eadi and Vt were compared for each mode. The integral of Eadi (ʃEadi) was used to represent patient's inspiratory demand. To evaluate tidal volume and patient's demand matching, Range90 = 5-95 % range of the Vt/ʃEadi ratio was calculated, to normalize and compare differences in demand within and between patients and modes. In this study, peak Eadi and ʃEadi are correlated with median correlation of coefficients, R > 0.95. Median ʃEadi, Vt, neural inspiratory time (Ti_ ( Neural )), inspiratory time (Ti) and peak inspiratory pressure (PIP) were similar in PS and NAVA. However, it was found that individual patients have higher or smaller ʃEadi, Vt, Ti_ ( Neural ), Ti and PIP. CVR analysis showed greater Vt variability for NAVA (p < 0.005). Range90 was lower for NAVA than PS for 21 of 22 patients. NAVA provided better matching of Vt to ʃEadi for 21 of 22 patients, and provided greater variability Vt. These results were achieved regardless of differences in ventilatory demand (Eadi) between patients and modes.

Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-Marital Investments with Assortative Matching

We study the incentive to invest to improve marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria in models with deterministic returns, and a unique equilibrium exists under reasonable conditions. Equilibrium investment is efficient when the sexes are symmetric. However, when there is any asymmetry, including an unbalanced sex ratio, investments are generically excessive. For example, if there is an excess of boys, then there is parental over-investment in boys and under-investment in girls, and total investment will be excessive.