Termos singulares, transcategoriais e Summa Genera na lógica de Aristóteles

Quais termos são suscetíveis de operações silogísticas? Para importantes intérpretes da lógica aristotélica - especialmente Ross, Patzig e Lukasiewicz - a resposta tende a introduzir um único e homogêneo grupo de termos, aqueles de generalidade intermediária (τὰ µεταξὺ). Fundamentada basicamente na classificação tripartite de entes que aparece no capítulo 27 de Primeiros Analíticos I, essa opinião atribui à silogística a exclusão de (i) termos singulares (como "Sócrates" e "este homem"), (ii) transcategoriais (como "ente" e "um"), bem como dos chamados (iii) summa genera ("substância", "qualidade", "quantidade", etc.). Em nossa opinião, esses resultados não derivam dos textos de Aristóteles, mas de leituras, traduções e interpretações impróprias das passagens centrais da discussão. Neste artigo, faremos um novo exame desses textos, a fim de mostrar que Aristóteles jamais afastou de sua lógica os tipos de termos que os intérpretes não hesitam em excluir da silogística. Assim, esperamos reintroduzir termos singulares, transcategoriais e summa genera, no domínio da silogística aristotélica.

Dos modelos de interpretación: la indeterminación de la traducción en quine y el argumento modelo teorético de Putnam

Las tesis de la indeterminación de Quine establecen que las condiciones de verdad de una oración sub-determinan la referencia de los términos que ocurren en la misma. La cuestión es ¿cuál es el alcance de esa sub-determinación? En Reason, Truth and History Putnam señala que la su-determinación es mayor de lo que podría suponerse a partir de los argumentos de Quine y se propone, con su "argumento modelo teorético", prolongar radicalmenteestos resultados. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que el argumento modelo teorético de Putnam no es una mera prolongación de los resultados de Quine, sino que se trata de un argumento que supone un modelo de interpretación distinto del que subyace al argumento de este último. Si estoy en lo cierto, tendríamos en este caso dos modos de entender la interpretación y dependerá de qué modo la entendamos, el alcance que le demos a la sub-determinación de la referencia por los valores veritativos. Considero, por lo tanto, que el argumento de Putnam, si bien radicaliza las conclusiones de Quine, lo hace introduciendo un modelo de interpretación diferente al que es desarrollado en Word and Object.

As leis da natureza e os casos de Tooley

Os objetivos deste artigo são: (1) apresentar quatro teorias com relação à natureza das leis naturais, (2) mostrar que apenas uma delas é capaz de responder satisfatoriamente aos Casos de Tooley e (3) indicar por que tais casos são relevantes para a nossa ontologia. Estes objetivos são importantes, pois o conceito de "lei natural" é utilizado em muitos, se não todos, os domínios das ciências e em muitos domínios da filosofia; e, se tais casos forem possíveis, eles serão situações que precisariam ser adequadamente descritas. Se uma e apenas uma teoria puder descrever tais casos adequadamente, haverá fortes razões para preferir tal teoria frente às outras.

The notion of process in nonstandard theory and in Whiteheadian metaphysics

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of A.N. Whitehead's philosophy of organism and especially his epochal theory of time, as mainly exposed in his well-known work Process and Reality, can serve in clarify the underlying assumptions that shape nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also as metatheories of quantum mechanics. Concerning the latter issue, I point to an already significant research on nonstandard versions of quantum mechanics; two of these approaches are chosen to be critically presented in relation to the scope of this work. The main point of the paper is that, insofar as we can refer a nonstandard mathematical entity to a kind of axiomatical formalization essentially 'codifying' an underlying mental process indescribable as such by analytic means, we can possibly apply certain principles of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme focused on the key notion of process which is generally conceived as the becoming of actual entities. This is done in the sense of a unifying approach to provide an interpretation of nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also, in their metatheoretical status, as a formalization of the empirical-experimental context of quantum mechanics.

Carnap and Kuhn on linguistic frameworks and scientific revolutions

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction.

A puzzle for philosophers

In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.

Caution and necessity

In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. (1) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, (2) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude.

Innatismo y control genético

Mi objetivo en este artículo es defender una elucidación reduccionista parcial del concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. En primer lugar, especifico las condiciones mínimas para una elucidación de lo innato. En segundo lugar, presento los principales enfoques que se han adoptado en la discusión, es decir, las propuestas reduccionistas, autonomistas y escépticas. Luego de ofrecer argumentos versus el escepticismo y las propuestas autonomistas, presento en detalle lo que considero es una elucidación parcial de lo innato en términos de control genético, mostrando cómo un concepto de la biología del desarrollo puede ser provechosamente utilizado para elucidar el concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. Por último, explicito las ventajas filosóficas de mi propuesta.

El efecto knobe: asimetrías en la atribuición de intencionalidad y sus causas

En este artículo proponemos una explicación novedosa del efecto Knobe. El efecto Knobe es una asimetría peculiar en la atribución de intencionalidad a un agente con relación a los efectos colaterales previstos de su acción, dependiendo sólo de la valoración moral del efecto y sin que nada más cambie en la situación juzgada: los efectos colaterales malos, pero no los buenos, se consideran intencionalmente producidos. Nos enfocamos aquí en la pregunta por la explicación de esa peculiar asimetría ¿basta la valencia moral del efecto colateral para explicarla? Hacemos un análisis sistemático de una gran variedad de viñetas presentes en los estudios experimentales y de sus resultados. Intentamos así aislar los factores explicativos. Proponemos que la asimetría se explica por concordancia o discordancia entre la valencia moral del efecto colateral y la actitud moral del agente, juzgada por los espectadores.